Daily Report

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Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani Officials Meet

NC0501151094 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] SNARK reported that the deputy prime ministers of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, Vigen Chitechyan, Avtandil Margiani, and Abbas Abbasov, are meeting today at the Red Bridge on the Georgian-Azerbaijani border.

Gagik Guliashvilli, the head of the Georgian [word indistinct] Department, told SNARK's reporter that the leaders of Georgia's Gardabanskiy and Marneulskiy Rayons and Azerbaijan's Kazakhskiy Rayon will also take part in the meeting.

It is assumed that the subject of the talks is protecting the gas pipeline entering Armenia.

The Armenian Government Press Service reported that no gas has entered Armenia since the last days of December.

Deputy Premiers Meet Russian Commander

NC0501162794 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] SNARK reported that the Georgian and Armenian Deputy Prime Ministers Avtandil Margiani and Vigen Chitechyan met in Tbilisi yesterday with the commander of the Russian troops in Transcaucasia, Lieutenant-General Fedor Reut, his deputy, and the chief of Staff [of the Russian troops in Transcaucasia], Major General Yuri (Bavoyevskiy).

SNARK's reporter received this information from reliable sources close to the headquarters of the Russian troops.

According to our information, the meeting discussed issues concerning the security of transport routes and energy lines entering Armenia.

Proceedings of Central Asian Parliaments Reported

PM0501162494 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition p 6

[Vladimir Berezovskiy report: "In Turkestan's Parliaments"]

[Text] Tashkent—The parliaments of the three Central Asian republics completed their work on New Year's Eve.

The Turkmenistan Assembly, without procrastination, ratified the recent agreements with Moscow on mutual guarding of the border, the status of Russian servicemen, migration and defense of migrants' rights, and dual citizenship. President Saparmurat Niyazov stressed that the institution of dual citizenship cannot be considered a concession to the 400,000 Russians living in the republic alone. The agreement is also extremely beneficial to Russia's 700,000 Turkmens.

There were around 40 questions on the Tajik parliament's agenda. Premier A. Abdulladzhanov resigned. Political circles in the republic think that the head of government has resigned under pressure from the incontrovertible evidence of corruption among and embezzlement of public funds by his entourage. The new premier is 44-year old Abduzhalil Samatov, the former vice premier. He is known as an experienced contemporary economist and the successful head of a commercial firm.

Head of state I. Rakhmonov's speech at the session was the crucial one. He admitted that the Pamir economy is on the verge of catastrophe. Civil war has cost the republic too dear. Over 400 enterprises have been looted and destroyed and whole sectors paralyzed. Around 300 major plants, factories, sovkhozes, and kolkhozes are on the brink of bankruptcy.

The present Uzbekistan Supreme Council has probably met for its last session. By unanimously adopting the law on elections to the new legislative organ—the oliy madzhlis—the parliamentarians signed their own sentence.

President Islam Karimov addressed the session and regrettably once again returned to the idea that Russians living in the republic cannot be granted dual citizenship owing to their possibly interfering in internal affairs and the danger of "lessening the patriotic spirit."

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 6 Jan

LD0601064394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0533 GMT 6 Jan 94

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA gives the findings of an opinion poll on popularity of Russian political figures. According to the poll, taken throughout 1993 on the initiative of the newspaper's editorial board and the VP Public Opinion Study Service, the final list of more than 100 most influential politicians of Russia in 1993 is headed by President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. The newspaper also carries chronology of all most significant dates and events in Russia in the past year.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on Russia's military doctrine and reforming of the country's armed forces:

"As far as the development of the country's armed forces is concerned, the year 1994 will be notable for the fact that the country already has available a practically complete 'military package' of laws, right up to basic military regulations.

"The 'basic provisions of a military doctrine of the Russian Federation', adopted at the end of last year, make the work on the development of the armed forces still more conscious politically, militarily, economically and from the viewpoint of military technology.

"However, all that does not at all mean that the new parliament will have nothing to do in the field of military legislation. On the contrary, rather. Life brings forth new and new tasks aimed at fostering a sense of patriotism in Russian people, pride for one's native land, and readiness to defend it. We must maintain and enhance the defence capability of the state and the combat readiness of the army".

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an interview with President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, who dwelt in detail on Kazakhstan-Russia relations and their role in the rallying of other sovereign CIS countries.

Having pointed out in particular that "unity is the way to the prosperity of Russia and Kazakhstan", Nazarbayev explained that "strategically Kazakhstan should be in alliance with Russia. Both Kazakhstan and russia now need each other".

Noting the multi-ethnicity of his country, Nazarbayev said this is why "sovereign Kazakhstan is responsible for the equality of other nations".

TRUD runs an interview with Arkady Volsky, one of the leaders of the Civic Union, who, upon having recognised the setback suffered by the bloc at the December 12 elections in Russia, nevertheless pointed out that "the Civic Union representatives in the State Duma are intent on constructive work".

"We are prepared to back any realistic and welllfounded bills aimed at promoting real reforms that are of benefit to all people in Russia," Volsky said.

Touching upon a possible participation of representatives of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, headed by him, in the work of the Russian Government, Volsky said "We are redy to join the government but, naturally, such a government in which our philosophy of reforms without 'shock' and unnecessary social by- effects would be shared. We are ready for the most resolute steps towards reforms but according to the principle: Measure seven times and cut off once".

PRAVDA on U.S. President Bill Clinton's forthcoming tour (beginning on January 8) of a number of European countries, including Russia and Belarus:

"The busy schedule of the U.S. President's European tour is believed to demonstrate the activeness of U.S. foreign policy and Washington's leadership in the post-Cold-War period."

The tour "does not promise to be simple and easy. In the changing world, American claims to leadership are in need of continuous backing by specific deeds or new ideas capable of taking the fancy of allies and partners. So far, there are not so many such ideas in the new administration's foreign-policy bag".

On the eve of Christmas, celebrated in Russia on January 7, all today's newspapers carry articles calling on people to do good and show tolerance in the country's present-day difficult situation, relate the history of the holiday, its peculiarities and traditions.

Program Set for Clinton Visit to Moscow

LD0601095794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0904 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Yuriy Romantsov]

[Text] New York January 6 TASS—Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov who participated in the bilateral American- Russian political consultations in Washington, said the following on Thursday [6 January] in an interview with ITAR-TASS after their end.

"Our discussions," the deputy minister said, "were comprehensive and successful in all respects. Naturally, we concentrated on the programme of President Clinton's visit to Russia on the eve of the Russian-American summit to be held in Moscow between January 12 and 15."

According to Mamedov, the programme was agreed on all key issues. It can be said with certainty, he added, that preparations for the summit are progressing successfully.

Mamedov noted that the sides would focus on social and economic issues at the Moscow meeting and talks: progress of reforms in Russia and the economic situation in the world.

They will also discuss peace-making efforts, above all in such regions as Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The two sides attach much importance to strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

This issue will occupy an important place on the agenda. As for Russia, it discusses this question both with Americans and other countries.

The summit programme also includes bilateral relations: environmental control, air service, etc.

Zhirinovskiy Says Clinton 'Scared' to Meet Him

LD0601113894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1044 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Shchelkovo (Moscow Oblast, central Russia), 6 Oct [date as received] (ITAR-TASS)—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), who received the card of a State Duma deputy in this city near Moscow today, assured those present that "the election campaign was honest" and that his party did not receive financial aid from any companies.

Elected to the parliament in the 114th single-seat constituency in Shchelkovo, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy was today approved by members of the district election commission as deputy, and the local adminstration congratulated him. The commission's chairman assured those assembled that although some people questioned the results of the elections, there are no grounds to speak about abuse during the elections. According to him, for instance, a suit had been filed with judicial bodies to declare the results of the elections in the 114th district invalid.

As usual, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy vigorously "beat off" Russian and foreign journalists who were still interested in the problem of financing the LDPR's election campaign and the results of his foreign tour. "Nobody gave us anything, it is all lies," he said and added that the campaign was conducted at the expense of "money orders from Russian citizens." "Not a single mafia grouping, economic structure, bank, or political organization gave us a kopeck," the LDPR leader claimed.

At the same time, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy did not deny that he accepts foreign currency from foreign journalists for his interviews. "There is a long line and those who want to jump it have to pay," he said.

He tried to play down the consequences of the scandal caused by his pronouncements in Bulgaria and Germany's refusal to grant him an entry visa. "[Bulgarian President] Zhelyu Zhelev was frightened by something, but all is now sorted out." According to him there was "an outburst of conflicting opinions in Germany," but now "everything has calmed down too, and the minister of foreign affairs is prepared to receive me."

According to Zhirinovskiy, he is being invited "to Austria, Spain, France, and Norway."

Questions regarding U.S. President Bill Clinton's refusal to meet the leader of the victorious party during his forthcoming visit to Moscow brought an especially emotional response. "I am ready, but he is scared—and so much the worse for him," Vladimir Zhirinovskiy stated. "Shame on such a president, let him go on playing his saxophone at home and not come here at all." "You in the west are all scared of the new, honest, and brave politician emerging in Russia," the LDPR leader added.

Answering the ITAR-TASS correspondent's question, Zhirinovskiy reported that leaders of the four largest factions in parliament have reached an agreement in principle on the candidature of the future speaker . "He will be a representative of a small neutral faction and his four deputies will be representatives of the four largest factions," Zhirinovskiy specified.

Filatov Meets U.S. Senators Nunn, Lugar

LD0501203694 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Report by V. Skvortsov; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Sergey Filatov, head of the presidential administration today met U.S. senators.

Democratic Senator Sam Nunn and republican Senator Richard Lugar represent those of America's political forces that support President Clinton's course toward large-scale economic cooperation with Russia. It is they who drew up the law on financial and technical assistance to Russia and the CIS countries in carrying through conversion and elimination of nuclear weapons.

Today the conversation was about the new Russian Parliament and how its work and interaction with the president will be organized.

Filatov said that the line-up of forces has already been determined. Now work with the factions is underway and questions of personnel and the agenda are being determined. The election results and the progress of reforms in Russia, plus questions of security, disarmament, and development of cooperation, will also be at the center of attention at the forthcoming meeting of the presidents of the two countries in Moscow next week.

Grachev Holds Talks With Senators Nunn, Lugar

Concerned Over DPRK

LD0501173294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has voiced concern over North Korea's possible withdrawal from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty [NPT]. Meeting U.S. senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Wednesday [5 January], he said that the step by the North Korean leadership could deteriorate the situation not only on the Korean Peninsula, but the world over.

Pyongyang declared its intention to withdraw from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in March 1993. Grachev said Russia favors further inter-Korean dialogue. The minister described as counterproductive the possibility to impose international sanctions against North Korea. The problem should not be tackled with hastiness. He believes it is necessary to consider the possible political and military implications that could follow the sanctions, as well as to ask for China's opinion on the issue, since the country has very close contacts with North Korea.

The minister has said that Russia stands for a balanced approach to the issue. He also believes that the international impact on Pyongyang should be aimed at drawing North Korea to rejoin the treaty, not at expanding its isolation. The development of the North Korean-U.S. talks, he believes, could be an effective means of influence. Russia and China could also influence Pyongyang.

Comments on NATO

LD0501175194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Russia's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev told American senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar on Wednesday [5 January] that he favored broader cooperation with NATO. He noted, however, that NATO's concept - partnership for peace - should take into account the interests of all states, not only the NATO members.

Grachev believes that this concept should apply not only to NATO, but also to the all-European security system and said that Russia was ready to develop cooperation with NATO on the basis of the following principles: the development of general political contacts, coordination of positions, and practical and coordinated actions.

Commenting on the basic principles of Russia's military doctrine at the senators' request, Grachev stated that this document was political rather than military, and that the renunciation of the principle not to use nuclear weapons first puts it on a par with similar documents on other nuclear powers.

Russia views nuclear weapons as a deterrent, not as a means of warfare, he said. He noted in this connection that the commitment not to use nuclear weapons first was at variance with this assumption.

He expressed the opinion that this commitment had not been taken seriously by the west. It was viewed simply as a propaganda statement undermining the former Soviet Union's military policy, said Grachev. He remarked, however, that the former Soviet Union had no plans to deal preemptive nuclear blows on any country.

Says Ukraine Virtually Nuclear Power

LD0501180394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has said that Ukraine was, to all intents and purposes, a nuclear state since its parliament had virtually not ratified the strategic arms reduction treaty (START-1).

In late 1993 the Ukrainian parliament ratified the Start-1 treaty, but with reservations which changed its essence.

Meeting in Moscow Wednesday well-known political leaders, U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, the Russian Minister said that presence of nuclear arms on the territory of Ukraine would be discussed at the Moscow summit January 12 between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his U.S. counterpart Bill Clinton.

Grachev believes taking part in the summit will be Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk who will give a certain impetus to the possible solution.

Nuclear weapons, believes the Minister, cannot be a subject of bargaining. This is dangerous, said Grachev.

He said he has a hot line with U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin.

Grachev has said on Wednesday, at 16:00 he intends to discuss with his U.S. counterpart acute security problems.

More on Talks

PM0601094394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Mikhail Pogorelyy report: "Russia Ready for Cooperation"]

[Text] Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian defense minister, received U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, who are visiting Russia, 5 January. During the conversation they touched on the state of and prospects for Russian-U.S. military cooperation. The increase in the intensity of ties in this sphere is indicated by the fact that last year there were 17 major events related to establishing cooperation between the two states' armed forces and another 26 are scheduled for the coming year.

At the U.S. senators' request Army Gen. Pavel Grachev told them about the features of Russia's new military doctrine. In particular he stressed that it is no coincidence that there is no reference in the "Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine" to Russia not being the first to use nuclear weapons. First, the corresponding U.S., British, and French documents contain no such provision. Second, such a pledge on our part did not enable nuclear weapons to be regarded as a means of averting war and a factor for deterring a potential aggressor.

The Russian defense minister described Russia's attitude to the "Partnership for Peace" idea mooted by the United States by saying the following: "We are ready to support the idea insofar as it considers the security interests of all states without exception" and if it is based on an all-Europe rather than a bloc system of security. As we see it, Pavel Grachev pointed out, true partnership means developing political dialogue, regular consultations, and reaching agreed positions, and this activity may culminate in coordinated practical actions. Russia is ready for that kind of cooperation.

During the meeting they also discussed questions of cooperation in nuclear disarmament and housing construction for servicemen, in particular servicemen from the troops being withdrawn from Germany and the Baltic states. There was also a detailed discussion of Ukrainian and North Korean nuclear policy and Russia's view of these problems.

Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces; Andrey Kokoshin, Russian first deputy defense minister; and, on the U.S. side, Thomas Pickering, U.S. ambassador to Russia, took part in the conversation.

It is somewhat symbolic that on the same day the Russian and U.S. defense ministers had their first conversation over the direct telephone line connecting the offices of the heads of the two countries' military departments. Henceforth it will be easier and quicker to resolve urgent "burning" problems. Another step has been taken toward developing military cooperation.

Grachev, Aspin Discuss Cooperation, NATO

LD0501185494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1755 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Jan—A telephone conversation took place this evening between Russian Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev and U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. An agreement on setting up a telephone hotline between the two countries' defense ministers in order to hold consultations and exchange opinions on defense and security issues was reached last September during the official visit of the Russian minister to the United States.

Yelena Agapova, the Russian defense minister's aide responsible for public and press relations, told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that in their telephone conversation the defense ministers discussed a number of military-political issues of mutual interest. More specifically, they exchanged views on the prospects of bilateral cooperation in the military-political sphere and agreed on a number of issues concerning the preparations for the Russian-American command and staff exercise of peacemaking troops, scheduled to be held in the summer of 1994 in the Privolzhskiy Military District.

At Les Aspin's request, Pavel Grachev set out his point of view on questions of the possible expansion of NATO. "We support a path which would lead to a truly all-European security system," the Russian minister said. "We believe that security and international stability should be inseparable and be backed up by all-European structures." Regarding the question of military cooperation between Russia and NATO, Pavel Grachev noted that today it is being implemented on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This includes questions of peacekeeping activity, within the framework of which the possibility is being discussed of preparing for and carrying out joint peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations and the CSCE and training military cadres to take part in peacekeeping operations.

"It is our hope that the 'partnership for peace' concept, proposed by the United States, will not lead to a broadening of NATO detrimental to Russia's interests, but will help to strengthen stability in Europe," Pavel Grachev stressed.

Yeltsin Orders Support for Russia-U.S. Enterprise Fund

PM0501163394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition p 5

["Directive of the Russian Federation President on Measures To Assist the Activity of the Russia-U.S. Enterprise Fund," signed by President B. Yeltsin, and dated 27 December 1993, No. 783-rp]

[Text] In connection with the creation of the Russia-U.S. Enterprise Fund (hereafter—the Fund), whose aim is to assist the development of private business in Russia:

1. The Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government is to offer the Fund every help in its activity.

2. The Russian State Committee for the Management of State Property is charged with coordinating work to assist the Fund's activity, liaising with the Russian Ministry of Finance and the Russian State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support of the New Economic Structures.

3. The Russian State Committee for the Management of State Property is to resolve the question of granting the Fund premises on lease terms in the city of Moscow and in one city in the Far East region (to be suggested by the Fund) as official premises.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] 27 December 1993, No. 783-rp

Dutch Firm's Financing Zhirinovskiy Viewed

PM0601112994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[Article by Vladimir Smirnov, deputy chief of the Central Bank of Russia Main Administration for Currency Regulation and Currency Control, followed by editorial comment: "Bank of Russia Agrees With Charges against GMM But Does Not Agree It Is Not Taking Steps"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA 24 December published items by two of its correspondents, Yu. Kovalenko and M. Berger, devoted to the Dutch company GMM [Global Money Management Trust]. Since Mikhail Berger focused his attention on the activity of this company, or to be more precise its office in Moscow, and also voiced a negative opinion of the Central Bank on this issue, I should like to answer this correspondent.

The office of the Dutch trust company "Trust Financial Services BV" is registered in Moscow. Under Russian legislation the offices of foreign firms are not corporate bodies and do not have the right to engage in commercial (economic) activity.

Thus, by taking money from citizens and corporate bodies, whether it was in rubles or hard currency, GMM twice violated Russian legislation. The first time when it embarked on commercial activity while it only had the status of an office. And the second time when it began operations involving money, which is only permitted to banks, while GMM is not a bank.

By calling its operations trust operations GMM is operating in a legislative vacuum since there is no law on trust in Russia and the company is very well aware of the fact. Trust operations presuppose that the owners of temporarily free money and securities entrust their management to trust companies with a view to deriving a profit. At the same time in the absence of a law on trust in Russia we have an adequate institutional basis for conducting operations involving the financial resources of corporate bodies and the population. That includes primarily banks and investment funds and in this connection GMM's maxim to the effect that it is introducing a new type of service onto the money market and we are not accepting it is unfounded.

And it is a very great pity that M. Berger, who has quite a good understanding of economics, should seem to be vindicating GMM's piratical actions when he speaks of "the incomprehensibility of Russian legislation, which allows an ambiguous interpretation of obvious things." It is true that he does not explain what obvious things and ambiguous interpretation he means.

Now about the fact that in M. Berger's opinion GMM is deeply "obligated to the Central Bank, which is not reacting in any way to the invasion of a foreign company onto the Russian financial market."

I ask to be forgiven for being obliged to say banal things but every public statement, particularly in the press, should be based on a knowledge of the facts. And the facts are that in late November I and administration chief Ye. Ivanov had a conversation with A. Liozner [name as transliterated], GMM's Moscow representative. He was informed of the illegal nature of the office's activity in attracting money in connection with the fact that it has no banking license and he was asked to halt this activity immediately or, if the office wanted to continue it, to start work on the creation of a bank.

On 23 December GMM was sent a letter from our main administration in which the company was once more asked to dissolve the contracts concluded with Russian Federation residents and stop advertizing for funds from Russian residents.

And another thing—about advertizing. In IZVESTIYA 12 November this year [as published] in an article entitled "Panama-3" M. Berger together with V. Kornev wrote in particular of their colleagues who are advertizing illegal activity: "...we are deeply convinced that newspapers and television companies which advertize the activity of firms with no legal right to undertake this activity should share the responsibility toward people who may be misled with their aid. Our esteemed colleagues, ask for your advertizers' licenses if they want, for instance, to take citizens' investments or vouchers. If they do not have the necessary documents, refuse this source of revenue." And they also wrote: "Esteemed colleagues, advertising is something more specific than bank notes. For this reason it can smell, sometimes very badly."

I absolutely agree but what about similar advertizing in IZVESTIYA? I should like to draw Mikhail Lvovich's attention to the advertisement of the "LEND" joint-stock company, slightly below and to the left of his article on GMM in the 24 December issue, in which the company promises first to take rubles from its client, then to convert them into currency, and to transfer the currency from a Swiss bank to anywhere in the world. Usually "LEND" offers an interest rate of 36 percent per annum (see IZVESTIYA 25 December, for instance) without the right to work with money. Examples of similar advertizing in IZVESTIYA could be continued but I hope the editorial office itself will discover the "harmful" advertizing and draw the necessary conclusions.

And for the future we are prepared for constructive cooperation with the newspaper since we can see mutual interest in it. [Smirnov ends]

From the editorial office: We are pleased that our assessments of GMM's activity in RUssia coincides with what the Central Bank of Russia thinks of it. But we want to draw attention to the fact that the outcome of similar thinking in the editorial office and the state institution can be fundamentally different. In the newspaper that outcome is a newspaper article, at the Central Bank it involves actions which accord with the situation.

Obviously it is important to explain to the lawbreakers that they are breaking the law. It is good that the currency regulation administration has done this twice: first verbally and then in writing. But what next? Even before the Russian Ministry of Finances had tried to explain to GMM

that the company was operating illegally. But if the lawbreaker, despite a large amount of explanatory work, continues his fruitful illegal activity, collecting money from credulous or reckless citizens, then who should take steps? Should it not be the Central Bank?

Yes, we accept the rebukes over the publication of advertizing by dubious financial organizations, including LEND, of the illegality of whose actions Vladimir Smirnov kindly informs us. But under the law we are not obliged to check the authenticity of information supplied by the advertizer. To refuse such advertizing is a matter for our good will. While the Central Bank simply has to react immediately and effectively to the emergence of illegal banks and other gathers of money. But unfortunately practice shows that the Central Bank is either reluctant or unable to protect Russians from illegal "plowmen" in the russian money field. That is borne out by the experience of the successful illegal banking activity of the "Russkiy Dom Seleng," GMM, and others.

Proceeding from this premise we insist that GMM and other similar companies which have already appeared and perhaps intend to develop their activity should be eternally thankful to the Central Bank for its total inability to offer any resistance to the illegal financiers.

France, FRG Concerned at Zhirinovskiy's Plans To Visit

PM0601115594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Reports by Yuriy Kovalenko in Paris and Yevgeniy Bovkun in Bonn under general heading: "Neither France Nor Germany Wants To Let Zhirinovskiy In"]

[Text] Paris—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's intention to visit France in February and to meet with its state and party leaders has thrown the latter into some confusion.

Some time ago Vladimir Volfovich came to Paris, where Eduard Limonov, who was great friends with him at the time, organized for Zhirinovskiy a warm meeting with Jean-Marie Le Pen, head of the extreme right-wing National Front, and also a news conference attended by two French journalists and four Russian ones.

In the opinion of certain commentators, the French have no formal grounds for refusing the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] chairman a visa.

Zhirinovskiy, who claims that the LDP is closer in its views to the ruling Rally for the Republic party than to the National Front, would like to meet with Jacques Chirac, chairman of the Rally for the Republic and mayor of Paris. "I am against such a meeting, which will lend legality to someone who openly espouses fascist views," Pierre Lelouch, National Assembly deputy and Chirac's foreign policy adviser, declared in this regard.

A number of French public organizations have already come out against Zhirinovskiy's visit. The official position was expounded most clearly by Alain Lamassoure, minister for European affairs. France, he said, cannot tolerate the statements which the LDP chairman has made concerning Bulgaria, the Romanian people, Finland, Turkey, and other countries. It is perfectly clear, the minister emphasized, that unless he changes his position, we will hardly be able to receive him in France. Foreign Minister Alain Juppe is of the same opinion.

This warning from Paris, however, does not seem to have had any effect. To all appearances, Vladimir Volfovich has energetically begun making travel arrangements. One of the stages in his preparations was an interview with a woman presenter for France's TF-1 television station against a backdrop of the Kremlin. (Incidentally, the Western press writes that Zhirinovskiy is now demanding $300 for a five-minute newspaper interview and many times more for a television one. At least, he asked one U.S. station for 60,000 "greenbacks").

The LDP chairman intimidated people with the war which will break out in Russia if events develop as before, and with wars in general—from India to Serbia. He announced that Chernomyrdin will be replaced as premier in March—no, not by Zhirinovskiy but by a more neutral figure. He behaved aggressively—which can hardly have pleased the French.

Bonn—After Zhirinovskiy promised to "remove" an official of the FRG Consular Service in Sofia, declaring that he is still backed by the KGB and its best secret agents in Bulgaria, even those German mass media which reacted comparatively restrainedly to the previous threats against Germany by the "lawyer's son" (to arrange a second Chernobyl or send back the Russian troops being withdrawn from Germany) took an interest in him.

Even if Zhirinovskiy receives a diplomatic passport as a parliamentarian, a government spokesman emphasized, this will not mean he has the right of free entry to Germany, and he will in any case have to apply for a visa.

Along with seven people accompanying him, Zhirinovskiy was intending to spend 18 days in Germany and indicated as the purpose of the visit participation in a "European conference" supposedly to be held in Berlin. But all attempts by official establishments and journalists to find the organizers of this conference were in vain.

Nor was it possible to establish which firm had invited him to Berlin. The name which Zhirinovskiy himself indicated in the appropriate column of the form could equally well have applied to at least 20 very diverse enterprises.

LPDR, Orthodox Church Official View Yugoslav Events

AU0501160494 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 24 Dec 93 pp 15-17

[Interview with Stanislav Mikhaylovich Zhebrovskiy, founder of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, LPDR; Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Vengerovskiy, head of the LPDR's intelligence-security service; and Vsevold Gaplyn, head of the Department of Foreign Church Affairs of Aleksey II, patriarch of the Russian Christian Orthodox Church, by Vlado Vurusic in Moscow; date

not given: "The Two-Headed Russian Eagle Will Soon Spread Its Wings Over the Balkans!"]

[Text] Not far from the center of Moscow, at No. 1 Ribnjikova Lane, amid digging and mud, in the attic above the hard-rock shop where, behind its protective iron bars, you can buy black leather jackets, black T-shirts, and all the things the hard rock and heavy metal fans desire, there are the offices of the winners of the recent elections in Russia, that is, the representatives of the LPDR, led by the controversial and politically unpredictable Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy.

A man sits among sheets of paper scattered all around the table and shabby couch in a narrow room with a view of a fire-devastated building. He is a close confidant and personal friend of Zhirinovskiy's, one of the founders of the party, the editor of the party bulletin, which has a bizarre name: "Zhirinovskiy's Justice" (and the minister of finances of the party's shadow cabinet. Zhirinovskiy has already proposed to Chernomyrdin, current Russian prime minister, that he take this man into his cabinet and give him the same portfolio.) The man we are talking about is Stanislav Mikhaylovich Zhebrovskiy!

A large map of the former Soviet Union hangs on the wall, with white-blue party flags designating the places where Zhirinovskiy won.

It is conspicuous that the most convincing victories were deep in the Russian provinces, in smaller industrial townships, in which the political economic giants used to prosper in the communist era, while now most of them are going to rack and ruin or are overwhelmed by losses.

The newspapers that support the democratic parties in Russia claim that, like Zhirinovskiy, Zhebrovskiy is of Jewish origin, although he is a greater Russian nationalist.

[Vurusic] Mr. Zhebrovskiy, although it seemed that you were the one who won the elections, some papers have reported that in the new parliament, that is in the Federation Council and Duma, the greatest number of seats will be occupied by the pro-Yeltsin Russia's Choice.

[Zhebrovsky] It is all nonsense, and the futile expectations of our so-called democrats. These elections were for party lists and individuals. Our party list won the greatest number of votes. And it did so quite convincingly, indeed! The Russian people did not want to vote for the repulsive and detestable Russia's Choice. As far as I know, only 8 percent of the electorate voted for that party list. However, Russia's Choice played a trick on the voters in the case of some lists, representing its candidates as independents. If it had been known that they were the candidates of Russia's Choice, the Russian people would have rejected them with loathing. For our people, it is like waving a red rag in front of a bull when you mention Russia's Choice. I witnessed an incident in Podolsk, when the people almost beat up the Russia's Choice candidate at its campaign rally. That is the real state of affairs.

[Vurusic] Foreign policy issues are an important part of your platform. You have put forward some new proposals for settling the crisis in former Yugoslavia, but it seems you support the Serbian side, in fact.

[Zhebrovsky] We support the Slav side!

[Vurusic] Croats are Slavs, too.

[Zhebrovskiy] All right, but you have Muslims there as well. In the region of former Yugoslavia we support the Slav, Christian-Orthodox side in the war, that is the Serbs. We are paying great attention, with a great deal of concern and anxiety indeed, to the way the Muslim ideology is breaking into Europe. They have been trying to conquer Europe for a long time and in various ways. For that reason one has to be extremely cautious. In our opinion, religion plays the most important role in that war. Muslims are the greatest danger to Europe. They are using you to establish their domination. Christianity must not allow that!

[Vurusic] Although the official election results have not come in yet, you have already received Vojislav Seselj's telegram from Belgrade congratulating you on your victory, while the representatives of your party also visited him in Belgrade....

[Zhebrovskiy] I have not seen that telegram yet, and there is nothing I can tell you about it. Still, Zhirinovskiy was in Belgrade, and, as far as I know, he did meet Seselj....

[Vurusic] Your party is called a pro-fascist party, and some people claim you are maintaining contact with your European counterparts. You said yourself that you had contacts with Seselj's Radical Party, which is openly pro-fascist....

[Zhebrovskiy] Come on, what kind of fascists are we? You have swallowed the propaganda bait of our so-called democrats, who are nothing but neo-bolsheviks. They are ready to do anything to stay in power. They are in a panic that they might lose it. They have brought such a powerful country as Russia to its knees, and now they are allowing the Americans to exploit it for miserable amounts of money in return. We want to see Russia on its feet again, in all its grandeur and beauty. Therefore they are afraid of us, and are trying to blacken us by calling us fascists, chauvinists, racists, and anti-Semites. They are even ready to trigger a civil war! Do you know how far they are going? They are even lying to our President Boris Yeltsin, and blocking his actions. They are constantly misinforming him, because the television is in their hands, and they prevent anyone telling President Yeltsin what the real state of affairs is. They are now in a terrible panic, because they are afraid of Yeltsin's personally meeting someone who will tell him the truth straight to his face, without reluctance. That man is Zhirinovskiy!

[Vurusic] To return to the subject of former Yugoslavia, and your attitude toward the international initiatives to end the war....

[Zhebrovskiy] We are against that war, and I think that Yugoslavia is the first drill-ground where the method of crushing and partitioning a state organized according to the national-territorial principle has been tested. We are against such a state organization. The best way to organize a state is on the territorial principle, not the national

principle. Cultural autonomy—yes, but no state should allow national-territorial autonomy! There cannot exist several states in one state. For instance, we support the idea that in Russia the question of national affiliation should be completely abolished. We do not ask our members about their national affiliation. Foreign journalists are always surprised when we say that we are not able to throw light on the national structure of the Liberal Democratic Party, because we simply do not ask anybody about it. What some people want to see happening on the larger scale, in Russia, is already happening in Yugoslavia, on a smaller scale. We also have Christian and Muslim factors here, and those people want to make them collide.

[Vurusic] Still, it seems that you see the greatest danger in the Muslims....

[Zhebrovskiy] Look at what is happening near Russia, on its southern borders. Turkey claims millions of square kilometers of regions which were under Russian jurisdiction for many centuries and which have become independent states by some treacherous miracle. Turkish expansionism wants Azerbaijan, Armenia, the greatest part of our Central Asian regions. Turkish expansionism also involves the region of former Yugoslavia, however, and the bells may soon toll for Bulgaria as well. We think that such a young religion as Islam—which is radical and impatient—is the greatest danger. A young religion is just like a young man: ungovernable and assertive. Christianity is like a mature man: wise and restrained. We are divided by 700 years. Just remember early Christianity: wars, crusades, inquisition.... Such things do not exist any more. Therefore the Muslims are sending their followers to wage wars....

[Vurusic] How do you view the Muslim state in Bosnia-Herzegovina today?

[Zhebrovskiy] It must not be allowed. Your Muslims are largely assisted by the Arab and other Islamic countries with weapons and oil, while those countries even represent Bosnia-Herzegovina in various international organs. If there were no such and similar aid, there would be far fewer problems in the region, and they would be easily solved.

[Vurusic] Quite probably, because there would be nothing the Muslims could fight with.

[Zhebrovskiy] It seems as though you did not understand what the Muslims want. I also find the behavior of the West quite incomprehensible. Look what the greatest Western cities are turning into! Mosques are mushrooming in all the cities where the Western Christian culture was conceived. There is the smell of roast mutton everywhere on the streets. Just look at Munich, Berlin, Amsterdam. By the turn of the century the number of Muslims in Paris will have exceeded the number of Frenchmen. Where is this leading? One should look at the future. I ask you: Who will then be considered a foreigner by whom? A Frenchman by an Arab, or an Arab by a Frenchman? The West does not understand what is happening in former Yugoslavia. The Western culture is absolutely different from the Eastern culture.

[Vurusic] Then, are you still in favor or the Serbs' retaining the occupied territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia?

[Zhebrovskiy] The most important thing is that peace is established there, and that blood is no longer shed. In order to accomplish that, however, perhaps one will have to implement some violent measures. It is better to destroy the source of evil now than let it spread and develop.

[Vurusic] Who and what do you think is that evil you are talking about?

[Zhebrovskiy] I will not discuss the details. It is politics we are discussing now! It is not pursued by giving interviews. It involves lengthy negotiations, compromises, persuasion, interests. We should go for peace, for cooperation. Not all the people are able to understand everything that can happen. And in large part it is already happening in former Yugoslavia. When two cultures meet, the later one starts to feel stronger, or at least capable of imposing itself on the other. If that problem is not settled, the war will last at least another 30 years: You have a lot of mountains there, the peoples are bellicose, and weapons will be coming in.

[Vurusic] Are you an anti-Muslim racist, in view of what you have just said?

[Zhebrovskiy] Of course I am not! I am just warning of the danger, but I am not calling for a war against them. Besides, until recently I did not even know that our party has many Muslim members. When public opinion started denouncing us, alleging that we are anti-Muslim racists, our Muslim members felt the need to say publicly that it was not true.

[Vurusic] In a recent interview for Radio Hamburg, Zhirinovskiy said that there could be another Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, but this time Russia would drop the bombs. How does that fit in with the appeals for peace and cooperation you called for after the elections?

[Zhebrovskiy] I was not present when that interview was given, so I am not able to explain what the statement actually means. I have been present during many of Zhirinovskiy's appearances, but I have never heard him say anything like that. However, we first have to see the context in which that statement was made. Perhaps it was taken out of context. Perhaps he was asked what he would do if Japan attacked us. We have to check what was said before and after that statement. Nevertheless, in this case I dare say it is a pure lie.

[Vurusic] It is said that your party is sending volunteers to Iraq, to help Saddam Husayn, as well as to Serbia....

[Zhebrovskiy] That is yet another piece of misinformation. No member of ours has ever been sent by our party to volunteer there.

[Vurusic] Still, there are Russians fighting on the side of the Serbs....

[Zhebrovskiy] We have never sent anybody there.

[Vurusic] Would you send the Russian Army to intervene in former Yugoslavia?

[Zhebrovskiy] Zhirinovskiy's statement is clear: Not a single Russian soldier will fight in a foreign country any longer. We shall withdraw our army from all the countries where its troops have been stationed.

[Vurusic] How do you assess the fact that most of the Russian soldiers serving with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] in Croatia voted for your party?

[Zhebrovskiy] They have understood that our party will help to make it possible for them to leave that region as soon as possible.

[Vurusic] Does that mean that you will officially demand that Russia withdraw its UNPROFOR troops from Croatia?

[Zhebrovskiy] We shall make public our attitude in that respect very soon, and propose it to all the major states in the world. One has to make radical changes in the approach to the Yugoslav crisis. One ought finally to tell the truth about what is happening there!

[Vurusic] What is the truth?

[Zhebrovskiy] The nationalistic games, plundering of assets, and geopolitical games of Germany, America, and Arabia. Many people will feel quite uncomfortable when we put forward our proposal, both in the East and the West. You can expect our proposal to come soon.

Vengerovskiy: When We Won, Panic Broke Out in the World!

[Vurusic] I am sitting in the foyer of the office usually occupied by Zhirinovskiy. After his celebratory news conference he took a vacation and left Moscow, refusing interviews and public appearances, and surrendering a part of his unexpected fame to his closest aides and veterans, who are ironically referred to by Moscow's democratic circles as "veterans of Moscow's stinking beer-cellars," an allusion to Munich's beer-cellars from where Adolph Hitler set out into the world of politics.

I am waiting to be received by the second most important man of the party, Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Vengerovskiy, head of the party's intelligence-security service, whom Zhirinovskiy intends to propose to President Yeltsin as prime minister of the Russian Government.

On the wall behind Vengerovskiy, right above his head, hangs the map of Russia as conceived by Zhirinovskiy: From Finland to Alaska, while the prominent detail on the map is an eagle, holding in his beak a banner reading Freedom and Law, which is, according to Vengerovskiy, the goal of the party's policy. Right at the beginning of the interview he feels it necessary to say that the war in former Yugoslavia is not the most important thing in the world. Russian citizens have many severe problems, and their greatest priority now is to solve them. Besides, he says, he does not conceal his former membership in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and, unlike many other people, he neither kept his membership card hidden nor did he burn it. Therefore the first question is whether he feels sorry that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist.

[Vengerovskiy] I feel sorry that Soviet Union disintegrated. We were the only party in Russia that condemned that act. I think that from that moment on Russia has been going downhill, and given our success in the elections, Russia and the Russian people have been given a chance to change the situation.

[Vurusic] Do you think that Russia today does not occupy the place it deserves on the international political stage?

[Vengerovskiy] Of course I do! What was the Soviet Union before? An important political factor, a superpower, while now it is a giant on its knees. Because of the policy that has been pursued so far Russia has become a state of second-rate importance. In Russia the death rate is higher than the birth rate! We are a state without international borders. Our historical borders are now thousands of kilometers away from Russia, although borders, according to the Helsinki document, are irrevocable.

[Vurusic] Do you understand the former Soviet Union as Russia?

[Vengerovskiy] And what do you think it was? The Soviet Union was founded on the territory of the Russian Empire, some peoples were given national autonomy, and look now—they are independent states! Russia has been left without access to sea, without large harbors. We have slid back into medieval Russia. Do you think that is normal? Of course it is not! Therefore we want to restore dignity and esteem to our fatherland, and to make it take the place again that belongs to it in the world.

[Vurusic] Does this mean you want the Russia represented by the map above your armchair, including Finland, Poland, and Alaska?

[Vengerovskiy] That is Russia in its best and most famous days. We are in favor of having neighborly relations with all countries, but we shall demand the revocation of aid and the privileged status in the sphere of economic relations that was bestowed on those former Soviet republics whose policy we find unsatisfactory. Of course, we shall elaborate the program of aid and privileges for other countries, as well as regulations the disregarding of which might lead to revocation of those privileges. This means that our attitude toward those republics will depend on their behavior. These are normal relations in international foreign policy.

[Vurusic] What will your contribution to Russian foreign policy be?

[Vengerovskiy] It will be as large as possible! Earlier, Russia's word used to count, its opinion was important, and it was fully taken into account in international relations. We shall do all we can to make things like that again. You see, as soon as we won, journalists from all over the world flocked to Moscow, because panic broke out in the world. That panic means that from now on the world will be paying more attention to Russia's opinion. Let me paraphrase Earnest Hemingway: "When the bell tolls, perhaps it tolls for you!"

[Vurusic] I have to ask you a question regarding the war in Yugoslavia, particularly because you support the Serbian side....

[Vengerovskiy] We usually find out what has been happening in former Yugoslavia from our members who have been there. Personally, I have been best informed by the author Edward Lymonov. You know from history that our Slav brothers, Serbs and Montenegrins, have always been close to us! We are bound together historically. We also know that Croats are Slavs as well. But the Serbs are much closer to us, because they are Christian-Orthodox. We have defended them many times. What is happening in former Yugoslavia right now is absolutely abnormal! It is a religious war! Let us say "No!" to all your nation states! We do not want Russia to be founded on the national principle. Let Yugoslavia be founded, as was Russia before, or as the United States is now, on the principle of states [gubernija].

Vsevold Gaplyn: In the Russian Christian-Orthodox Church We Have Monarchists, and Even Communists!

[Vurusic] In the last few years, after decades of the Soviet authorities, the Russian Christian Orthodox Church has started to reassume the place it had for many centuries. Many churches were demolished, most of the clergy were expelled, and believers were imprisoned. Even the very top of the Russian Christian Orthodox Church was controlled by the almighty KGB.

On the eve of the recent bloody events in the Russian Parliament, the Russian Christian Orthodox Church and its patriarch, Aleksey II, were mediators in the negotiations between the conflicting factions.

The mediating mission failed, which, as is said, was taken quite badly among church officials. They even consider that the church has missed a chance to win the political and religious place in Russian society it had at the time of the empire, when Orthodoxy was recognized as the official state religion.

Although church officials deny it, the Russian Christian Orthodox Church exerts significant influence on the politics of other Christian Orthodox churches, so that after the outbreak of war in former Yugoslavia, several meetings took place between Pavle, patriarch of the Serbian Christian-Orthodox Church, and Patriarch Aleksey II.

In Danilovskiy monastery, which dates from the 13th century and is now the home of the Department of Foreign Church Affairs of the Patriarch of Russian Christian Orthodox Church, we are talking with father Vsevold Gaplyn, head of inter-church cooperation and relations with international organizations.

Danilovskiy monastery was nationalized right after the revolution in 1917, and until 1983, when it was given back to the church, it had been a prison for the children of political prisoners.

What is the role of the Russian Christian Orthodox Church today, given the changed political conditions?

[Gaplyn] The church wants to act in a pacifying way, and our main task is the salvation of human souls. If people are suffering, the church has to protect them and take care of them. If people are living well, and in compliance with the laws of God, then church-state relations will also be good. You are aware of the recent tragic events, caused by the political crisis in society and in the relations between the former parliament and President Yeltsin. In that situation we tried to play a peacekeeping role, and at one moment it appeared to us that our mission would be successful, but unfortunately, human malice and mutual intolerance, as well as destructive and murderous instincts were stronge, and brought about tragic events. Regardless of such an outcome, however, the Russian Christian Orthodox Church will always support peace, and strive for it. Our authority in society is great and indisputable, and for that reason we are becoming a desirable ally of many political forces. The church, however, is above politics, it is above political conflicts. It cannot be otherwise, because the church itself involves monarchists, and even communists.

[Vurusic] Regarding the war that is going on in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, many people maintain, even some in Russia, that it is a religious war, because its warring factions are Catholic, Muslim, and Christian Orthodox....

[Gaplyn] As far as I know, the highest officials of the Serbian Christian Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church reject any notion that a religious war is being waged in former Yugoslavia. In their letters and addresses to believers both Cardinal Kuharic and Patriarch Pavle are interceding for peace. We in the Russian Orthodox Church also think that the roots and reasons for that terrible war in former Yugoslavia are of political origin, rather than religious. As for the relations between the Russian and Serbian Orthodox Churches, I have to underline that they are very close and brotherly, because the language of our service is the same. The Russian church completely supports the Serbian church in this war. We are very happy to see that the representatives of the Serbian church are cooperating and making efforts to find the path of peace together with the officials of the Catholic Church in Croatia!

[Vurusic] The Serbs often boast about their Orthodox brotherhood with Russians and Russia, considering it their great protector, no matter what they do. Do you think that such boasting might sometimes damage the Russian Orthodox Church's reputation?

[Gaplyn] Our relationship with the Serbian people is brotherly. We understand their hopes and expectations. Still, that brotherhood must not be understood as support for conduct that opposes Christian morality and peace efforts.

[Vurusic] The Serbian church happens to be in the center of yet another problem. That is the demand that the Macedonian and Montenegrin Orthodox Churches be independent, and have their own patriarch....

[Gaplyn] From the point of view of ordinary Christian Orthodoxy, there is no such thing as an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church! No such thing is recognized by any of the existing orthodox churches in the world. In that point the Russian church supports its

Serbian counterpart. I think that the question of the independence of a particular church structure cannot be solved by overthrowing the economic structure of the church, as has happened in Macedonia, or in Ukraine. As for the Montenegrin situation, I see no reason for the Montenegrins to have church independence at all!

[Vurusic] A considerable number of orthodox believers live in Croatia, so there are even suggestions that a sort of Croatian orthodox church should be founded. What would be the Russian Orthodox Church's reaction to that?

[Gaplyn] I am not familiar with such suggestions. Nevertheless, it would be the following: There are church parishes, and they are administratively connected. Since certain Croatian parishes are economically linked to the Serbian church and Patriarch Pavle, it is logical that the Serbian church's opinion should be taken into account. Only with its permission could a part of its territorial property be given a certain degree of independence.

[Vurusic] Do you have any contact with Cardinal Kuharic, and the representatives of the Captol [site of cathedral] in Zagreb?

[Gaplyn] No, we do not, but we would like to have contact with Cardinal Kuharic, and the Zagreb Captol, so that we could obtain more information. Some time ago I met the representatives of the Croatian Protestant Church in Barcelona. It was a very instructive and interesting conversation. We found a common language also in our desire to see peace in your country as soon as possible.

[Vurusic] What are your relations with the Vatican today?

[Gaplyn] Somehow in 1988 and 1989 relations with the Vatican worsened. At that time Catholic evangelism started in Russia, and the missionaries did not always behave properly. As we see it, they did not always act in compliance with our mutual vocation on earth, they did not always behave in accordance with their laws. They did not take account of our Russian pride, our tradition and culture, but just this year it appears that relations with the Vatican have started to improve.

Relief Aid To Be Given to Former Yugoslavia

LD0501214894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1616 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others]

[Text] Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has signed a decision which says that Russia will provide relief aid estimated at 100 Mn rubles for former Yugoslavia. Hard currency expenditures associated with the relief aid baby food and medicines are not specified.

The aid will be handed over to Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), as well as to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This will be done to maintain the prestige of the Russian Federation and the international community's efforts in providing aid to the population of the former Yugoslavia

Russia Reinforces Blue Helmets on Croatian Border

LD0601110394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1038 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—305 Russian paratroopers with weapons and equipment left late on Wednesday [5 January] to reinforce the Russian battalion of "blue helmets" ensuring peace on the border between Krajina Serb and Croatia.

It is for the first time that the Russian peace-keepers will be armed with mortars, anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft weapons. Earlier the Russian soldiers had only firearms with them.

The service of the Russian airborne troops told TASS on Thursday that the paratroopers were dispatched upon a request of the commander of the UN peace-keeping forces in former Yugoslavia and with the knowledge of the UN Security Council.

It added that it is hard for the current strength of the Russian battalion to fulfil its mission on the border between Krajina Serb and Croatia. The zone monitored by the Russian force is 100 kilometres long and 30 kilometres wide and has 24 checkpoints.

Both Croats and Serbs regularly violate ceasefire there.

The train with paratroopers is expected to arrive in place on January 9.

Yeltsin Meets CIS Executive Secretary

LD0501165394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1210 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today met CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya, who stopped over in Moscow en route to China.

According to information received from the Presidential Press Service, the sides have discussed prospects for implementing the agreements and documents signed during the CIS summit in Ashgabat.

President Yeltsin expressed satisfaction with the creative tendencies appearing within the Commonwealth, with the growing understanding of the need and inevitability of integrational processes.

As chairman of the CIS Heads of State Council, Yeltsin stressed the importance of stepping up the formation of a full-blooded and effective economic union and of strengthening collective security.

The sides also discussed some organisational measures, intended to consolidate the Commonwealth of Independent States, to enhance its authority on the international arena.

Further on Yeltsin-Korotchenya Talks

LD0501212594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] On Wednesday [5 January] in the Kremlin, Russian President Boris Yeltsin received Ivan Korotchenya, the CIS Executive Secretary.

INTERFAX has learned that during their 40-minute conversation they discussed concrete issues aimed at the strengthening and development of the Commonwealth. They noted that by joint efforts they would manage to overcome crisis phenomena and the prolonged strip of failures in economic development experienced by majority of countries.

During the meeting they paid great attention to the problems of the Economic union. In particular, they pointed out that there was still no legal basis for this union. The participants of the talks stressed the necessity to speed up formation of payment union in the multi-currency system and parallel initializing of important documents to create a free trade regime.

Korotchenya asked Yeltsin, who will chair the CIS in the first half of 1994, to set forth proposals concerning creation of inter-state structures to ensure activity of the economic union.

Yeltsin and Korotchenya also discussed issues related to practical implementation of the Collective Security Treaty.

On the eve of this meeting Korotchenya sent a letter to Yeltsin in which he proposes to prolong the term granted to heads of states to make a decision concerning formation of collective peacemaking forces and their functioning which is to expire on March 24, 1994.

Russia, Belarus To Merge Monetary Systems Mid-Jan

LD0501180194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1723 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS—Russia and Belarus agreed on Wednesday [5 January] to merge their monetary systems as of mid-January, 1994 and make the Russian rouble the only legal tender in both republics.

The decision was reached during the Russian-Belarusian talks in Moscow which were attended by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Belarusian Premier Vyacheslav Kebich.

The participants signed a joint statement on the integration of the Russian and Belarusian monetary systems. The statement said that the integration will take place after the prime ministers of the two republics have signed a package of more than ten agreements specifying the mechanism of integration in Minsk in the second half of January.

Kebich told ITAR-TASS after the three-hour talks that the sides have also agreed the exchange rate of the Russian rouble and the Belarusian coupon under which one coupon will be exchanged for one rouble.

Kebich also said that Yeltsin expressed the hope that the agreements to be signed in Minsk will come into force as soon as possible. "This would fully meet the interests of the heads of government," he added.

The Belarusian premier believes that the process of Belarus's transition to the Russian rouble will be long and may take three to six months. This is caused mostly by technical problems of cash supplies to Belarus. Kebich said some other CIS states may also join the rouble zone. "But for this to happen, a certain mechanism should be worked out," he concluded.

Yeltsin Meets Kebich, Chernomyrdin 5 Jan

LD0501162294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1532 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, 5 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin today met Vyacheslav Kebich—chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Belarus—and chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, Viktor Chernomyrdin. The meeting took place in the House of the Government of the Russian Federation. This was reported by the press service of the Goverment of the Russian Federation.

Questions of the forthcoming merger of the monetary system of the Republic of Belarus with the monetary system of the Russian Federation and of trade-and-economic cooperation were examined during the talks.

An accord was reached on the signing in the course of January of this year in the city of Minsk of a package of documents regulating this process. Other key issues of bilateral relations were also discussed.

Chernomyrdin on Closer Economic Ties With Belarus

LD0501205294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2024 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS—"A statement signed by the heads of the Russian and Belarusian governments in Moscow today on the merger of the monetary systems of the two countries is an important landmark we sought to achieve," said Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin during a brief conversation with journalists after the ceremony of signing the document was over.

The Russian prime minister pointed out in reply to a question asked by ITAR-TASS that "today, Russia and Belarus have not only come up close to the merger of their monetary systems, but to the deepening of economic integration in the CIS framework."

Chernomyrdin pointed out that the creation of the single rouble space between the two countries has a mutually advantageous character, adding that "none of us is seeking to gain any advantage at each other's expense". The prime

minister declared that "by signing today's statement, Russia does not encroach on Belarusian sovereignty. The document is aimed at deepening the coordination of our activities in the economic sphere and this is the principle followed by the whole Europe in its development."

As a result of Russo-Belarusian talks held in the building of the Russian Government on Wednesday, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vyacheslav Kebich signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation in 1994. Vice-premiers of the two countries, Aleksandr Shokhin and Vladimir Zalomay, signed an agreement on supplies of Russian natural gas to Belarus and the construction of a system of gas pipelines on the Belarusian territory.

Belarus Leader Comments

LD0501214594 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2000 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Russia must become a member of NATO before East European countries and Lithuania do so. Journalists were told this by Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich after his talks with Viktor Chernomyrdin, head of the Russian government. The Belarusian prime minister believes that this step will make it possible to avoid military-political polarization in Europe. In this connection, Vyacheslav Kebich thinks that after Russia's admission to NATO Belarus may also become a member of the bloc. He stated that the question of the position of the two countries in respect of joining NATO will be discussed during the visit to Moscow next week by Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet. This was reported by INTERFAX.

Border Troops Commander Satisfied With Azerbaijan Visit

LD0501211194 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] In the first days of the new year, Andrey Nikolayev, commander of the Russian Federation's border troops, met President of Azerbaijan Geydar Aliyev in Baku and visited the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Dagestan. The trip is linked to the very difficult issues of guarding CIS state borders and of the security of internal borders and those with non-CIS states.

[Begin recording] [Andrey Nikolayev interviewed aboard plane, in flight] For two years there have been no serious, substantial contacts with Azerbaijan, with our colleagues in Azerbaijan, on the border issue. Much has been lost, but luckily not everything and an important result of the meeting in Azerbaijan was the fact that our colleagues in Azerbaijan and the president of Azerbaijan showed thorough understanding of the problems outlined by the Russian side—Azerbaijan's entry into the CIS and joining the collective security treaty. Russia's goodwill and wish to provide for the national interests of Azerbaijan and Russia, and to protect the interests of other CIS states where Azerbaijan and Russia are concerned, create the conditions for settling the questions we are faced with. [end recording]

UN Attention Drawn to Latvia's 'Discriminatory Policy'

LD0501222594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1832 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations January 5 TASS—The U.N. General Assembly circulated as its official document a statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry in connection with the adoption by the Latvian Parliament of a law on elections to the bodies of local self-government.

The statement said that despite the inside and outside criticism, the Latvian Parliament has adopted the second reading of the draft law on the elections to the bodies of local self-government. The draft deprives non-residents of Latvia of not only their passive but also active franchise, introduces language restrictions for non-ethnic Latvians (the right to run public elections will be granted only to the candidates who pass examinations in the Latvian language) and creates barriers (by nationality) for the nomination of candidates in Riga and other big cities with a large percentage of non-ethnic residents.

The statement also pointed out that Latvian lawmakers continue to ignore recommendations by experts of the Council of Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), including CSCE Supreme Commissioner for Ethnic Minorities Max van der Stoel who consider as inadmissible the removal of non-residents who account for a considerable part of the country's population (several hundred thousand people) from participation in local self- government.

Because Russia's position at the bilateral talks has received no response from its partners, the Russian Foreign Ministry has to draw the attention of the world community and human rights organisations to the growing discriminatory policy in Latvia aimed against non-ethnic residents, primarily Russians. Before it is too late, it is necessary to do everything possible to prevent aggressive nationalism from thriving in the Baltics. This will pose a threat to Europe of which Russia has repeatedly warned, the statement said.

NACC Seen as Alternative to Expanded, Reformed NATO

PM0501125794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jan 94 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant General Dmitriy Kharchenko under the "On Eve of Event" rubric: "What To Expect from the Meeting in Brussels"]

[Text] A session of the NATO Council opens in Brussels, the Belgian capital, 10 January at the level of the heads of state and government of the member countries of this military-political organization. It is proposed that two main issues will be at the center of the session's attention:

how to resolve problems of international security, and how to treat the request from a number of Central and East European states for admission to membership of the North Atlantic Alliance. It will essentially be discussing the future of this alliance in the modern world.

On the eve of the NATO summit it seems expedient to examine the question of Russia's relationship with NATO. But before trying to find the answer to it, I believe that we should consider the following:

A truly paradoxical situation has taken shape. Practically everyone in the West believes that the North Atlantic Alliance was the undoubted winner of the Cold War. At the same time this alliance has probably never before been faced with such acute and intractable problems. It is even said that NATO is experiencing a kind of crisis.

The bloc's critical state is all the more surprising because it followed directly on the outburst of euphoria which in the West accompanied the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. At the London meeting in the summer of 1990 the state and government leaders of the alliance countries welcomed the changes in Europe enthusiastically and even called them historic. Then suddenly a crisis. What is going on here?

The point is that NATO in the form in which it was created in the late forties is practically played out. The "threat from the East" has disappeared. The enemy has disappeared. Yet that is precisely what the bloc organizers needed not only to implement the policy of "containing and rolling back" communism but, above all, to consolidate the leading role of the United States in the postwar world. For long years the bloc's chief function was to be the instrument of Washington's policy and to involve other Western countries in it.

There is more. Having rid itself of real or imaginary fears of a "massive attack from the east," NATO has found itself facing new and this time very real dangers. These are the unstable situation in Russia (let us recall the pained reaction of some people in the West to the results of the parliamentary elections in our country) and also in other states which have emerged on the territory of the former USSR, the possibility of the uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction, and, finally, the interethnic and ethnic conflicts on the periphery of the bloc, which are escalating into fierce armed clashes, as has already happened in Yugoslavia, Moldova, and the Caucasus. How is NATO to react to all these dangers, and what can it and must it do under these conditions?

The top-level NATO meeting is to indicate an answer to this question.

All this also directly concerns Russia, Particularly as the question of expanding the NATO framework by admitting a number of East European countries to this organization's ranks is arising very acutely. Every state's sovereign right to choose the forms and means of ensuring its security which best suit it has to be respected. But NATO's leading circles know of Moscow's negative attitude to the prospect of the alliance's accelerated expansion. This might not resolve existing problems but create new ones. For example, it might undermine the established legal treaty system on our continent—above all, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Instead of strengthening trust and stability, new seeds of mistrust would thereby be sown—which would undoubtedly lead to the destabilization of the whole situation.

The expansion of NATO's zone of responsibility will directly affect Russia's interests for geopolitical, military, and also internal political reasons. As a result of the alliance's expansion the bloc's military grouping —the largest in the world—will reach lines close to Russian borders. This will require a fundamental reappraisal of all our defensive concepts, a reshaping of the armed forces, a revision of the operational apportionment of theaters of military operations, the deployment of additional infrastructure, the relocation of large military contingents, and changes in operational plans and the nature of combat training.

It is also easy to imagine that both the leadership and the public of Russia would perceive the widening of the circle of NATO members as an attempt to isolate us and to create a "cordon sanitaire" on our western borders. It would not be out of place to remark that this could promote the emergence of xenophobia in our society and strengthen the influence of right-wing radical nationalist parties and organizations.

This, however, is the opinion not only of Russians. It was no coincidence that the influential German newspaper DIE WELT wrote recently that a desire to recreate the Iron Curtain to cut themselves off from an unstable neighbor—Russia—lies behind all the attempts to expand NATO to the east.

Leading NATO circles also understand the delicacy of this situation. To all appearances they are in no hurry to admit new members, despite insistent requests from Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and a number of other East European countries. The U.S. President has advanced as an alternative an idea which has been named "partnership for peace." I believe that Russia could support this idea insofar as it takes into account the security interests of all states without exception. Of course, this partnership should be geared to forming unified security standards throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. The priority development of a political dialogue, constant consultations, the attainment of concerted positions, and, in the long term, coordinated actions constitute genuine partnership.

At their sessions in early December the NATO countries' foreign and defense ministers confirmed their support for the "partnership for peace" plan advanced by Washington. Nevertheless, the essence of this plan and the ways of implementing it are still insufficiently clear. Obviously, these questions will be the object of close examination at the upcoming NATO Council session, and we would very much like its participants to take the Russian viewpoint on this problem into consideration. Of course, what will be

decided in Brussels will also be discussed at the meeting of the Russian and U.S. presidents to be held in the next few days.

All this certainly does not mean that an insurmountable gulf lies between Russia and NATO. This was shown by Russian President Boris Yeltsin's recent meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner. It was pointed out there, in particular, that an objective assessment of Russia's role in ensuring international security and stability requires its relations with the North Atlantic Alliance to outstrip the relations between the latter and the Central and East European countries in terms of pace, volume, and richness.

It is notable that we can already see compatibility in terms of a number of basic aims in the military-political concepts of Russia and the NATO countries. This is being promoted both by the deideologization of international relations and by the coincidence of the sides' views on the main problems of ensuring security.

Both sides give priority in this sphere to political methods. The use of military force is regarded as an exceptional measure, permissible only in the interests of self-defense and also in peacemaking operations. Both the "new NATO strategic concept" adopted in 1991 and the recently approved "Main Provisions of the Russian Federation's Military Doctrine" contain exceptionally important points: No state or coalition is regarded as an enemy by either the North Atlantic Alliance or Russia. Both documents recognize that the limitation and reduction of arms accord with the national interests of all states and help strengthen universal security. It is possible to say that this opens up a real opportunity to eliminate the residual elements of military confrontation in Europe.

Unfortunately, such elements do still exist. Whereas Russia is carrying out a thorough reform of its Armed Forces, having already significantly reduced their strength and intending to continue moving in this direction, the NATO countries' military activity is still being reduced only slowly. It was pointed out at a recent session of the bloc's Military Planning Committee that the strength of the member countries' armed forces has been reduced by just 15 percent over the past few years, while military spending still amounts to 3.2 percent of GNP. And this in the absence of a real enemy!

But the following question arises: If NATO's expansion appears inexpedient—let us put it that way—from Russia's viewpoint today and if everything is not yet clear with the "partnership for peace" plan, is there any way out of the situation which is taking shape? Obviously there is, and maybe not just one. It is possible, for example, to point to the further enhancement of the role and significance of the activity of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC]. It already unites 38 states—both NATO and former Warsaw Pact members, including, of course, the Russian Federation. Russia actively participates in NACC sessions at the foreign minister level, and its representatives from the Defense Ministry participate in the work of various commissions, seminars, and courses within the framework of this organization.

This framework, however, is still quite limited. Obviously, the time is coming to expand it considerably. There is a real opportunity to turn the NACC into an organization for collective security in Europe. This would not mean lessening the role of the CSCE but, thanks to the fact that far fewer states participate in the work of the NACC than in the CSCE, it is easier to arrive at mutually acceptable decisions there and to make these decisions more effective and more consonant with urgent tasks and with the demands of the situation.

It would not be out of place to remind you here that all the members of the NACC understand this. A recent NACC meeting adopted a statement which spoke of measures to further strengthen cooperation within the framework of this organization. It sets itself the task of continuing and activating consultations on political questions and questions connected with ensuring security, as well as developing cooperation on military questions. In particular, a new working plan for dialogue, partnership, and cooperation in 1994 was approved for this purpose.

Why should emphasis be placed on organizations such as the NACC, let us say? Why cannot the functions of ensuring regional security be entrusted to NATO? Because the North Atlantic Alliance was created as a specific organization of leading Western countries under definite conditions and with quite definite aims. But the conditions have changed decisively.

It seems beyond doubt that any attempts to transform NATO can change virtually nothing in its essence. The North Atlantic Alliance remains yesterday's organization. It is not its modernization that must be on the agenda, but the abandonment of bloc thinking in favor of an effective and efficient system of European and international security. It is evidently time to breathe vital force into the fertile idea of creating a security system "from Vancouver to Vladivostok" and to prepare and set in motion the appropriate mechanism.

These are the views I would like to share on the eve of the NATO summit with regard to the serious problem of the relationship between Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance.

Further on NACC

PM0601114994 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 7

[Pavel Shinkarenko "Commentary": "Meeting Point of Eastern and Western Interests"]

[Text] The idea of expanding NATO to encompass countries in Central and East Europe seemed to have been buried once and for all in Brussels, where a session of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC] was held in early December. But the unexpected success in the parliamentary elections of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's party, voicing ultraradical views of restoring the USSR and of the new Russia's foreign policy "added fuel" to the smoldering

fire. First in Vilnius the Baltic Council of the three former Soviet republics asked for guarantees from the West, then the nerve of politicians in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary failed. "Poland will press for the countries of East Europe to be admitted to NATO most speedily," Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski said. "Acceding to NATO could be a means for Hungary and other countries in the region to reliably join Europe and provide weighty guarantees of security and stability," Hungary's new prime minister, Peter Boross, stressed at a 22 December press conference.

Europe calmed down somewhat after Boris Yeltsin's statement regarding the immutability of Russia's foreign policy and the announcement of the Federal Assembly election results: The rumor of the overwhelming victory won by the Liberal Democratic Party and the national-patriots proved somewhat exaggerated. But the question of NATO's possible eastward progress has not been withdrawn once and for all. What is more, Russian diplomacy is confronted with new tasks. First, organizing reliable contacts with Federal Assembly deputies, who are already seen to be not at all inclined to toe the executive line. Second, proposing a clear program for cooperation with all-European structures. A base for this is in place: During his recent visit to Brussels Boris Yeltsin signed an all-embracing political declaration on cooperation with the European Union—a declaration that has made it possible to view with hope the prospects for Russia's economic relations with the EU. But there is no such treaty with the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, or NATO.

Dialogue with the NACC opens up extensive opportunities in this connection. Set up three years ago, it is in our view fully justifying its existence during the transition from confrontation to East-West partnership. "The NACC is unique in that it operates at the meeting point of the interests of West, Central, and East Europe," Andrey Kozyrev, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry, rightly pointed out at the Council session in Brussels. For NATO countries it provides an opportunity to transform the North Atlantic alliance with consideration for the radically changing nature of the threats to European and international peace. It provides Russia and other countries in the former USSR with a practical mechanism for partnership with their former adversaries in the most sensitive sphere of security. For the countries of Central and East Europe it means an opportunity to eliminate the sense of a certain "security vacuum" without expanding NATO. What is more, there is an interest common to all—that of jointly countering new challenges to peace and stability on our continent.

Former Warsaw Pact Guided by 'Suspicion and Grudges'

PM0501164994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Aleksandr Sychev report: "Lech Walesa: The Russian Bear Cannot Be Tamed"]

[Text] "The Americans want to tame the bear, forgetting that this cannot be done in the dense forest," Walesa declared in an interview in THE WASHINGTON POST. "Russia will never miss a good opportunity. Poland has always been just a tidbit to it. If the West panders to Russia over trifles today, tomorrow it will seize something a bit bigger. If the West does not heed Polish arguments, demons will wake up and something similar to Yugoslavia will happen."

"The 'partnership for peace' is a fine idea from the viewpoint of the old democracies, but it does not fit the modern realities which have taken shape after 50 years of communism."

With these words Polish President Lech Walesa cast doubt on the hope which the NATO countries were pinning on the "Solomon's solution" which seemed to have been found to the problems of the bloc's relations with its former opponents in the late Warsaw Pact. The "partnership for peace" was to have enabled the alliance not to assume excessive obligations with regard to ensuring the security of the East European states which have embarked on a democratic path, but also not to destroy their dream of joining the bloc at some time. The program also made it possible to calm down Russia, which had started to get agitated on realizing that it might find itself alone, facing a "Berlin Wall" moved up to its external borders.

As a public opinion poll conducted by GAZETA WYBORCZA showed, IZVESTIYA's own correspondent L. Kornilov reports, Walesa was expressing the opinion of his fellow citizens. Some 70 percent of Poles are convinced that Russia threatens Poland militarily, 65 percent believe that it is also dangerous from the political viewpoint, and 53 percent fear economic aggression. Those who are 40-50 years old, have some higher education, and are earning well fear Russian expansion particularly badly.

On the eve of the top-level Brussels meeting, which will take place 10-11 January, other East European countries have been following Poland's example. President Ion Iliescu has sent to Brussels a message expressing Romania's wish to join NATO. A meeting of the defense ministers of the "Visegrad Group" (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary), at which it is proposed to formulate these countries' unified position on the program being adopted within NATO, is scheduled for next Friday.

Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski has held talks in Bonn with his German colleague, Klaus Kinkel. Virtually just one question was touched on: Poland must obtain guarantees of its security and gain a clear idea of how and when it will become a full member of NATO. "Everyone who walks like a duck, talks like a duck, and looks like a duck has the right to be treated like a duck," he told Kinkel, pointing out that Poland has traveled a considerable part of the way and can already count on a worthy place among the Western countries.

Western agencies report that Olechowski's statement about the duck was received with understanding in Bonn. The whole thing was spoiled slightly by the incautious statements of President Walesa, who illustrated another

saying of Olechowski's about "political myths" which render simple things unattainable.

The minister included among such "myths" the fears that Moscow will remain isolated. But Walesa showed how cool and overloaded with suspicion and grudges the relations with the former Warsaw Pact allies are—relations which Russia inherited from the times of the USSR's domination of East Europe.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Passes Decree on Counterintelligence Service

LD0501174194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has passed the decree confirming the provision on the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service and its structure, well-informed sources told Interfax. This service's director Nikolay Golushko and his first deputy Sergey Stepashin, are working out the selection criteria for the personnel of the former Security Ministry, disbanded by Boris Yeltsin last December.

Details Given

LD0501181394 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1700 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The number of employees of the newly created Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service, including its territorial structures, will be approximately 75,000. In comparison with the Russian Ministry of Security, abolished in December, the number of personnel is being cut by 46 percent. Sergey Stepashin, first deputy head of the Federal Counterintelligence Service, reported this in an interview to INTERFAX. According to him, the new service will not have investigation and detention centers. It will not be fighting corruption, which is not characteristic of its functions. Such functions were formerly carried out by Ministry of Interior organs. The Lefortovo detention center where organizers of the 3-4 October events in Moscow are now being held is being transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. All these changes were approved in the course of today's meeting in Moscow between the leaders of the Federal Counterintelligence Service and President Boris Yeltsin.

Service Will Answer to President

LD0601093594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0809 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Jan—The president of the Russian Federation has signed an edict endorsing the Statute on the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FCS) [Federalnaya Sluzhba Kontrrazvedki], which defines the tasks and structure of the service. The FCS public relations center announced this today.

The functions of the counterintelligence and antiterrorist units are defined and the powers of the FCS have been kept as far apart as possible from those of the law enforcement bodies. An FCS which performs functions outside their specialized service is ruled out. The total staff of the FCS will be 46 percent less than that of the former Ministry of Security.

The statute envisions that the FCS will be directly subordinate to the president of the Russian Federation.

Service Will Have 75,000 Officers

LD0601094694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0825 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By KRIM-PRESS correspondent Sergey Oleynik for TASS]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—The number of Russian counterintelligence officers will total 75,000 which is 46 per cent less than before the former Security Ministry was transformed into the Federal Counterintelligence Service, according to a spokesman of the service.

Aleksey Kondaurov told CRIME-PRESS on Thursday that all officers of the former Security Ministry will have to pass qualification tests before getting a new employment, however he denied that this would be a "personnel purge".

"If anyone is to be dismissed, this would be done only at his own request or in connection with retirement", he added.

The new provisions for the counterintelligence service, which were approved by the Russian president and to who it will directly report, entrust it with the struggle against all types of espionage - economic, political, military and scientific.

Besides, the service will fight terrorism and drug trafficking, according to Kondaurov who added that the service will no longer engage in activities alien to counterintelligence tasks.

The former Security Ministry anti-organised crime department was transferred to the Interior Ministry, while the investigation department became a part of the office of the Russian prosecutor general. The former KGB investigation prison in Lefortovo was also transferred to the Interior Ministry.

The service will consist of four major departments - counterintelligence, military counterintelligence, economic counterintelligence, terrorism and drug fighting, according to Kondaurov.

Yeltsin Confirms Top Officials

LD0601100394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0936 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—The Russian president signed a resolution Thursday confirming four top officials of the former Security Ministry in their corresponding positions in the Federal Counterintelligence Service, according to the press office of the Russian leader.

The four are:

Major General Igor Mezhakov - head of the personnel department of the service,

Major General Yevgeniy Savostyanov - deputy director and head of the Moscow and the Moscow region branch of the service,

Colonel General Anatoliy Safonov - deputy director,

Major General Aleksandr Serebryakov - head of the financial department.

More on Revamping Security Service

MK0601093094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Aleksandr Kudakayev report under the "Security" rubric: "Russian Chekists Reorganize Themselves After Western Style"]

[Text] All in all, two weeks have been allotted for the drafting of a corresponding statute in line with the edict scrapping the Security Ministry and creating a Federal Counterintelligence Service [FCS] (the new name of the Russian secret service).

It has come to light from sources close to presidential quarters that work on a regulatory document for the Russian special service has been completed. It was signed by Boris Yeltsin yesterday. In accordance with it, the FCS comprises the very same structure of the former Security Ministry minus the Investigation Directorate and the so-called 15th Directorate (in charge of underground towns). Stripping the FCS of investigative functions makes it look more like a civilized country's special service. Earlier, a separate presidential edict made border troops an independent organization.

In all likelihood, the 15th Directorate will be handed over to the Main Security Directorate—Mikhail Barsukov's agency. This, however, will only legally formalize what is already solid reality. The fate of the Investigation Directorate is still unclear. There is a possibility of some reorganization of the former Security Ministry's inner structure, but it will not be of a fundamental nature.

Former Security Ministry personnel are awaiting a repeat efficiency rating procedure which, however, no one fears. To date there are only two men on the payroll of the new organization—its director Nikolay Golushko and his first deputy Sergey Stepashin.

Yeltsin Reportedly Returns Draft on Cabinet Reform

LD0501173594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] According to well-informed sources, President Boris Yeltsin has returned to the government for reworking the draft decree on a cabinet reform. The draft was submitted to the president at the end of last year. Yeltsin discussed its details with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and several other leading figures.

The sources say the president had questioned several key provisions of the draft.

The sources believe the resignation of Vice-Premiers Aleksandr Shokhin and Sergey Shakhray is a decided issue. They also feel Vice-Premiers Yuriy Yarov and Aleksandr Zaveryukha are going to be dropped from the cabinet too. As for Anatoliy Chubays, it is not clear whether he is going to leave the government altogether or remain the head of the State Property Committee without being a vice-premier

Baturin Appointed Presidential National Security Aide

LD0601102994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1012 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin appointed Yuriy Baturin as his national security aide, the press service of the Russian leader reported on Thursday [6 January].

Commenting on his appointment, Baturin told TASS that he would now act as a "link between the president, the federal counterintelligence service and the foreign intelligence service and would solve those issues which do not demand immediate control from the president".

This first appointment in the presidential administration this year can be characterised as a good sign. By appointing the doctor of law as the presidential national security aide, Yeltsin confirmed his intention announced late last year to rely on professionals while reforming his administration.

The 44-year old Baturin proved to be a professional during nearly one year of work as the presidential legal adviser. Most of legislative decrees of the president were drafted with his participation.

Besides, Baturin has often surprised reporters by his independent outlook. An author of the law on the press he has recently criticised the government position on state control over the media.

Baturin, who has an education of a journalist, also graduated from the Moscow Physical-Technical Institute and the Insitute of Law. His first scientific work which gave him the degree of master of sciences was devoted to Europarliament, the second one which made him doctor of sciences dwelled on the problems of computer legislation.

Baturin began his political career in the administration of former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Many of his colleagues quit state work after Gorbachev resigned, but Baturin was called up to work in Yeltsin's administration.

In contrast to many of his colleagues in the Kremlin, Baturin did not participate in the recent election campaign saying that "if a state official gives priority to political activity, then his direct work moves to the background".

Yeltsin To Meet With Skokov; Yerin May Be on Way Out

MK0601114094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Yerin May Go?"]

[Text] According to information from a prominent political figure, who is a member of "Russia's Choice," a

meeting between President Boris Yeltsin and Yuriy Skokov, former Security Council secretary, is scheduled to take place sometime during Christmas. Among other things, they will discuss the question of reorganizing the Internal Affairs Ministry. It is worth noting that Yuriy Skokov, Viktor Yerin, and Viktor Ilyushin already held a meeting the other day. According to the source, these consultations may precipitate significant reshuffles at the Internal Affairs Ministry in the near future. In particular, Viktor Yerin's first deputy, Mikhail Yegorov, who is also chief of the Internal Affairs Ministry's Main Administration for the Struggle Against Organized Crime, may be appointed internal affairs minister.

Government Reshuffle 'Evidently' Postponed

LD0601125994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1218 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS observer Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—The long-awaited government reshuffling which was expected to be announced on Thursday is, most evidently, postponed for at least another five days.

Two weeks ago it was announced that Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin had to draft the reshuffling scheme by January 6, however, TASS learned from reliable sources that on Wednesday the president returned the draft back to the prime minister for "improvement". Nobody in the entourage of the president and the prime minister agrees to elaborate.

However, several officials close to Chernomyrdin hinted that there would be no major restructuring of the government. The number of ministries and department will be reduced inconsiderably, some of them would simply merge.

Although head of the government administration Vladimir Kvasov confirmed that the government staff will be reduced by 20 per cent, it is still a secret how the nine deputy prime ministers will be reshuffled.

It remains to guess the future composition of the government according to who of its members had already moved to their new offices in the former parliament building.

As for today it is known for sure that the prime minister, as well as two of his first deputies—Oleg Soskovets and Yegor Gaydar—have already resettled.

It is impossible to find out who else has moved to the new premises. The entourage of the prime minister recommends to wait for a corresponding presidential decree which will make it all clear.

However, it is rumoured in the government circles that the prime minister would have two first deputies and two deputies. The latter may be Yuriy Yarov and Aleksandr Zaveryukha who are currently responsible for the social and agrarian policies.

However, a government member who asked not to be named told TASS that the exact number of deputy prime ministers would depend on whether four of the current deputies would succeed in getting leading positions in the new legislature. The four include Vladimir Shumeyko, Sergey Shakhray, Aleksandr Shokhin and Boris Fedorov.

Anatoliy Chubays will most evidently remain head of the property managing committee, but will be stripped of the post of deputy premier, according to the source.

It is quite probable that Shumeyko and Shakhray will get leading positions in parliament, but the prospect is dubious for Shokhin and Fedorov.

Shokhin, the chief Russian foreign debt negotiator, boasts support of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and if he ends even as the foreign trade minister this would be a sensation proving that there is a tough struggle in the Russian establishment.

Fedorov, who is also the finance minister, had stated before parliamentary elections, that he would resign if his arch rival Viktor Gerashchenko, the chief banker, keeps his post. However, Chernomyrdin would hardly agree to sack Gerashchenko.

In the final analysis, it is clear that the exact government reshuffling scheme has not been yet determined either by Chernomyrdin or by Yeltsin. It remains to wait until the new parliament opens its first session on January 11 and whether the deputy premiers succeed to get the positions they want there.

Georgiy Satarov on Revamping Administration

LD0501203094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1528 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow January 5 TASS—"Can the presidential administration and the Russian Government be reorganized from the inside, through the efforts of the apparatus, and in face of inside opposition? This is the problem," member of the Presidential Council Georgiy Satarov told ITAR-TASS here today.

He claims that the present state apparatus is inefficient. Any transition of power from elected politicians to a bureaucratic apparatus engenders an urge to uphold corporative interests, not the interests of the electorate. This leads to the formation of an "army of state bureaucrats" in Russia.

"The obviously low level of professionalism is another drawback of Russian bureaucracy," Satarov believes. This is why politicians of the "latest call-up" have "raised much fuss and have provoked political squabbles in the upper echelons of power, turning apparatus offices into party headquarters". This resulted in the apparatus's deep politisation which leaves it very little time for real work.

Consequently, the bureaucrats have abused the powers given them by the apparatus to satisfy personal political ambitions. The Russian people could witness this before the latest parliamentary elections.

Satarov noted that "Boris Yeltsin has realised the existence of this problem, and this is confirmed by his intention

to revamp his own administration and the government by cutting the number of officials". Moreover, the president told a press conference on December 22 that it was necessary to pursue a publicly open policy, to promote a permanent dialogue between the authorities and the society."

Satarov believes that both these things are most important, as well as the personnel policy's orientation on professionalism, which could "reduce the share of politicised bureaucrats and their destructive influence".

Filatov, Ilyushin Vie for Influence

MK0601095094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Tamara Zamyatina report in the "Nuances" column: "Filatov and Ilyushin Vie for Influence in the Kremlin in a Bid To Reform the Presidential Administration in Their Style"]

[Text] As it transpired on 12 December, the presidential administration machine—three analytical centers under the president, the State Legal Directorate, the Directorate for Liaison with the Territories, the Presidential Council, and a host of aides and advisers—failed either to analyze the voters' mood in the run-up to the elections, to predict the outcome of the campaign, or more or less coherently and promptly to sum up the results of the voting.

The skidding of the "analytical machine" became so obvious that two parallel projects for reforming the presidential apparatus were born in the Kremlin simultaneously.

One is being developed by deputy administration chief Sergey Krasavchenko. Its essence, according to Sergey Filatov, consists in that the three analytical centers under the president, headed by Nikolay Malyshev, Anatoliy Rakitov and Petr Filippov, will be reorganized as a single expert-analytical center. This center or expert council should concentrate all analytical information coming in from various research structures and work out recommendations for the president, the government, and leaders of the Russian regions. Each expert will be responsible for a particular area of activity and have a corresponding working group assigned to him.

In spite of its obvious symmetry, this system does not root out the isolation of the presidential administrative structures: Along with the expert-analytical council, the corps of advisers and various directorates under the president will remain. Duplication is inevitable.

The other plan for reforming the administration is being devised by independent experts from among the Presidential Council members. It rules out the horizontal subdivision of structures within the administration. This is a classic hierarchic scheme whereby the head of the "pyramid" will have several deputies with the rank of presidential aides. In their turn the deputies will have mid-level analyst personnel subordinated to them while the latter will rely on working groups supplying "raw material" and providing preliminary information analysis.

In fact, however, competition is unfolding not so much between two concepts as between two figures. Journalists who are at home in the Kremlin corridors of power know very well that there are two competing camps in the presidential apparatus. These are the administration headed by Sergey Filatov, and a staff of experts/analysts headed by Viktor Ilyushin, the president's closest aide and chief of his personal office, and who was also Boris Yeltsin's associate in Sverdlov party structures. Viktor Ilyushin is apparently the most "tight-lipped" [zastegnutyy] man in the presidential apparatus, and the most influential.

Mr. Ilyushin tends to favor the second scheme, whose essence lies in building a single "pyramid" of the presidential apparatus with himself sitting at its top.

Strictly speaking, neither Mr. Ilyushin nor Mr. Filatov are analysts. They substantially differ in the extent of openness in politics--openness, the need for which was highlighted by President Yeltsin at his post-election press conference. Viktor Ilyushin has perfect command of the apparatus situation but, as journalists already know, with his style of work the "presidential court" will be fenced off by a solid wall of silence and secrecy.

Sergey Filatov's rejection of a deputy's chair in the State Duma rather signifies his intention to head the drive to reform the administration. According to some reports, reorganization will apparently follow the scheme proposed by him. Boris Yeltsin, too, will hardly decline his good offices and charismatic image.

False Rumors on Imminent Explosion in White House

LD0501163094 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] Information that an explosive device has been planted in the White House, where the Russian Government is to have its premises and where Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and some of his deputies have already moved in, and that an explosion there was imminent turned out to be false, INTERFAX has learned from (Litvinov), duty officer at Moscow's Main Internal Affairs Directorate.

At the same time, he said, operational measures to find the person who made the anonymous telephone call concerning the imminent explosion are continuing. Such anonymous calls can be regarded as malicious hooliganism and can entail imprisonment between one and five years in accordance with the criminal code. The spokesman said that the caller, who telephoned at around 1730 on Tuesday, was a woman.

Yeltsin Sends Letter to Coup Leader Lukyanov

LD0501161094 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Excerpt] [Announcer Aleksandr Panov] The SCSE [State Committee for the State of Emergency] trial resumed and was again adjourned until 10 January in Moscow. Our correspondent reports sensational, as he put it, details of today's sitting.

[Correspondent Aleksandr Ukhov] The lawyers of defendants [Anatoliy] Lukyanov and [Vasiliy] Starodubtsev proposed that criminal proceedings against their clients be dropped in connection with the fact that Lukyanov and Starodubtsev had been elected to Russia's highest legislative body. At the request of defendant Lukyanov, lawyer Padva read out a letter from Boris Yeltsin which the Russian president had sent Lukyanov on 30 December. The letter said, inter alia:

[Padva reading letter] I congratulate you on the holiday (and wish) that we establish fruitful and constructive joint work sharing responsibility for the future of Russia and its citizens. I am asking you to submit your proposals regarding forms of interaction between parliamentarians and the president and mechanisms for resolving possible contradictions between us. [passage omitted]

Press Service Denies Yeltsin Letter

LD0601084894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0803 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—The press service of the Russian leader denied on Thursday press reports claiming that the Russian president had sent a personal message to former Soviet parliament speaker Anatoliy Lukyanov congratulating him on being elected to the new Russian parliament.

"This does not correspond to reality", the press service said and blamed the lawyer of Lukyanov, who is standing trial for organising the 1991 abortive Soviet coup, for misinformation.

The press service said that the president had sent a message of greetings to all the lawmakers elected to the new parliament in which he expressed hope for joint constructive work.

However, the lawyer of Lukyanov presented the message, while speaking in court, in such a way as if it had been sent personally to Lukyanov.

"Unfortunately, reporters failed to realise this 'nuance' which exposes defects in professional ethics of the lawyer", the press service said.

Trial for Coup Plotters Adjourned

LD0501135094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1243 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By CRIME-PRESS correspondent Yuriy Shcherban]

[Text] Moscow, January 5 (TASS)—The trial of 1991 Soviet coup organisers adjourned on Wednesday [5 January] until January 10 because of the illness of two accused.

Former soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov has a high blood pressure, while former Soviet parliament speaker Anatoliy Lukyanov is suspected to suffer from pneumonia.

Yeltsin Guarantees Russians Freedom of Information

LD0501140494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0918 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 5 (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin has decided to take additional steps to guarantee the right of Russian citizens to information. This is reflected in his "Decree on the Citizens' Right to Information", received by ITAR- TASS on Wednesday [5 January].

The president instructed the commission for legislative proposals to prepare a bill "On the Right to Information", which would be presented to the new parliament as a top priority legislative initiative.

Until the adoption of such a law, the decree establishes the duty of all government bodies, organisations, enterprises, public associations, and responsible officials to ensure freedom of information. In particular, the access to information which is of public or personal interest to Russian citizens is guaranteed.

The decree stipulates that the essence of decisions taken by government bodies is to be explained more in-depth on radio and television programmes. The state television companies have been ordered to prepare a series of programmes which will explain the activities of federal bodies.

One of the decree's points particularly declares that the work of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power are to be given equal air time.

More on Edict

PM0601095794 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "The President Guarantees"]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin has decided to take additional steps to guarantee the right of citizens to information. This is served by the edict "On Additional Guarantees of the Right of Citizens to Information," which ITAR-TASS received yesterday.

The president has entrusted the Legislative Proposals Commission with preparing a draft law "On the Right to Information," which will be submitted to parliament as a priority legislative initiative. Pending the adoption of such a law, the edict establishes the responsibilities of state organs, organizations and enterprises, public associations, and officials in ensuring information openness. In particular, it guarantees the accessibility of information which is of public interest or affects citizens' personal interests.

The essence of state organs' decisions will be explained more extensively on radio and television.

One of the points in the edict particularly stipulates that the activities of federal organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power are given equal coverage in programs.

By means of another edict Boris Yeltsin has decided to form the Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes under the Russian Federation president on the basis of the Information Arbitration Court which operated during the period of preparation for the parliamentary elections.

The edict, which ITAR-TASS also received yesterday, states that the main functions of the Judicial Chamber are to assist the president in defending rights and freedoms in the mass information sphere; to ensure the objective and reliable nature of reports; to ensure the principle of equality of rights in the mass information sphere; to ensure protection of the moral interests of children and young people in the mass media; to ensure pluralism in news and sociopolitical television and radio programs; and a number of other tasks.

Anatoliy Vengerov has been appointed chairman of the Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes.

Yeltsin Decrees New Body To Handle Information Disputes

LD0501193094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1226 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 5 ITAR-TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree on the formation of the permanent Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes, to work under the president. The chamber's chairman, Anatoliy Vengerov, granted ITAR-TASS an interview in which he said the new chamber was designed to reinforce the information rights guaranteed in article 29 of the Russian constitution, and assist the president in protecting the freedom of the press.

Vengerov was the chairman of the Information Court of Arbitration, which was formed to handle disputes arising from the recent electoral campaign and gave rise to the new chamber. He is sure that his experience in that post can become the basis for the judicial chamber's work. The new chamber, just like its "predecessor," will not be included in the federal court system and will use moral and legal methods to carry out its resolutions.

The main task of the judicial chamber is to assist the president in implementing the constitutional guarantees of rights and freedoms. Besides that, the chamber will deal with the truthfulness and objectivity of information and ensure that the principle of pluralism is followed.

The chamber will have wide powers concerning disputes over the amount of radio and TV coverage given to the parliamentary factions in the Federal Assembly. A completely new aspect has also been attached to the chamber's functions, the defence of the "moral interests" of children and youth in (or perhaps from) the mass media.

In addition, the former press and information ministry's job of issuing warnings to mass media which break the law "On the Mass Media" has been transferred to the judicial chamber for information disputes.

The chamber's personnel has been appointed. It includes four members of the former arbitration court besides the chairman: Igor Yeremin (deputy chairman), Aleksandr Kopeika, Viktor Monakhov and Mariana Panyarskaya. Igor Ivanov, the chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, and Yuriy Feofanov, editor-in- chief of the ZAKON (Law) journal, have also become members of the judicial chamber.

Debate Over Speaker Part of Factional Power Struggle

PM0501141594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Yermolin: "Factions in State Duma in Search of Accord"]

[Text] On 4 January, immediately after the new year holiday, the leaders of the four factions in the State Duma—"Russia's Choice," the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the Communists, and the Agrarian Party—held a routine meeting on determining who the speaker in the lower chamber and his deputies should be. I might hazard a guess that whatever the outcome of the meeting, it will for the moment be impossible to talk of some stable long-term compromise between the leading factions in the new parliament.

On the contrary, an enduring struggle is emerging between the newly formed parliamentary forces in the run-up to the first session (which, I must remind you, opens on Tuesday, 11 January), with many instances of disagreement, and not just between those whose orientations run absolutely counter to one another. There are today no grounds for talking about any kind of democratic bloc. The nature of the sporadic statements made by Shakhray's and Yavlinskiy's camps bear witness to their intention primarily to do their own thing. "Russia's Choice" is looking very much alone at the moment.

Maybe the situation will change after "Russia's Choice" makes it plain that it is not claiming the role of "big brother" in relation to its potential less numerous allies. But for the moment it is easy to detect notes of hurt pride in the tone of Sergey Shakhray himself and his closest associate, Konstantin Zatulin. For example, commenting specifically on the intention of the four aforementioned factions to "add" their own deputy speakers to the speaker, Zatulin says that he sees in this a threat of the next in the series of presidium dictatorships. But Shakhray, as far as we know, absolutely avoided participation in a negotiation process according to the formula "four plus the others."

Strictly speaking nothing unpredictable is happening. It would be strange if the factions, which have just emerged from the furnace of the elections, suddenly began to

fraternize according to principles of equality and nonresistance. And if they only took as their basis for reconciliation proposals prepared somewhere off in a presidential commission. No, what should have happened has happened—that is, a power struggle. For every former Soviet person knows: However much you talk about the titular nature of the speaker's position, it is nevertheless the position of the chief. Everything comes down to the degree to which this chief will adhere to decorum and regulations, and to how much of a professional he will be.

The only thing which is alarming is that the faction members are clearly striving for relations based on seniority. The number of votes received at the elections, it seems, is beginning to fulfill the role of a distinguishing mark. Naturally such a table of ranks produces a corresponding mood in relations.

Nonetheless there are no grounds for absolute pessimism. I repeat that there is in train a normal process of, let us say, the sharing out of strategically advantageous seats in the State Duma. In such circumstances nervousness and overwrought emotions are unavoidable. Let us try to hope that participation in the lawmaking process itself will settle the "Brownian motion" of the political struggles within parliament and turn the parliamentarians' attention to Russia's and Russians' urgent problems.

No Agreement Reached

LD0501173894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Party groups in the Russian State Duma have not reached agreement in their consultations on candidates to the posts of speaker and his deputies.

According to a well-informed source, Russia's Choice, Communists, Agrarians and Liberal Democrats are ready to agree on a speaker to represent one of the smaller groups—Yavlinskiy's bloc or the Women of Russia—on condition that his or her four deputies represent their four biggest groups.

Communists favor a strong, not decorative speaker as well as the formation of a leading body such as a council of the Duma.

According to the source, the four biggest groups are also discussing the formation of parliamentary committees. Russia's Choice is claiming leading posts in two or three (economic) committees, Liberal Democrats in the international affairs committee, Communists in defense and security committees, agrarians in committees on agriculture, constitutional legislation and legal reform.

A former member of the Supreme Soviet and a representative of the Agrarian Party Vladimir Isakov intends to head the latter committee.

Consultations Continue

LD0501165294 Moscow M[illegible]ak Radio Network in Russian 1600 GMT 5 Ja[illegible]

[Text] Party groups in the State Duma who are continuing their confidential consultations on candidatures to the posts of speaker and his deputies have not yet reached agreement. INTERFAX has learned from a well-informed source that Russia's Choice, the Communists, the Agrarians, and the Liberal Democrats are ready to agree to the election of a speaker from one of the smaller groups—Yavlinskiy's bloc or Women of Russia—so long as the four deputies are elected from these four largest groups.

Chernomyrdin Appeals to Independent Deputies in Duma

LD0501192894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1258 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Jan—This meeting with you—who are of the land, of the people—is very important to me, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said today at a meeting with members of the Inter-Regional Association of Independent Deputies of the Federal Assembly's lower house. The government needs to know what stand independent deputies will take in the State Duma, he added.

Chernomyrdin stressed that the government would support any faction willing to work for the good of the country and called on deputies to establish firm cooperation between government and parliament based on a centrist position. He, in his turn, guaranteed to support constructive dialogue between the two branches of power. If necessary, I will come and meet you and bring the whole government with me, he said.

Chernomyrdin said the government would not be pursuing "popular" economic policies and that everything should be done to avoid a situation where the executive proposes "unpopular" and the legislative "popular" measures.

Meets Shakhray, PRUA State Duma Members

LD0501175494 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1650 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, 5 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin met Sergey Shakhray, chairman of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord [PRUA] today, along with members of the PRUA faction in the State Duma—Aleksandr Shokhin, Konstantin Zatulin, Yuriy Kalmykov, and others.

The political situation and the consultations prior to parliamentary sessions were discussed along with the prospects for cooperation between the government and the State Duma, the composition of the Russian Government, and ministerial powers.

Shakhray Speaks on Future of State Duma

LD0501164994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1610 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow, January 5 (TASS)—"Deputies of the State Duma chairman should be elected on a parity basis: one

from the election blocs and the other from individual constituencies," Russian Vice-Prime Minister Sergey Shakhray said.

Speaking at a meeting with the deputies of the State Duma from autonomous entities in Moscow on Wednesday, Shakhray said that "there have been attempts by large election blocs to predetermine the fate of the State Duma behind the back of the majority of deputies." He stressed that the Party of Russian Unity and Accord is ready for forming a broad coalition in the Duma "at least on the basis of a common approach towards the principle of election of the duma chairman." This would ensure the equality of all deputies. Additionally, all Duma leaders should be elected individually by secret ballot, Shakhray said.

He pointed out that a faction in the State Duma can include not less than 14 people which equals the number of seats each bloc has in the house if it has cleared the five per cent threshold. Shakhray added that a "faction begins to exist only after it has been registered by the Duma secretariat."

Government Earmarks $500 Million for Parliament Complex

LD0501165694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1131 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The Russian government has earmarked $500 Mn for the construction of a new parliament complex in Moscow. This was reported on Wednesday [5 January] to the organizing commission of the new parliament by Pavel Borodin, a presidential spokesman. He said that by the end of January contracts are going to be signed with a number of foreign construction companies.

According to Borodin, construction will begin on February 1 and end by January 1 next year. He said there was every guarantee that the project would be completed in 10 months.

The complex will consist of an administrative building with a floorspace of 360,000 square meters and a 700-room hotel. It will be built in place of a stadium between Krasnopresnenskaya metro- station and the former building of parliament.

Gaydar Opposes Construction of Building

LD0601100894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0922 GMT 6 Jan 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Oleg Velichko]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar is against the idea to construct a new building for the Russian parliament and said the issue of appropriating 500 million US dollars for the purpose was not discussed by the government.

"If the discussion takes place I shall personally oppose it", he told TASS on Thursday.

Gaydar, who is the leader of the Russia's Choice parliamentary group, recalled that his bloc had already proposed to the Russian president to keep the existing parliament building, known as the "White House", for the new legislature.

"The position of the bloc on the given issue did not change", Gaydar said.

Further on New Building

MK0601112094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jan 94 pp 1, 2

[Ivan Rodin report in the "Parliament" column: "A Merry Christmas, People of Russia! The Government Has Raised $500 Million To Build Another White House"]

[Text] Yesterday a deputies commission on accommodating the State Duma once again unanimously confirmed its previous decision: The building of the former Comecon is unsuitable for the work of the lower parliament chamber. The deputies refused to be convinced otherwise by Pavel Borodin, chief of the Main Socio-Production Directorate of the presidential administration, and his deputy Andrey Voykov, who were present at the commission session. Both of them, however, reaffirmed: The White House will not be ceded to the Federal Assembly. Instead Mr. Borodin promised an early construction of a special parliament building next to the former House of Soviets (presumably in the place of the Krasnaya Presnya stadium). At the end of January bidding is to be held among a number of foreign construction companies and as of 1 February the erection of the future compound for the Federal Assembly will begin, planned to be completed by 1 January 1995. The compound includes an administrative building (360,000 square meters) and a hotel for the deputies (700 suites, mostly of three and four rooms). Some $500 million is earmarked for this. As one of the deputies noted, precisely this sum is required to implement a conversion program in the military industrial complex. A source in the Russia's Choice parliamentary faction told NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent that his impression is that everything is being done to make the Duma monolithic in its opposition to the executive branch, since Russia's Choice also favored the Duma's presence in the White House. The former Comecon building itself is being hectically prepared for the deputies' arrival. True, its present lessees—for the most part commercial (and fairly well known) structures—have not yet moved out. As people from the presidential administration have promised, this will probably happen by the end of the month and by 1 March the refurbishing of the building will be completed. At present it lacks telephones, service areas, furniture, and various technical equipment. With respect to the latter NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's confidential source commented tersely: It has been stolen, although judging by the documents, everything is in perfect order.

It can therefore be assumed that after its first session the Duma will have to interrupt its work for one to one and a

half months. Incidentally, chances are that there will be no joint session of both chambers on 11 January since Boris Yeltsin is not planning to address it. On one hand, this is not provided for under the new constitution; on the other, he apparently does not want to let the deputies into the Kremlin and report anything to them. According to sources in the president's administration, there are plans for the president to address an assembly of deputies who will be invited to the Kremlin as a group of citizens.

Many questions are scheduled for the first session's agenda: the election of the Duma chairman and his deputies, the approval of the number of committees and their leadership, and the adoption of interim rules of procedure. This agenda can apparently be fulfilled only if consensus is reached at the ongoing preliminary consultations between factions. At present, however, it has been achieved on only one issue—the rejection of the premises assigned to the Duma. The candidacy of the speaker has not been determined yet, and it is not even clear according to which principle he will be elected. Russia's Choice, although it continues talks on the chairman candidacy with the Agrarian Party of Russia, the Russian Federation Communist Party, and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, is still committed to the idea of electing him from among representatives of small factions. As one Russia's Choice deputy told NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent, these factions include primarily Yabloko and Women of Russia, and their candidates, Vladimir Lukin, Anatoliy Adamishin, and Alevtina Fedulova, although the last two figures arouse objections: the first within his own faction, the second from the negotiating partners. With respect to electing four deputy speakers on a party principle (this idea is a kind of compromise between large and small factions) with the speaker representing some non-influential group, Russia's Choice is fairly well disposed, hoping that it will manage to uphold the concept of a weak Duma leadership. The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, in the words of its chairman, is ready to swap "its" deputy for three committees, although in the general interfactional bargaining it is laying claim to the international affairs committee, whereas the Russian Federation Communist Party wants the defense and security committee, and the Agrarian Party wants the agrarian committee and the constitutional and judicial reform committee. Russia's Choice is claiming chairmanship in all financial and economic committees, of which there will be two or three.

At present, however, the communists and the agrarians have decided to abandon the idea of proportional formation of the Duma bodies and of a weak speaker, which would perpetuate the situation as it emerged prior to the elections where no one gained any advantage. They are slowly gathering a majority coalition and want it to receive leading posts and also to form a certain omnipotent Duma Council—something like the presidium in the former Supreme Soviet. This was reported to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent by a source from the Russia's Choice faction.

Duma Commission Says Former Mayor's Office Unfit for Work

LD0501212894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian President Andrey Voykov and the Operations manager under the president Pavel Borodin met with members of the deputies commission of the Committee for organizing the State Duma activities Wednesday [5 January].

The commission, which is responsible for providing premises for the State Duma, is headed by the Federal Assembly's Chief of Staff Vladimir Podoprigora.

The need for the meeting arose after the commission sent to the president its official conclusion that the building (36 Novy Arbat Street) and the adjacent Mir Hotel, set aside for the State Duma, are unfit for normal parliamentary activities.

After hearing the arguments offered by the administration, the commission believed they were unconvincing and unanimously adopted its previous decision. In the summing-up document the commission took into consideration the assurances that the commercial structures, such as Mosbank, the International Monetary Fund and others would vacate the building of the former Mayor's Office by February 1. Also taken into consideration was the administration's promise to finish the repairs and fit the building by March 1. The commission said, though, that deputies would not have normal working conditions in the building. The above conclusion is to be considered today, at 19:00, at the meeting of the Organizing Committee headed by Sergey Filatov.

Deputies Warn of Party Control in Parliament

LD0501163494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1605 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow, January 5 (TASS)—Independent deputies of Russia's new parliament warned on Wednesday that large election blocs are seeking to gain control of the State Duma.

A statement issued by the Inter-regional Association of Independent Deputies of the Lower House of the Federal Assembly today suggests reforming the house factions not only by the principle of their party orientation, but also by other principles. It also proposes forming ruling bodies of the house on a parity basis. The deputies believe that every candidate should be elected by secret ballot.

The number of deputies of the State Duma chairman should be determined by the following principle: one deputy from the election blocs and one from individual constituencies.

The statement stressed that the house procedural regulations should be based not on a party principle, but on the principle of multi-factionalism which takes into account

the interests of the whole deputy corps. As for the procedural regulations they should not violate the constitution or contradict the voters's will, the deputies said.

Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said that the government will support any faction which will work for the benefit of the country.

Speaking at a meeting with members of the Inter-regional Association of Independent Deputies of the Lower House of the Federal Assembly in Moscow on Wednesday, Chernomyrdin said "for me the meeting with you, representatives of the people, is very important. The government must know the position of independent deputies in the State Duma."

The prime minister called on the deputies to stick to the centrist position to develop close cooperation between the government and the parliament. He pledged support for a constructive dialogue between the two branches of power. "If the need be, I will go to you and bring the whole government along," he said.

Federal Assembly Joint Session Unlikely

LD0501212094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] There is every likelihood that a joint session of the Federal Assembly's Houses, expected in the Kremlin's Marble Hall on January 11, will not be convened. Most likely, the Federation Council and Duma will hold separate sessions on that day.

A presidential administration spokesman has told INTERFAX that the Federation Council and State Duma Organizing Committees, led by Vladimir Shumeyko and Sergey Filatov, will submit to Yeltsin shortly their recommendations on how parliamentary sessions should be held. Their guidelines will make up the basis of an appropriate instruction.

Duma is due to meet in the former building of the Mayor's Office on New Arbat, 36, and the Federation Council—in the former Russian Press House on Bolshaya Dmitrovka, 26.

Soviet-Style Hang-Ups May Hamper State Duma's Work

PM0501140994 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Jan 94 p 1

[Lyubov Tsukanova report under the "Forecast" rubric: "Soviet-Style Duma—Try It by All Means, But Will It Work?"]

[Text] Consultations between the four largest factions in the newly elected parliament are going on behind closed doors. It is their prerogative. The information area is already overloaded with rumors, proposals, and plans on the future work of the Federal Assembly, and particularly the State Duma. We are expecting sensations, we are steeling ourselves for scandals. Perhaps it is not a bad thing that the "machinations" are being concealed from society for the time being. Ultimately, it is not scandal we need, but constructiveness.

There is just one factor which prompts wariness. The essence of the talks, the latest round of which took place yesterday, is concentrated on the search for candidates for State Duma chairman. Why does this question concern the deputies so much? After all, if we proceed from the new Constitution, the figure of chairman is purely ceremonial: He chairs sessions, and he is in charge of internal order. Neither party allegiance, nor his attitude toward reforms, nor his stance in respect of the government and the president should be decisive in the make-up of the speaker: All that is required is an upstanding manner, organizational ability, and a high degree of empathy with and loyalty to the various points of view. Finding such a person among 450 deputies would not be such a difficult problem, provided there is agreement over the priorities.

But clearly, the matter is precisely one of priorities. The old Soviet habit is coming into play: The most important thing is not the law (in this case, the Basic Law)—the most important thing is who is chief. If the chief is "one of yours" you stand a chance, but if he is "someone else's" there will be additional problems. Given that we all realize how difficult it is to break this habit, the agreement (or the readiness to agree) that the candidate speaker ought to be sought not amid the strongest "pressure groups" but in the small factions was very pleasing to begin with. At the very least, this is a guarantee that the political "hue" of the chairman will not have a decisive influence on the activity of the Duma.

But nothing of the sort. Three of the "strong" (the agrarians, the Communists, and the liberal-democrats) have already prepared a candidacy "between themselves," and everyone is already avidly totting up the votes they can collect.

The next logical step in this system is as follows: If the "strong" fail to install their chairman, then it will be necessary to secure for themselves the deputy chairman's seat at least. Thus there will be as many deputy chairmen as there are "strong" elements. And it may be that the idea springs to mind—and why not?—to install a deputy chairman from each faction. To keep a balance, it could be said.

All this is only too reminiscent of the old Supreme Soviet, and only too far removed from the civilized parliament toward which everybody is striving. Equally far removed is the idea to give the new parliament a newspaper. Who will undertake to determine the orientation of this publication, and the principles according to which it will act? A cursory dismissal greeted all talk of an information bulletin. No, it must be a popular newspaper, with ready-made subscribers, with all the attributes of a sociopolitical publication. Accordingly, this will constitute either a guarantee of frenzied and grueling brawls between the political groups across the pages of one publication circulated throughout the entire country, or a puppet publication subordinate to

the chairman (or the presidium, if there are a lot of chiefs) wholly in the spirit of the old ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA.

Soviet power, of course, did not leave us unscathed. And it will continue to survive for a long time yet—if not in form, then in essence. It has a serious base in the new parliament. It merely remains to hope that the effectiveness of this type of rule will prove less than high in the new conditions. You can pour old wine into new wineskins, but the taste will inevitably differ.

State Duma Deputy on 1994 Political Scene

OW0601031594 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1945 GMT 28 Dec 93

[Studio interview with Vyacheslav Alekseyevich Nikonov, State Duma deputy, by Sergey Lomakin; from the "Utro" program—live]

[Text] [Lomakin] Now we have another guest on our program and I think that since this is the last program for the year we will talk a little about forecasts. He is Vyacheslav Alekseyevich Nikonov, doctor of historic sciences, adviser of the International Reform Fund, and deputy of the new State Duma. I would like to congratulate you and ask you: How do you see the coming year?

[Nikonov] First of all, good morning and greetings on the coming new year, as well as the new political year. What will happen in terms of political stability? It seems to me that the political stars will not be too kind to Russia next year, although I am sure that things will not go as far as the acute conflicts we had in October of the past year.

[Lomakin] You mean this year?

[Nikonov] Yes, October of this year. We can see that a new constitutional order has been created, new representative organs of power have been elected, yet nevertheless the composition of these representative organs and the very content of the constitution are not something that inspires too much optimism. As you know, the content of the State Duma is such that opposition forces will predominate in it. The constitution also includes a whole series of hitches and careless points which could be used by the opposition in order to destabilize the situation.

Naturally the question arises: How fruitful will the future Federal Assembly be, and how effectively and quickly will it be able to adopt laws? I would not harbor too many illusions in this regard. We are, after all, entering into a completely new constitutional system. A fundamentally new state organ of legislative power is being created which must organize itself, and this too will require some time. A lot of time will be taken up by questions relating to the location of this organ. Obviously it will not agree with the proposals made by the president about putting it in the CEMA Building or the Russian Press House, about which there has been talk.

I am sure that the question of assessing various political events of the past year will arise. Unfortunately, the new constitution gives the State Duma a fairly serious opportunity to move a vote of no confidence in the government and to force it to resign. According to the new constitution, it turns out that if the State Duma passes a vote of no confidence in the government twice, consecutively, the President must either disband the Duma or ask the government to resign, but it includes a rule according to which the President cannot disband anything on these grounds during the first year of the Duma's work. So the president would have to ask the government to resign.

This would create a situation of fairly serious political instability, even though the president has some counter options. The fact is that after the resignation of one government, he can nominate a premier unacceptable to the Duma. He can do this three times, after which he can disband the Duma. So the constitution includes a whole series of points which will promote confrontation in the relations between the two branches of power.

[Lomakin] Tell me please, Vyacheslav Alekseyevich, I think this concerns many people: How will Zhirinovskiy act, taking into consideration his victory at the elections?

[Nikonov] First of all, I do not consider that Zhirinovskiy won at the elections. Obviously he made a very strong showing, but we know that Zhirinovskiy got his representatives only into that half of the lower house, the State Duma, which was elected according to party lists. As far as the second half of the State Duma—which was elected from electoral districts—is concerned, there are not too many Zhirinovskiy supporters in it, while in the Upper House, the Federation Council, there are practically none.

I think that Zhirinovskiy will undoubtedly play a fairly active role through the coming year. I imagine that his tactics will be to demonstrate the utmost constructivism. He will try to show himself to be a loyal supporter of President Yeltsin's course, a course of reforms. Essentially he will be telling people: I, together with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, will do everything possible to establish order in this country.

[Lomakin] Will this be some kind of smokescreen?

[Nikonov] It will be a serious smokescreen, since it is quite obvious that as soon as there is any whiff of the next elections, his tactics may change 180 degrees and he will say: We tried, we did everything to achieve order in the country together with the president, but it turns out that the president has insufficient strength in order to fulfill this task.

I attach fairly great hopes to the elections that we will have next year. As you know, we will have elections in all the subjects of the federation—in republics, krays, and oblasts—and they will be held in accordance with legislative norms that will be developed within the subjects of the federation themselves. Local elections will also be held. In essence, the entire system of power, from bottom to top, will take shape next year. Unfortunately, it was in disarray in recent times.

[Lomakin] Thank God, Vyacheslav Alekseyevich, that we have arrived at an optimistic end. There is nothing more

thankless than making forecasts; however, we tried to do this today and Vyacheslav Alekseyevich Nikonov played first-chair violin in our orchestra today. He is one of the newly elected members of the State Duma, a doctor of historical sciences, and an adviser of the International Reform Fund. Thank you.

[Nikonov] Thank you and once again, a happy new year.

Party Leader Says 'Too Soon' for Alliance Talk

PM0501155994 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with Valentin Kuptsov, first deputy chairman of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation Central Executive Committee, by Valentina Nikifirova; place and date not given: "Still Too Early To Talk of an Alliance"]

[Text] The distribution of forces in the Federal Assembly is a serious question; hence journalists are endeavoring to forecast the various scenarios ahead of time. The creation of several blocs has already been announced, and for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation they have prepared alliances with "Russia's Choice" and the Liberal Democratic Party. But what is happening in reality?

[Kuptsov] It is too soon to talk about blocs and factions. A great deal of serious preparatory work is going on. Deputies are working in temporary commissions preparing for the first days of the sessions and agreeing working questions—on the procedure for forming factions, refining the standing orders, and carrying out consultations on the leadership of standing committees and commissions.

[Nikiforova] Valentin Aleksandrovich, many deputies are taking their seats in parliament for the first time. Won't they prove powerless to resolve state questions?

[Kuptsov] We have taken account of this; that is why we are holding a seminar for our deputies 8 January. There we will give advice on the forms of participation in State Duma committees and commissions.

[Nikiforova] An all-Russia day of action by left-wing forces "For the Restoration of Legality and Civil Peace in the Country" has been appointed for 9 January. What is this?

[Kuptsov] It was initiated by our party organizations. It will be held differently in different places: meetings with deputies, passing on voters' mandates to them. People will meet in clubs and culture centers and at rallies.

[Nikifirova] Where will our deputies be living?

[Kuptsov] For the time being, in the "Rossiya" Hotel. But no one is there to meet them, and there is no transport. We hope that these are temporary difficulties.

Yavlinskiy Group Does Not Plan To Join New Cabinet

LD0601130694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1226 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Melnikova]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—A parliamentary group based on the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin election bloc does not plan to participate in the new government, ITAR-TASS learnt on Thursday [6 January] from Igor Yakovenko, member of the group's temporary council and co-chairman of the Russian Republican Party.

"The bloc stood out during the election campaign against combining parliamentary work with that in government structures," Yakovenko, member of the State Duma (lower house), explained. "We ran for the State Duma for parliamentary work rather than for joining the cabinet," he stressed.

The group regards as its main task "the drafting and adoption of bills to change the mechanism of carrying economic reforms peacefully". Yakovenko noted that the elections corroborated the mechanism's inefficiency.

The group now numbers 30 people, but it will possibly be boosted by independents. The temporary council includes Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (group chairman), Yakovenko, Vyacheslav Shestakovskiy, Vladimir Sheynis, Anatoliy Golov and Vladimir Lukin.

Group representatives are now working on all committees engaged in organising the State Duma's work. According to Yakovenko, the status of legislator is among the main topics of ongoing discussions.

The group suggests free rather than imperative mandate of lawmaker. Yakovenko said that the imperative mandate presupposes that a lawmaker is to vote strictly in compliance with a decision of a group he represents. He added that "such an approach is fraught with turning a legislator into a puppet".

Speaking about a possibility of setting up a democratic coalition, Yakovenko noted that "democratic groups will most probably cooperate to counter revenge-seeking forces".

He did not preclude "temporary cooperation" with Russia's Choice and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord as well as with communists and the Agrarian Party.

Yakovenko confirmed that the group nominated Lukin for the post of State Duma speaker.

Agrarian Party Outlines Foreign Policy Priorities

LD0501220494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1616 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others]

[Text] Leader of the Agrarian Party [AP] of Russia Mikhail Lapshin says Russian troops must continue to guard the Tajik-Afghan border. "If not, our external borders will soon lie just outside Moscow," he told Interfax.

While hailing Russia's peacemaking role in what Russian diplomats describe as "near abroad" countries (meaning former Soviet republics), the AP leader is skeptical about Russia's involvement in similar operations elsewhere. In

his view, Russia should have stayed away from the UN peace mission in the former Yugoslavia after betraying its fellow Slavs, notably Serbs there.

Nor does Lapshin share the foreign ministry's position on Iraq. "Supporting U.S. police actions is not Russia's business," he said, adding: "I have a vague idea of the ruling regime in Iraq, but regimes come and go while people stay on."

The electoral platform of the Agrarian Party, which consults on foreign policy issues with former Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, did not contain a section on international affairs. There are two reasons to explain this, Lapshin said. One is the brevity of the election campaign. The other—foreign policy issues as applied to the strategy and tactics of the Agrarian Party, place the need for independent but competent experts. In our view, should the AP find itself to be a tiny party in the new parliament, it ought to focus on the farming sector's problems alone, he said, but with broader representation, the party would elaborate its own approach to foreign policy issues.

Judging from Lapshin's interview, the AP's approaches appear to be shaping up. Our party, he said, sets great store by Russia's economic and political independence. On foreign policy matters, Lapshin said the AP would stick to the concept of the country's self reliance for food, which among other things, provides for government regulation of food imports.

Independent Lawmakers Plan To Become Centrist Force

LD0501151894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1138 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Pavel Kuznetsov]

[Text] Moscow, January 5 (TASS)—A group of indepedent members of the newly-elected Russian State Duma announced on Wednesday that they plan to form an inter-regional association of independent deputies.

The group held a meeting in the parliamentary centre, where they approved a declaration about the association. The declaration says, "the association can and must became a true centre for the consolidation of all the State Duma's constructive forces". In the future the association intends to lobby for parliamentary faction status.

The declaration also states that the independent deputies, "who were elected in one-seat constituencies and are not obligated to any of the political parties or movements, are personally responsible before their voters, the constitution, and Russia as a whole".

The association promises to base its activity on "the principles of parliamentary freedom and responsibility, common sense, political realism and pragmatism, and respect for the views of other groups and factions".

Democratic Process Needs Untainted New Blood

PM0501171594 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Professor Grigoriy Atamanchuk, doctor of juridical sciences: "Reforms Lose Out in Battles for Positions of Power"]

[Text] The elections are over but the choice, it seems, has yet to be made: Will Russia take the path of peaceful, creative, and rational development, or will it continue to writhe in convulsions of self-flagellation and self-destruction? There would seem to be few alternatives, but the choice is by no means evident. I will not undertake to list all the causes which reflect and imply weakness and instability in respect of the democratic process, but I would like to draw attention to a few. First and foremost, it must be acknowledged that the democratic process has not yet harnessed to itself all those people who are notable for their autonomous position, merit, stable view of life, and their advanced abilities to evaluate something in terms of deeds, rather than words. By dint of their very being, these people—let's call them "critically reasoning figures"—have always been pushed aside from power and the solution of social problems by an authoritarian bureaucracy, as they did not acknowledge the rules of the political game being proposed. But even now, and moreover on the very same grounds, many of them have still not become respected or even equal components of the democratic process.

Once again they have proved unacceptable because from the very start of democratic reforms they argued the need for a balanced and serious approach, gradualness, and rational and systematic actions, for gearing oneself toward the interests of the majority of people, for a differentiated and honest approach to the past, both distant and recent, for morality in politics, and many other significant social values. People of this mold have long warned of the danger of "accelerated" changes without due account of their social consequences, the unacceptability of rushing headlong across the entire "front line," and the impossibility of relying on false stereotypes, such as the claim that "it is necessary to create rich people, and then the rich people will make the whole country rich." But few heard them, and they were ever more frequently accused of conservatism, backwardness, a failure to understand the processes and...they were cast out from democracy. So it is that many of them remained in the wings. To the detriment of democracy.

Moreover, it is impossible not to see that to this day the democratic process is somewhat cautiously and timidly based on science. It "trusts" only certain, staid elements, who were always geared toward power and prepared to serve any system for the sake of obtaining a portfolio. It is with equal success that they praised socialism, as indeed they reject it today. Suspicion is aroused by the fact that during the election campaign, for instance, the staid elements of one and the same branch of knowledge "split" into dozens of blocs, as if there can exist dozens of truths in one and the same science, on one and the same subject.

Hence the selective nature of the approach to proposed recommendations, the tendency to select from the them only that which is politically "beneficial" to somebody, and the orientation toward certain one-sided postulates.

As a result, in the policy and practise of state administration there is much in the way of subjectivist improvisation, actions geared to the moment and not to the future, "flitting" from one side to the other, servility in the face of some foreign model or other, a solicitation of "advice" from one visiting authority after another without due consideration of the fact that he represents the interests and views of that structure which sent him. Naturally, all this impacts on the country's development and it does not in fact advance reforms. And if we are talking about the latest election campaign "performances," scientific know-how in the sphere of social psychology was employed by the democrats according to the principle of "whatever it says, do the opposite." After actions like that, were the results of the Federal Assembly elections really so surprising?

And there is yet another aspect which abruptly catches the eye as a consequence of the foregoing factors: The depressing incompetence and aggressive ignorance of many of those who were swept into the offices of power on the wave of democratic reforms and who now set themselves up as a buttress of democracy. Instead of studying, trying to get to grips with the science, art, and experience of administration, closely watching what and how experienced people in other countries of the world do it, honestly analyzing the consequences of their deeds, decisions, and actions, such people found nothing better to do than to get drunk on power, to engage in their own pet development projects, and to organize "battles" for the most influential positions. It is their fault that a converse situation has arisen whereby state power is often used not to resolve the country's major problems, but to satisfy the ambitious aspirations of those who have acceded to power. Moreover, this type of thing is already done quite openly, in the public eye—they do not shy away from it, nor do they fear it, but, on the contrary, they are proud of it. Does this mean that it is "permissible"?

But given that incompetence makes itself known, and that sooner or later it becomes obvious—thanks, in fact, to the failure to resolve vital problems—the incompetent periodically "seek out" culprits responsible for their own lack of talent, be this in the form of the apparatus which is allegedly putting the brakes on reforms, or in the form of former partyocrats apparently distorting reforms, or the regional elite which pursues its own mercenary interests, or nationalist forces which do not understand the advantages of an integral state, or the director, or the farmer, or whoever. In the years of Soviet power, indeed prior to the revolution even, a great deal of "experience" had accumulated in respect of the quest for enemies, so there is no need to devise anything new here, it is sufficient to recall famous times gone by.

In brief, there are many symptoms which give rise to alarm over the fate of the democratic path toward the development of the fatherland.

No doubt it is time to take something of a new look at the bases and capacities of the democratic process, and not only to strengthen the substance and efficiency of the reforms under way, but also to update significantly the basic lineup of reformers, and to bring into it those professionally trained, morally pure people who for whatever reason are still "in obscurity." Not because they oppose the democratic process: They do support it, but they will not accept those methods, means, and forms via which this process is unfurling. There was a time when the October cause was saved by the involvement therein of so-called bourgeois elements. Something like this needs to be done now: It is necessary to draw into the democratic process all those who value Russia and hold it close to their heart.

The development and appearance of infamous trends shows that the main thrust of the battle for democracy lies not in the past but in the future, when the incompetence and irresponsibility of many who have latched onto democracy will have to be paid for. It is worth preparing for this future today by reinforcing and expanding the democratic process.

Decision on Planned Christmas Protests Imminent

PM0501181594 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Chuprin: "What Will Christmas Sunday Be Like in Moscow?"]

[Text] There are attempts to blow up the comparative political quiet in Moscow since the events of 3-4 October last year. Representatives of a number of opposition movements—the "Russian National Union," the "National Salvation Front," and "Working Moscow"—have stated their intention to hold mass protest actions 9, 11, and 12 January "against the 21 September-4 October coup d'etat" and also to show their negative attitude toward the start of the new parliament's work.

Your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent was told at the Moscow city hall state and law administration that whether the demonstrations will take place will be decided 5 January at 1200 hours at a meeting between the city's executive power and the opposition leaders.

Will these politicians not turn the 1994 Christmas holidays into a 1905 "bloody Sunday?"

Reforms Must Now Be 'Adjusted'

PM0501181794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Article by political scientist Aleksey Kiva: "A Different Russia... A View of the Results of the Parliamentary Elections From the Angle of Our Immediate Future"]

[Text] **Hoping That Fate Itself Has Not Toyed Too Long...**

I cannot shake off the thought that once again—I am referring to the parliamentary elections and Vladimir

Zhirinovskiy's unexpected success—unknown laws of the historical process are toying with us.

The success of the LDPR [Liberal Democratic Party of Russia] is at the same time an answer to the historically significant question of whether revenge by communism is possible in the foreseeable future. The answer is: It is not possible. This is also a shattering defeat for the bloc of national-patriotic forces grouped around the newspaper DEN and similar publications and exemplified by the National Salvation Front [NSF]. Who remembers the NSF now? Yet only a little while ago its leaders were terrorizing the Supreme Soviet, calling the political tune for Ruslan Khasbulatov, and making a puppet of Aleksandr Rutskoy; it was primarily they who were the source of the threat of a constitutional coup, they who were the organizers of direct actions to seize power, as demonstrated 3-4 October.

So far we have twice witnessed the phenomenon of self-defeat by the forces of the past: communism as a social system in 1991 and the soviets as the organ of state power of that system in 1993. Maybe in Zhirinovskiy and his LDPR we have a new phenomenon—the phenomenon of self-exposure. In other words, the transformation into a dead end of the destructive energy gradually accumulated over the years and the decades in society during the years of communist rule and later generated by every conceivable and inconceivable means by the NSF leaders, other communopatriotic organizations, and also the mass media. It has already happened more than once in history that the danger of a particular social phenomenon has been removed because it has suddenly acquired grotesque features in society's eyes. That is not a categorical assertion; rather it is an assumption or hypothesis.

The Same Two Poles All Over Again?

"What a strange and fateful country is Russia!" Ilya Erenburg wrote in his article "The Poles," published in Kiev in 1919. "It is as though the only colors left for it on the divine palette were black and white." You cannot help recalling these words when you think about what may lie in store for us. The two years until the next parliamentary and presidential elections in our dramatic life will probably move as swiftly as a play based on a book by Agatha Christie. And what will happen? The political center has collapsed as an influential force, and the polarization among the political elite has unfortunately also affected society itself, albeit not yet on a large scale. As yet there is no sign of either a second or a third echelon to take the place of the current democrats without detriment to our future civilized development. Yet at present radical trends are merely gathering strength.

Experience of postsocialist development in Europe shows that the parties that have undertaken the extremely difficult mission of transforming the deathly economy and deathly political system into something viable with mechanisms for self-development through their reforming activity at the same time call into being negative processes and phenomena in the socioeconomic and spiritual and moral spheres which mean that they are usually defeated in the next elections. Their defeat is usually to the benefit of left-wing forces that have emerged from communism. Lithuania, Poland—the list goes on.

At present we have no such forces, and there is not even any sign of them. When Viktor Ilyukhin, one of the leaders of the CPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation], was asked about the party's drift toward social democracy, he answered in the negative, claiming that this is just tactics. "If we had approached voters with extreme left-wing slogans, we would inevitably have lost the elections." That is frank. In the pure bolshevik style.

But neither do we have any sign of an alternative on the right of the current ruling democrats. "Yabloko" [Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc]? The PRUA [Party of Russian Unity and Accord]? It is doubtful. Maybe, instead of the possible transformation of the Communists into social democrats, a bloc will emerge on the left made up partly of "Gorbachevites," partly of industrialists, partly of agrarians, and partly of moderate nationalists? In short, at present we are left with the same old gloomy bipolar picture. Will the Communists be replaced by nationalists? In general the current authorities have to forecast what the political spectrum may be in two years' time. And not only forecast it, but so far as possible channel the social process in a civilized direction.

Zhirinovskiy As a Barometer of Russians' Social Temperature

Nevertheless, let us return to our topic, so to speak. The wave of emotion in viewing the election results has abated. The hysterics from the particularly "neurotic" section of our intelligentsia have largely ended. Admittedly, a new round of moaning about other topics has begun. A considerable proportion of the intelligentsia has never grasped the simple truth that democracy is an expensive and troublesome business, and the intelligentsia's characteristic maximalist approach is totally unacceptable here.

So the time has come for more civilized assessments, profound analysis of what has happened, trustworthy conclusions, and appropriate decisions. The tone of the serious press, statements by representatives of the establishment, and recent steps by the president show that the decline in the population's interest in the elections and referendum, the LDPR's unexpected success, and the unrealized hopes of "Russia's Choice" have been seen as a warning. And it has been heeded. The immediate future will indicate whether it has been properly heeded. However, a few fundamentally important details of the latest scene in the Russian political drama remain backstage. Nor can the audience see the prompters. Not everything is clear about the LDPR's success. At the same time it is totally obvious that however we describe Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's ideological and political views (neofascism, national-chauvinism, and so forth), however we explain his success, and whatever future we forecast for this success, today we are living in a different Russia from the country that existed prior to the elections. Neither better nor worse—simply different. Reality is becoming increasingly complex and increasingly multidimensional, with more and more factors determining the vector of social

development, and this development itself is becoming less and less unilinear and predictable.

Essentially Russia is now different from the old familiar country that existed on the eve of the elections. It is simply that many of us have failed to notice this. We have failed to notice that the rules of the political game have changed fundamentally. The multiparty system and free access by parties to the mass media, the different capacities of different participants in the election campaign to pay for and exploit airtime, in general the different approaches toward the election campaign itself, the absence of an established political culture and traditions of parliamentarianism, and the pursuit of different moral (or immoral) imperatives objectively also created different conditions of political struggle. It's like the proverb: Nothing ventured, nothing gained.

Dangerous Specter

But, as the saying goes, every cloud has a silver lining. Rephrasing our unforgettable classics, let us say that the elections highlighted a specter that has begun to haunt Russia—the specter of authorities that are out of touch with the people. So when the democratic public, frightened by Zhirinovskiy's neo-Nazi slogans and appeals, hastens to set up an antifascist movement in the country, I assert the following. Yes, such a movement must be created for we have already come face to face with fascism during the 3-4 October events. But the antifascist movement, if it is destined to exist, must not be reduced to the struggle against the LDPR. I emphasize, I constantly have the feeling that the "Zhirinovskiy phenomenon," for all its possible dangers, is merely a timely warning to society. An even more serious danger—unless, of course, the response is appropriate to the challenge—may emerge from behind the not overly broad back of Vladimir Volfovich or from another direction entirely. Furthermore, his success has come as a surprise to Zhirinovskiy himself, and developments during the realization of this success may come as a surprise to us.

The prevailing opinion is emerging that Zhirinovskiy skillfully reaped a harvest that he had certainly not sown. In other words, the votes for the LDPR were a transmogrified protest by our citizens against current living conditions. Correct. But this is not only a social protest, although that may be the predominant element. Discontent has built up in many areas. That is on top of the fact that many people have lost their accustomed status. And on top of the extremely negative fact of the lumpenization of a considerable section of the intelligentsia.

First, there is crime and corruption. This is also a social and, as we know, serious problem, although it is mixed up with a lot of half-truths and downright lies thanks to the endeavors of the opponents of reform and the superficiality of our journalism and simply of stupid people. It will take more than three months, three years, or even thirty years to put a stop to them. Crime, corruption included, will exist as long as man lives, given that he is by no means a holy product of nature. This is shown by the experience of the most stable, "well fed," and law-abiding nations. In any case, we by no means lead the world in terms of the number of crimes.

The problem, in my view, lies in, on the one hand, sharply reducing the most dangerous and worrying types of crime, especially organized crime, and, on the other, convincing society of the seriousness of the authorities' intentions, so that the crude lie about the "criminal revolution" and "criminal authorities" does not stick like mud to the reformers, particularly in the upper echelon of power. However, there is just one aspect to the problem. The reformers themselves must be clean, and the president and premier must be uncompromising in combating this evil. There is more need of glasnost here than in any other sphere. We must create conditions in which it is difficult for corruption to spread.

Second, many people are feeling bad about the disintegration of the USSR, many people still have relatives in nearby foreign countries. Many people have lost their accustomed links and contacts and their accustomed way of life. Not to mention those for whom identity as an empire and superpower is the supreme value in itself; who would reduce their own mother to poverty for the sake of reveling in our military might and experiencing paroxysms of joy at the very thought that we are feared in the world and regarded as an "evil empire" and that we are capable of destroying all life on earth several times over; and who seriously believe in the possibility of restoring the USSR or the Russian empire and are prepared to countenance a bloodbath for this. All this must be explained to people. But there is a need for particular tact here. However, we must also tell the truth: Attempts to save the USSR by force would have meant a real tragedy for the peoples.

Third, not only history, but also the communopatriots were on Zhirinovskiy's side. Revanchist forces conducted real psychological warfare against the president, the democrats, and Russian democracy in general effectively under the protection of the Supreme Soviet. The nationalists, together with the communists, managed to create in the eyes of a section of the Russian people a false image of a humiliated country acting at the bidding of the West and especially the United States and selling off its national assets. As though following the behests of Dr. Goebbels, the communopatriotic press kept on repeating absurd, deliberately false and simply insulting claims about Boris Yeltsin's "occupation regime," the "government of national betrayal and treachery," and "colonial democracy," called for a "national liberation struggle," urged the people to "rise up for a fight to the death," and so forth. In other words, it created an "enemy image" not only outside but also inside the country in an attempt to bring about the effect of wounded national pride characterizing Germany on the eve of the fascists' arrival in power. Clearly, this succeeded to some extent. And this happened at a time when Russia, as the legal successor to the USSR, remains a nuclear superpower and enjoys great political clout in the world.

Fourth, when you consider that Zhirinovskiy is more of a good actor than a stage manager, his stage management is

highly professional. He not only "privatized" virtually all the sore points of a society that has just embarked on the path of transition from totalitarianism to democracy but also keeps in mind the particular features of our national character and traditions, taking account of our strong and weak points. His attention focused on the following: the tendency of many of us at least to rely on simple and speedy solutions, includir g strong-arm solutions, the fear of independence, the habit at the drop of a hat of looking to the all-powerful state, which has to look after us, the continuing longing for a "master" who would emerge and "impose order," and the ineradicable belief in honeyed promises and simple gullibility.

Even Cats Like a Kind Word

What do the many people tired of poverty and hungry for rapid change care about Gaydar's macroeconomic schemes when Vladimir Volfovich promises to change life for the better as soon as they vote for him! To some people he promises free underwear, to others vodka, and to others entire countries on a plate.

Psychologists who have made a special study of the personality of Zhirinovskiy have said how skillfully he exploits the stereotypes of behavior which were developed in society over many years of totalitarianism and which have by no means vanished but have merely entered a state of latency and, given the opportunity, are ready to immediately proclaim their existence. Take the problem of the hatred that was constantly fueled in Soviet society—only its targets have changed. It is simple to make political capital out of hatred that can be easily aroused in conditions of crisis and directed against "yid masons," or "Caucasian nationals," or those who are "selling the homeland down the river."

The psychologists emphasized that direct criticism, especially crude attacks on the LDPR leader, will inevitably boomerang.

I don't know whether Zhirinovskiy would have been helped by hypnosis or psychotherapy if the democrats in various blocs and parties had not confused people; if society had not been in a state of deep crisis; if many people had not been so disoriented and troubled; and if the democrats had done what they ought to have done as democrats right from the first steps in the emergence of the new Russian statehood and new social system.

What is really bothering people? Poverty? Yes, of course. But that is not what bothered us. The most oppressive thing is the apparent lack of any glimmer of light or prospects for the future. The disintegration of absolutely everything. The collapse of familiar principles and the values established over the years of Soviet power. The ones who find themselves in the most difficult position are elderly people and in part young people, many of whom are simply drifting with the current. Is this not why so many young people followed in "Zhirinovskiy's wake"?

Where Are We Heading

Many people have simply lost their heads in the face of the flourishing criminal business, raging "wild capitalism," the insolent behavior of the "nouveaux riches," the rampant crime, and the irritating behavior of our advertising, which has no sense of proportion or tact, in the face of a whole series of antisocial and antispiritual phenomena. They are fed up with communism, alias real socialism, and they do not want any return to the past, but they can in no way come to terms with what is taking its place. It is natural for questions such as "What are we building?" and "Where are we heading?" to arise in such conditions.

And instead of attempting to answer these questions, to remove our fellow citizens' concern, and to explain to them that all this filth is the price society is forced to pay for the crimes of communism, which pushed the country out of its natural channel of development; that at the same time this is the price that must be paid in order to create eventually normal economic and social relations as the basis for our prosperity; that we have to put up with this filth as other peoples have done in order to avoid coming full circle and finding ourselves back in long lines facing empty shelves in the stores like our Ukrainian brothers, for instance; that we are almost on the point of more or less getting out of this filth—in the face of all this the democrats arrogantly say: "We are laying the foundations of a new society in accordance with common sense and world experience, as other peoples have done."

The people want to know what our social ideal is, what our new values are, what our new spirituality is. If their questions are not answered by the democrats, they will turn—and in part already are turning—to other political forces.

In the extremely difficult struggle against the forces of the past, against the numerous and diverse forces of reaction, the democrats have consciously or otherwise surrendered to their political opponents some extremely important values revered by the people and capable of rallying them in the fight for the country's future. These include the ideals of social justice, patriotism, statehood, and lofty spirituality. These values must be won back without fail, especially as this process has already begun. Unless, of course, the democrats want to be defeated, thereby dooming the young Russian democracy to defeat as well.

Last. In the years since August 1991 the democrats were concerned primarily to destroy the material and spiritual foundation of communism and prevent it from being revived. This is understandable. The forces of revenge are a real threat to our progress. But the focus of the struggle must now be shifted. I am convinced that the only social model that can be successfully implemented in our country is one which from the outset attaches exceptionally great importance to the social aspect of change and is geared, if you like, toward state paternalism, as in Japan, and toward preventing severe social contrasts. In the struggle between the two principles of freedom and social justice that has

dragged on over the centuries, it is the latter that will triumph in our country unless we succeed in harmonizing them.

And in this connection it is very annoying, no, very worrying that the democratic authorities seem to have divested themselves of everyday concern for people, or at any rate have not created appropriate mechanisms for this. But people who have grown up in the specific conditions of real socialism are often not yet ready for the independence characteristic of other countries. During the transitional period at least something must take the place of raykoms [party rayon committees]. In this sense Zhirinovskiy played the role of litmus paper. He visited many krays and oblasts. He said what people wanted to hear and flattered them. He praised. Persuaded. Reassured. Promised. And people took this as a display of attention, as a show of concern for them. And they responded.

What Is To Be Done?

The first conclusion. The policy of reforms "in all directions," so to speak, must be adjusted. I do not think it should be fundamentally changed. A coalition government? I do not think that would be sensible. Everything must be directed toward easing the situation of the most underprivileged section of the population as much as possible.

The task of combating crime and corruption must become just as much of a priority. It is time to realize that these two problems have become extremely acute sociopolitical, spiritual, and moral problems, and the sympathies of the broad people's masses will be won by the side that can prove that it is capable of dealing with them.

The second conclusion. The government must react more sensitively than ever to the mood of the masses, on the one hand, and explain, persuade, and prove the correctness of its line and the inevitability of passing through a stage of difficulties and the accompanying multitude of glaring antisocial phenomena, on the other hand. It must show more clearly what will happen if we turn aside from the course of reform and attempt to introduce a different model of transformations in present conditions.

The third conclusion. The questions "What are we building?" and "Where are we heading?" must be answered at the highest level. The answer must be intelligent and immediate. Society needs a social, spiritual, and moral ideal. It is simply impossible to manage without this—at least in our country. But all this will be left hanging in the air unless we begin building democratic parties. And not just a presidential party. We need a mass democratic party, in the spirit of struggle for a "society of universal well-being," if you like.

The fourth conclusion. We must finally formulate the philosophy of national-state development and clarify its components. I reiterate: It is unforgivable that the democrats have left the idea of statehood and patriotism to those who, when it comes down to it, are neither patriots nor state-minded, if you mean by state-minded someone who fights for a social, democratic state called upon to serve the people rather than enslave them and to expend the country's resources in the interests of improving the people's well-being rather than waste them, as happened under the communists.

The fifth and final conclusion. Foreign policy, including policy toward the nearby foreign countries, must also be adjusted in the light of the changes taking place in the country. Although I think it already is undergoing major adjustments.

National Unity Leader's Investigation Dropped

PM0501150594 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by Vadim Gorshenin under "Version" rubric: "Barkashov Meets With Military Prosecutor's Office"]

[Text] What was their conversation about?—some analysts are now trying to answer this question. The point is that, according to one of the numerous versions associated with the name of Aleksandr Barkashov, the investigation into the participation of Russian National Unity's leader and his subordinates in the events of bloody October 93 has been ended. The "Barkashovites'" departure from the House of Soviets building before the start of combat operations is being advanced as an argument.

Another question arises in this connection: Was the clash in which Barkashov was seriously wounded not the consequence of his initiation into certain details concerning the shooting up of the parliament building? According to information received by the editorial office the Russian National Unity leader was wounded in the back by automatic fire from a VAZ-2108 vehicle. And...—a new detail emerges here—...it was his friends who picked him up, not a passing vehicle at all. As has been stated, it was they who took him to the hospital, giving a false name in the interests of personal security, because they feared not the official authorities but the same people who had instigated the shooting. In this context the information that Barkashov's supporters themselves appealed to the Internal Affairs organs 29 December, requesting that protection for their leader be organized, looks quite plausible. According to the same version the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] did take such measures and transferred Barkashov to its own departmental hospital.

Various high-ranking officials in the MVD and General Prosecutor's Office refused to confirm or deny this version. Nevertheless, it is contradicted by information that the Russian National Unity Council has made a statement accusing militia organs of making an attempt on Barkashov's life and warning that it reserves the right to carry out its own investigation and take adequate measures to protect its leader, with all that that entails.

At the same time we have learned that yesterday the Military Prosecutor's Office sent its investigators to the same MVD hospital where Barkashov is staying and began investigative activities.

Media Issues

Journalists Prepare To Strike During Parliamentary Week

LD0501205894 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1530 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The strike to be staged by Russian newspaper journalists, timed to coincide with the parliamentary week of 10-17 January, may actually take place. A POST-FAKTUM correspondent has learned that this evening all the editorial offices on the territory of Russia will receive faxes containing an appeal to strike from the two unions of journalists, of Russia and of Moscow.

ITAR-TASS provides information about a number of demands being submitted to the government of the Russian Federation by journalists of the organizations, with yet another appeal to Viktor Chernomyrdin. Journalists think it necessary to establish purpose-orientated subsidies for all editions for the first half of 1994 to provide for the publication of issues that have already been paid for by subscribers.

Chernomyrdin To Meet With Editors

MK0601100094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[SEGODNYA report: "'Newspapers' Strike' Might Not Materialize"]

[Text] Yesterday, editors-in-chief of key Russian publications were still considering calling a strike to protest the newspapers' critical economic situation. It was decided to call a warning strike in the first "parliamentary week"—from 10 to 17 January. Three newspapers disagreed with the decision, including ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, NOVAYA YEZHEDNEVNAYA GAZETA, and also KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (spokesmen for the last newspaper expressed their solidarity with the "strikers"). It soon transpired, however, that Mr. Chernomyrdin is ready to meet with the editors-in-chief today to talk about all the existing disagreements.

More on Prospective Meeting

LD0501224894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1725 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's meeting with representatives of the association of publishers and chief editors of the leading newspapers will be held either tonight or on Thursday. The agreement to hold the meeting was reached at the conference today of First Vice Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeyko, supervising the Press Ministry, with chief editors of the leading newspapers.

The meeting was attended by the chief editors of such newspapers as "TRUD" (Potapov), "ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA" (Natalya Polezhayeva), "KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA" (Vladislav Fronin), "IZVESTIYA" (first deputy chief editor Nikolay Bodnaruk) as well as the chairman of the state committee for the mass media, Boris Mironov, and the first secretary of the Moscow Journalists' Union, Ludmila Scherbina.

Prior to this, the association of publishers and chief editors, unions of journalists of Moscow and Russia, Fund for Protection of Glasnost and other journalist organizations sent a letter to the prime minister listing their demands for saving the Russian press from a crisis.

In particular, they demanded revising the government decision to recalculate the basic funds of printing, communications, pulp and paper and other cooperating industries, granting journalists the right to participate in the privatization of printing enterprises and other facilities, introducing subsidies for timely issuing of pre-paid editions, and lower taxes imposed on the mass media.

In their letter, journalists proposed the prime minister "immediately receive representatives from the press and journalist organizations."

Moscow Editors To Strike

LD0601111194 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Text] The chief editors of virtually all newspapers published in Moscow have decided to strike on 10 January. They have taken this action because publishing houses have increased by several times the cost of their services, referring to a government decision on reassessing production assets. According to the editors, this will make the future existence of their publications impossible. KOMERSANT, which is not worried about any price rises, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which is restrained by army discipline, the NEW DAILY NEWSPAPER, which does not cooperate with the government and wants nothing from it, and the ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, which believes that it is not the government but the printing trades who have incorrectly fixed tariffs that one should be fighting, will not be taking part in the strike.

Siberian Papers To Strike

PM0601093794 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Valeriy Yaroslavtsev report: "Siberians Support Central Newspapers' Editorial Offices"]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk—For around two months now residents of Krasnoyarsk Kray and the republics of Khakasiya and Tuva have not read ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. That is the length of time that it has not been printed by Krasnoyarsk's "Ofset" Production and Publishing Combine owing to lack of money to cover paper and printing costs.

This is a graphic example of what may happen to other Russian publications as a result of Russian Federation Government Decree No. 1233 on revaluing the capital stock at national economic enterprises. Krasnoyarsk newspapers have reprinted ahe Appeal from Russian press

personnel and the chief editors of the leading central newspapers to V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government.

The editors of leading Krasnoyarsk and certain rayon newspapers, as well as the "Ofset" Publishing House, have signed up to the appeal. As a sign of solidarity they are willing to stop publishing during the first "week of parliament"—11 through 17 January.

Editor Gives Reasons for Strike

MK0601111094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Chief editor Vitaliy Tretyakov article: "If 'NG' Does Not Appear Next Week. We All Are in the Clutches of the State"]

[Text] Our readers will know that an absolute majority of dailies and weeklies of Moscow and of all Russia are ready to interrupt their publication for the duration of the next week. As this issue of "NG" is going to print (the last issue during this "short" pre-Christmas week), such a decision was confirmed at the conference of chief editors that took place last night. Readers are entitled to know what "NG" editors are being guided by in this protest action.

First and foremost, this is no classic strike. The editorial office will work, gather information, and journalists will write articles. True, the newspaper will not be printed. Subscribers and readers in general will be the worse for it, as well as the numerous "NG" contributors whose articles are in next week's plans but will not be published. On behalf of the editorial office I apologize to all of them, but we have to do this.

"NG" was not the initiator of this action, yet it will take part in it because it has more than once experienced not only the absence of journalist solidarity in Moscow and Russia (the story of our repeat registration), but also a direct and aggressive non-solidarity (attacks on "NG" and other newspapers for the "blank spaces" instead of censured material).

Not many people understand the main economic sense of journalists' demands. Stripped of unessential nuances, the crux of the problem is as follows.

The revaluation of the fixed assets introduced by government decree No. 1233 automatically leads to an increase in all and sundry payments and taxes, etc. To be effected by the owners of these assets. In our case, by the printing and publishing complexes. They would naturally put the burden on their customers, or newspapers and magazines. Hence there will be a doubling or quadrupling (to begin with) of the costs of printing services for editorial offices. According to one version, there is not a direct dependence here, because printers capitalized on this decree in their own interests.

Why was "NG" not the first to propose this action? Just because the relatively small print run of our newspaper takes smaller funds than of those newspapers whose circulation runs to 1 million copies. While we paid, say, 10 million in December, in January we will be obliged to pay 40 million, i.e. 30 million over and above. A newspaper publishing 1 million copies would have to pay 400 million in January instead of 100 million rubles in December, meaning that it would have to "find" another 300 million.

But the thing is that it is the state that owns all printing shops in Russia, as it owned them in the USSR before. A complete monopoly has been preserved here. Therefore, all of us—and you, readers, too—are in the clutches of this state. Or more precisely, the government that runs this property and us all as it sees fit.

It needs only one thing: a monopoly on the distribution of information. Which is why the freedom of speech in Russia is hanging by a thread. It is there but it is hanging. Thus it will perhaps exist until the government becomes sick of it.

Till we meet again in 10 days or perhaps earlier?

We shall see.

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA Not To Strike

PM0501173594 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Silence Again?"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] In the past few days a lot of questions from readers have been coming into our newspaper's editorial office: Will SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA support its colleagues' action? Even without this the newspaper was unlawfully closed down for almost three months, and subscribers failed to receive a great deal of important, true information about a whole period in the life of Russia and the world. Surely we will not be left without a newspaper again, they ask worriedly.

Although we fully share the undoubtedly just indignation of our journalist colleagues at the prevailing price chaos and bureaucratic chaos, we are nevertheless forced to say no to the collective protest action. We hold too dear the possibility—recently infrequent—of communicating with our readers, we have too much to say, we have too many lies to refute. For us, the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA journalists, silence is a luxury we cannot afford.

We have our own score to settle with the present authorities, and it too is not small. No one intends to compensate for the losses to readers and the journalists' collectives which were brought about by the unlawful closure of the newspaper, and subscriptions to our newspapers are being hindered and blocked in every way at the mail offices. Every conceivable and inconceivable obstacle is placed on the path of every issue of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published. The situation is exacerbated many times by the fact that the editorial office's current account was unlawfully impounded literally until yesterday. Because of this we are not in a position to settle our accounts with our partners in the production and distribution of the newspaper in a timely fashion.

In the face of this, to be published, to get through to the reader, having penetrated the cordon of obstacles, means to conquer.

Six Newspapers To Suspend Publication During Clinton Visit

AU0501205894 Paris AFP in English 2047 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, Jan 5 (AFP)—Six Russian newspapers said Wednesday that they would suspend publication for one week from Monday, during US President Bill Clinton's visit, to protest against government restrictions on the press.

The shutdown, which had initially been threatened during a press conference Tuesday, was sparked by a November 25 government decision that would cause a sixfold rise in newspaper production costs.

The newspapers consider this as the latest move to strangle Russia's emerging independent media, and blame the government for fighting to control the mass media rather than to guarantee freedom of the press.

The six politically diverse newspapers—IZVESTIYA, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA and VECHERNAYA MOCKVA—will be shut down for at least one week from January 10, according to a decision by their editors.

Russian journalists' union president Vsevolod Bogdanov said that a majority of local and regional newspapers would also join the movement.

The editors said, however, that they would be willing to renounce the suspension if an immediate solution to their problem was found.

Letter Pleads for ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, Supplement

PM0501175194 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Open letter to Russian Federation Government: "Defend Free Speech"—ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI headline]

[Text] Esteemed Mr Chairman!

Esteemed members of Government!

For several days there have been reports in various mass media and on television and the radio concerning the closure of the newspaper ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, the inaugurator of which was the former Russian Federation Council of Ministers. The reason for the destruction of a newspaper which in the course of the past year has become one of Russia's leading publications, and one, moreover, with its own identity (which is very rare for the present rich newspaper market) is the decision of the journalists' collective to become the founder of its newspaper. In our view the arguments for and aims of this decision are set forth with full justification in published items (ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Nos. 250, 254, and 1-2).

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI's desire to become an autonomous and free representative of the mass media, independent of organs of power, cannot and should not be viewed as a compromise or an attempt to enter into opposition with the government. On the contrary, we are sure that the theme of power and society, the theme of the establishment of Russian statehood, which have been the main ones in ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI and its supplement—VEKHI, the newspaper of the independent intelligentsia—must remain leading ones. It is this free and open expression of feelings and profound thoughts about Russia's paths, its economy, politics, and culture, and about man above all, which must not be fettered by any bureaucratic pressure or membership of the apparatus.

In the democratic state which we have proclaimed and in which we are all learning to live there should be no "vassal press." Otherwise we shall return again to the obedient semi-official organ of PRAVDA and authoritarian methods of leadership.

As readers of ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI we cannot fail to note that the VEKHI supplement is as of today the only platform to express the views and arguments, positions and creations of the most diverse writers, journalists, critics, historians, philosophers, and art critics.

Do not allow the destruction of a child in whose birth you yourselves were involved! Defend the interests of our fellow citizens and readers who have chosen ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI. And there are 600,000 of them.

[signed] Mikhail Ulyanov, Sergey Mikhalkov, Nikita Mikhalkov, Sergey Solovyev, Vladimir Maksimov, Yuriy Lyubimov, Artem Anfinogenov, Yuriy Gnedovskiy, Lyudmila Kasatkina, Sergey Kolosov, Sergey Slonimskiy, Viktor Rozov, Vasiliy Selyunin, Andrey Dementyev, Rimma Kazakova, Valeriya Priyemykhov, Irina Raksha, Vladimir Kostrov.

'Absurd' Lawsuits Against Media Questioned

PM0501170194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[Maks Khazin article: "Barannikov Versus Filatov. Background to Former Russian Security Minister's Suit"]

[Text] The plaintiff did not show up for the first session. I do not think he will appear for the second or for any of the subsequent sessions—however many there may be. But the trial will take its course, because the reason for the plaintiff's nonappearance is a very good one—the jail governor will not let him out.... Nonetheless, nobody has the right to forbid even someone under arrest from using the legal process to uphold his honor and dignity. V. Barannikov has availed himself of this right. Yes, it is the very same man who was formerly minister of internal affairs and subsequently Russian security minister.

Just who defamed his honor and dignity so painfully that the twice ex-minister—who, judging by everything, will have by no means the last place in the dock during the

criminal trial (which, you will agree, would seriously distract anyone from worldly concerns)—sufficiently for him to bring a civil suit?

It is clear from his statement that the suit was prompted by the TV program "Moment of Truth," in which the interviewee—Sergey Filatov, leader of the Russian Federation President's Administration—termed Barannikov's behavior "treachery," clearly claiming that he had "worked for two camps." It is these expressions in quotation marks that the plaintiff is seeking to refute through the courts.

Without in any way predetermining the court's ruling or impinging on its prerogatives and powers, I would nonetheless like to dwell initially on two purely formal points.

First, why was the defendant named as the "All-Union (?) State Television and Radio Company"? What millennium are we living in, Dear Friends? Where is that Union?

Second, why was presenter Andrey Karaulov named as a defendant? After all, as is well known, he is an interviewer, he asks questions—he has no responsibility for the quality or accuracy of the answers. Did he perhaps suggest the answers? The plaintiff does not make this claim. Consequently, the defendant is a man who listened (like millions of viewers) to what the interviewee said. In Barannikov's opinion, this should cost him dear. But more of that later....

We say notion of the fact that this is an attempt to rebut not a widespread and allegedly inaccurate report, but an assessment of someone's behavior—a judgment that any citizen is legally entitled to make. A patient, while not denying that he had numerous symptoms of a certain disease, could with equal success angrily contest the diagnosis reached by the doctor. This is all the more pertinent as Barannikov does not dispute the fact that he was indeed in a different "camp" during the famous events.

But, I repeat, the courts will decide all this. S. Filatov and A. Karaulov do not need my help or protection; their lawyers are highly qualified and have repeatedly confirmed their reputation as very experienced counsel.

But there is one aspect whose importance goes beyond this particular case.

The law allows plaintiffs in cases of this sort to seek compensation from defendants for the moral wrong done them, setting the sum at their own discretion. And it is envisaged that people concerned about their reputation will not be unrealistic and that they have two true friends—logic and common sense.

How much do you think V. Barannikov wants for this "dishonor"? Don't be shy, let's talk big money, using the minimum wage as the starting point—100,000, 200,000, 500,000? Wrong. Surely not a million? Wrong again. How much then? One hundred million. Per person. A total of 200 million.

Well, I could understand if the suit were against some commercial structure—best of all foreign—with the ability to invite the wives of high-ranking law enforcement officers to Switzerland at its own expense, put them up in a swanky hotel, and pay for them to visit jewelry and fur stores. (Incidentally, there is no information from Barannikov or Dunayev to refute this report). The firm could stand it. But, even if we seriously suppose that the courts find for the plaintiff, how can two, albeit presumably highly paid, state servants be expected to come up with this much?

The fact is that nobody expects them to. It is no more than a bold gesture. And no allowances should be made for the stressful situation in which the plaintiff finds himself, or for his being unaccustomed to this situation and the prison regime. Another court is hearing a suit brought by his nearby cellmate, former Vice President A. Rutskoy. This suit is again for 200 million, but it was brought by him, before his arrest, from the unstressful quiet of his own office.

I have written about this too (IZVESTIYA No. 197 of 15 October): These absurd lawsuits against the mass media emerge because the plaintiffs have been relieved of the necessity to pay the state's costs. Any other plaintiff seeking more than 1,000 rubles [R] through the courts is obliged to pay 15 percent of the sum sought before the trial starts. Otherwise the judge will not accept the suit. Incidentally, there has been a proposal to extend this procedure by presidential edict to defamation cases as well.

Doctor of Juridical Sciences Professor I. Noy, a well-known academic, replied to the previous article. He too agrees that the situation is abnormal, but proposes a simpler solution—abolishing Paragraph 11 of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Decree No. 11 of 18 August 1992 "On Certain Issues Arising During Court Hearings of Defamation Cases Against Citizens and Organizations." Indeed, this paragraph allows the courts to seek state costs under such cases only in the amount of...R10. I. Noy believes that the law "On State Costs" has been wrongly interpreted in this instance.

Changing the existing procedure would have no impact on the right of citizens and corporations to uphold their honor, dignity, and business reputation. But it is these nonmaterial categories that will take priority in attempts to bring court cases. The desire on this basis to win a couple of hundred million (or simply to scare people) should, in our view, incur a natural commercial risk.

Ekho Moskvy Radio Considers Joint-Venture Offers

MK0501144094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 1, 2-9 Jan 94 (signed to press 4 Jan) p A3

[Mikhail Shevelev report under the "Market" rubric: "'Echo' Up for Grabs"]

[Text] January promises to be a turning point in the history of the "Ekho Moskvy" radio station. Its future will depend on whose capital it will manage to attract. The largest independent radio station already boasts an audience of 4 million listeners or so.

In Moscow and Moscow Oblast, where "Ekho" is on the air, it has already presented serious competition for

"Radio Rossii" and "Mayak." By the end of 1993, however, it became obvious that "Ekho's" financial position does not look as bright as its approval rating. Wear and tear on its equipment has begun affecting the quality of broadcasting. Meager salaries by comparison with, say, music radio stations, force journalists to look for extra income or to go into business.

If "Ekho Moskvy" is to survive, it has no other choice but to attract outside capital. There have been so far two candidates courting this "bride" —the "Most" financial group and Weigel Broadcasting, an American company.

In the past six months the "Most" group under Vladimir Gusinskiy proved to be an aggressive buyer on the mass media market. At present, it controls the SEGODNYA newspaper and the fourth television channel. What it lacks to have a complete spectrum is a popular radio station. "Most's" offer to "Ekho" looks as follows: an open credit line in exchange for 51 percent of the radio station's stock. This means that the station risks losing political, not only financial, independence.

Weigel Broadcasting is not a newcomer on the broadcasting market: After 25 years in business it owns eight television stations in the United States. According to the company's spokesmen, they are interested in "Ekho's" independence, because in the end it earns a good income. Weigel Broadcasting is ready to invest money not only in equipment: the 50 percent of stock it expects to get in exchange for its services opens up a way toward compromise-based management.

There is no unity inside "Ekho Moskvy" as to whose proposal it should accept. Editor-in-chief Sergey Korzun and journalists are inclined to forge a partnership with Weigel Broadcasting. Proposals by the "Most" group appear enticing to Yuriy Fedutinov, the station's commercial director. The fate of "Ekho Moskvy" will apparently be decided in mid-January at a general meeting of stockholders.

Print Media Price Rise Implications Reviewed

MK0501122094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 1, 2-9 Jan 94 (signed to press 4 Jan) p 5 A

[Viktor Loshak report under the "In the Country" rubric: "Without Newspapers?"]

[Text] There has been no conflict more serious between the press and the authorities in this country than the one that erupted at the end of last year. Trade union leaders and editors in chief of central newspapers have advised the prime minister with coal miners-style bluntness and solidarity of their plans to cease issuing their publications unless Viktor Chernomyrdin changes his Decree No. 1233 concerning printers, paper industry workers, and mailmen. If the professional rebellion is in any way different from others that have already swept the country a number of times, it is that the newsmen have not said a single word about their own well-being. The only thing they request is: Do not give ill-conceived orders the most immediate consequences of which will tighten the noose around the entire press and thus the possibilities of tens and tens of millions of people to get printed information.

The letter signed by 25 editors in chief is unique also because newspapers of nearly the entire political spectrum have seen their interests converge at the point of death. Faced with the threat of a sixfold or higher rise in tariffs, even the most well-to-do ones have sensed the chill of nonexistence. As co-authors of a letter challenging the government, all of them have displayed a certain courage, but what I see as a desperate step was taken precisely by those who issue their publications using that same government's money. While rebuking or ignoring the rest, the government can simply cut off oxygen from its own newspapers. The restive ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI may be a case in point—according to rumors, the plans are to close the newspaper and to set up a new, obedient publication in its stead.

Many people suspect that by driving tariffs through the roof with one hand and handing out subsidies with the other, the authorities are conducting a selection on the current newspaper market. All the more so because journalists have already swallowed without a wince the trial pill of the House of the Russian Press being taken away from them.

On the whole, nothing extraordinary has been under way: the redistribution taking place on the markets of authority and ownership cannot but trigger yet new battles on the information market. When it has finally dawned that to come to power in this country one needs simply to stick around in the television box as long as possible, the main battles broke out behind television programs' scenes. Given that the biggest bucks in the information business are made precisely behind those same scenes, neither strange edicts on the fourth channel, nor regular reshuffles of television chiefs, nor the fact that upon hearing cries "Thief!" no one rushed to fire or arrest anyone come as a surprise.

It is television that has drawn a line without any help from the press at an entire stage of the mass media's evolution. The celebration of the new political year was a propaganda fiasco of such scope that people usually do not get back to their former jobs in Federal Information Centers, ministries, or press services. However this matter might be resolved technically, there is nothing to be done with the public opinion any longer. I do not rule out a situation, however, where someone in the president's or the prime minister's entourage would start whispering: Former ministers are gone, and see what happened—the press staged a mutiny.

If this is a mutiny, it is a mutiny of despair. It evolves against the backdrop of determining the results of subscription. By and large, the readers' audience is beginning to melt, if it is not already melting. There is only a total of three newspapers with 1 million or more subscribers, whereas as early as one year ago there were nearly 10 of them.

In fact, leaving the letter of the editors in chief unanswered, the authorities are simply drawing practical conclusions from their assessment of the press' performance on the eve of the party vote. For those who themselves are to bear most of the blame, the journalists' fault is both convenient and evident. A politician reproached MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI for having failed, along with other newspapers, to warn society about the threat of Zhirinovskiy. When the critic was shown a November issue, in which even the cover spoke about the threat, he at once "turned his coat:" Zhirinovskiy allegedly won because you advertised him, among other things. Having published their letter in 25 publications, the leaders of journalists unions and editors in chief have to a certain extent become hostages to the government. After all, people subscribed to IZVESTIYA, TRUD, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and so forth, not to Chernomyrdin. It is the publications that should be held responsible. But to an even greater extent we are still hostages to the printers, mailmen, and paper industry workers. Publishers have already attributed the current fourfold (!) increase in prices to the government decree, against which the newsmen's letter is aimed. In the first half of last year, however, the publishers did not need any decree at all to effect an almost similar price rise. What if our letter will serve the interests of yet another state monopoly? Will the signature by the president of the publishers' association be a sufficient guarantee?

Indeed, government decree No. 1233 elicits both bewilderment and protest. But who can guarantee that subsidies instead will not raise even more questions? Will we be able to find common ground then? The statement is only a preamble, albeit an important one, to further solidarity actions.

Regional Affairs

Moscow Government Limits Weekend Opposition Protests

PM0501171994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Viktor Belikov report: "Moscow Government Restricts Scale of 'Protest Actions'"]

[Text] Having examined notifications from opposition organizations concerning mass measures to be held 9, 11, and 12 January, the Moscow government has adopted decisions sharply reducing the number of people permitted to participate in them and changing the places where the demonstrations will be held.

The leaders of the "Russian All-National Union," the National Salvation Front, the Russian Communist Workers Party, and "Working Moscow," had coordinated their plans in terms of the time and place of mass actions of "protest against the 21 September-4 October 1993 coup d'etat." The demonstrations were meant to be timed to coincide with the opening of the State Duma, starting Sunday with a rally on Free Russia Square outside the White House. Then on Tuesday and Wednesday the plan was to picket the approaches to the Kremlin, conduct a mass rally on Lubyanka Square in the evening, and organize a procession of thousands through the city's main streets.

As was announced 5 January at a City Hall meeting with representatives of the action's organizers, the Moscow government has made an area near the Russian White House available for a rally of up to 1,000 participants on 9 January. A mass rally cannot possibly be held 11 January on Lubyanka Square because of the inevitable disruptions and interruptions in the work of city transportation during the rush hour. "Sakharovskaya Ploshchadka" (No. 1) at Luzhniki is being made available instead.

There will be no pickets outside the Kremlin or large processions along streets in downtown Moscow. Instead, 100 pickets may appear at the high-rise State Duma building on Novyy Arbat between 0900 and 1900 on 12 January.

Chechnya To Hold Elections for Parliament 13 Mar

LD0601095194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0840 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—The Russian Central Electoral Commission has announced on Thursday that elections to the new Russian parliament will be held in the self-styled Caucasian republic of Chechnya on March 13, 1994.

Chechnya, which proclaimed sovereignty, refused to hold elections to the new Russian legislature on December 12.

The Central Electoral Commission proposed to the people and the leadership of Chechnya to "consider and positively solve the issue of the republican participation in elections to the Federal Assembly of Russia in March 1994".

"The Chechen republic, according to the Russian Constitution, was and remains a fully-fledged subject of Russia and should be worthily represented in the Federal Assembly", the commission said.

Electoral Commission's Appeal to Chechens

LD0501230294 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] We have just received the text of probably the final appeal and the resolution issued by the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation to the people and the leaders of the Chechen Republic. The appeal says: We suggest that you examine and make a positive decision on the question of the Chechen Republic's participation in the elections to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to be held in March 1994. In accordance with the constitution of the Russian Federation, the Chechen Republic was and still remains a component part of the Russian Federation and has every right to be properly

represented in the Russian Federation's Federal Assembly. The resolution proposes that elections are to be held on 13 March 1994.

Electoral Commission Announces New Polls in Tatarstan

LD0601110294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1021 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Novikov]

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS—The Russian Central Electoral Commission announced on Thursday that new elections to the Russian parliament will be held on March 13, 1994 in the Republic of Tatarstan where less than 50 per cent of the electorate came to the polls on December 12.

In the self-styled republic of Chechnya, where elections were not held at all, the new polls are also scheduled for March 13.

In other Russian constituencies where December elections failed new polls will be held either on March 6 or 26.

North Ossetian Elections Seen as 'Extremely Untimely'

LD0501213094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1348 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Head of the North Ossetian Government Sergey Khetagurov described the presidential elections scheduled for January 16 as "extremely untimely." According to INTERFAX sources, Khetagurov told North Ossetian intellectuals that the first round of elections would be unlikely to bring about definite results.

He urged the voters to rally around the future president and prevent a social split irrespective of the election results.

The Central Electoral Commission informed INTERFAX, meanwhile, that 6 out of the 8 candidates would continue the presidential race. Two candidates, among them former first secretary of the North Ossetian Communist Party Committee Aleksandr Dzasokhov, have withdrawn their candidacies.

Dzasokhov stated that he had removed his candidacy "in the interests of social consolidation and victory of the sound forces".

Kabardino-Balkar Parliament Session Confirms 'Consensus'

PM0501141794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Nikolay Gritchin report: "No National Radicals in Kabardino-Balkar Parliament"]

[Text] Nalchik—The Kabardino-Balkar Republic parliament will start work following the Christmas vacation. Not a single national radical has made it into the supreme legislative organ this time. In electing 72 deputies for the next four years from 224 candidates, the republic's population definitely showed its preference for centrists.

Between 18 months and two years ago the republic experienced an upsurge of national extremism—there were open-ended rallies in Nalchik's main square attended by thousands of people calling on the authorities to resign, protest hunger strikes, and even an attempt to storm Government House. In order to defuse the situation, V. Kokov then relinquished his powers as chairman of the republic's Supreme Council. Tired of living under the threat of violence, the people rejected the extremists' calls and in the first presidential elections plumped for V. Kokov from among the many candidates. His policy of stabilization, consensus, and unity with Russia is supported today too. Confirmation of that was the first joint session of the chambers held just before the New Year. It elected the chamber chairmen and deputy chairmen backed by President V. Kokov. The Council of the Republic is headed by Vice Premier Z. Nakhushev, who is a Kabardin. The Council of Representatives is headed by M. Zhaboyev, technical director of the Tyrnyauz Tungsten and Molybdenum Combine (Europe's largest), who is a Balkar. The deputy chairmen are Russians—L. Fedochenko, deputy director of the Uplands Geophysical Institute, and Ye. Golovko, director of a sewn goods enterprise.

A note of consensus was struck by the voters themselves. Contrary to the fears that people would vote only for representatives of their own ethnic group, the Russian Mayskiy Rayon elected as parliamentary deputy the Kabardin Yu. Shomakhov, while Nalchik plumped for a Kabardin, a Balkar, and a Russian. But the republic is most proud of the fact that a confident victory in the elections to the Council of Representatives was won by A. Shkhagoshev, a senior official at the Kabardino-Balkar MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Administration for Combating Organized Crime, who lost his hands when confiscating a grenade from a participant in the open-ended rally outside Government House 18 months ago. People from different ethnic groups collected money to pay for him to be treated in Germany. The German doctors managed to achieve the inconceivable—they sewed his hands back on. Adalbi Lyulevich can now do a great deal with these hands—he even drives.

Vologda Official Protests Governor's Plan for Oblast Duma

PM0501150294 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Viktor Filippov report: "Vologda Governor Forms Docile Duma"]

[Text] Vologda—Top state officials have again fallen out in Vologda. Governor Nikolay Podgornov has set the local duma elections for 20 March. But president's representative Guriy Sudakov has publicly described the future duma at a press conference as a "device for voting through projects prepared by the administration."

Professor Guriy Sudakov delivered this sharply worded statement after analyzing how many documents on the local duma elections and local self-government organs signed by Nikolay Podgornov are in line with the Constitution and the president's Edict "On the Basic Principles of the Organization of State Power in the Components of the Russian Federation."

"The system of powers in the region should be balanced," according to president's representative Sudakov. "But since October we have only had executive-administrative power operating here. In addition, the temptation has arisen to exploit the upcoming elections to consolidate that priority forever. Under the president's edict, the rayon self-government organ is to be formed from representatives of the self-government organs of villages, settlements, and so forth. But according to the statute signed by the Vologda Oblast head of administration, the rayon assemblies will be formed solely from the heads of local administrations."

In his opinion, representative power in Vologda Oblast will, if formed according to Governor Podgornov's conception, be subordinate to executive power. Among other things, the governor has set tough deadlines within which the future oblast duma must submit legal acts to him for signature.

The membership of the Vologda Oblast Duma has been determined by the governor at 15 deputies, only six of whom will work on a permanent basis. The governor has allowed workers in organs of executive power to combine their duties with deputy status. President's representative Sudakov fears that on 20 March the people of Vologda will get an administrative-industrial lobby obedient to the governor instead of a proper legislative organ.

International Affairs

START Delegation Meets With President Clinton

LD0601115594 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1100 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Text] U.S. President Bill Clinton received members of Ukraine's official working delegation, Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasyuk, and Oleh Bilorus, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United States, in the White House. The conversation centered on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament issues. Questions of bilateral relations such as, in particular, stepping up cooperation between the two states in the sphere of the economy and U.S. assistance to Ukraine's defense industry in carrying out conversion, were also addressed.

Valeriy Shmarov expressed gratitude to President Clinton for the positive role the United States is playing in organizing and holding trilateral consultations between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in order to settle complex issues facing Ukraine in pursuing the course toward attaining nonnuclear status.

This was a report from the NOVYNY television and radio agency at the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry's press center.

Doubts Remain on Resolving Nuclear Issue at Moscow Meeting

LD0501183094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1616 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature: reports by Diplomatic Correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoi and others]

[Text] During a three-sided meeting of the presidents of Russia, Ukraine and the United States in Moscow, not all issues, if any, concerning nuclear weapons in Ukraine are likely to be cleared up. The only thing Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine can do is to confirm unambiguously to Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton his republic's international commitments on nuclear disarmament and promise to submit again the START-I treaty for ratification by the new parliament.

This statement was made to INTERFAX Wednesday by a senior Russian diplomat responsible for Russian-Ukrainian relations.

He believes that the likely three-sided summit may present a good opportunity for Kravchuk to distance himself in public from the partial ratification of the treaty.

The diplomat has said the United States promised to Ukraine financial aid worth $170 Mn [Million] as soon as the disarmament process begins.

The Americans are practically-minded people. They will not give money to Ukraine for mere promises, he said.

Defense Representative Denies Meeting

LD0501215294 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2030 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev—Speaking to a UNIAN correspondent, a representative of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense press center denied Russian media reports (particularly those by ITAR-TASS and Ostankino) about Ukrainian-Russian military consultations in Kiev on the future fate of the nuclear arms deployed on the territory of Ukraine, allegedly due to start on 5 January with the participation of Defense Ministers Vitaliy Radetskyy and Pavel Grachev. "The Ministry of Defense did not plan for such a meeting on 5-6 January," the press center representative said. He added that work is in progress on preparations for a bilateral agreement on military cooperation, and Ukrainian-Russian military consultations on the issue were already held from 28 to 29 December in Moscow. According to an earlier UNIAN report, the Ukrainian delegation was led by Deputy Minister of Defense Ivan Oliynyk.

In the view of a high-ranking Ministry of Defense representative who would not give his name, a meeting of Ukrainian and Russian defense ministry delegations on the nuclear arms issue will be possible only after the problem is discussed by the presidents of both countries, or at least by government delegations.

Foreign Minister Sends Message to PRC's Qian Qichen

LD0501194994 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1321 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev—A UNIAN correspondent was informed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on 4 January that Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko, has sent a personal message to Qian Qichen, vice premier of the State Council and minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of China, in connection with the second anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic links between Ukraine and China. In particular the letter notes that "China became one of the first states in the world to recognize Ukraine, establish diplomatic relations with it, and open its embassy in Kiev. China's attitude to the development of relations with Ukraine is highly valued in our young country. The visits to China by Leonid Kravchuk, president of Ukraine, and Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council, in this short period of time have demonstrated this."

It was reported at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the legal and contractual basis of inter-state relations between both states has been elaborated much better than that with many other states which had stronger links with Ukraine prior to the break-up of the USSR. Twelve documents were signed during the visit to China by Leonid Kravchuk in 1992 alone, some of which have already been ratified by both parliaments. According to information of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of Ukraine, according to the results for 1993, China is the leader in the East Asian region in volume of exports from Ukraine. The People's Republic of China purchases road technology, electrical

equipment, timber, cement, metal, pipes, fittings, and other goods from us. The structure of products imported from China is distributed almost evenly between products of light and textile industries, products of the conversion of the Chinese military-industrial complex, and agricultural produce.

A reception on the occasion of the second anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two states took place at the embassy of the People's Republic of China in Ukraine on 4 January. Yuriy Rylach, deputy minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, who was present at the reception, expressed the hope for further fruitful development of interstate relations. Ivan Drach, chairman of the "Ukraine" society; Petro Myroshnykov, chairman of the Ukrainian-Chinese friendship society; and Valentyn Lipatov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of Ukraine, were also present at the reception. Zhang Zhen, ambassador of the People's Republic of China in Ukraine, thanked the guests from ministries and departments of Ukraine, the active members of the Ukrainian-Chinese friendship society, and representatives from business circles of the capital and from the diplomatic corps for their attention and cooperation.

Ambassador Shcherbak Meets With Israeli Opposition Leader

AU0501132994 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 4 Jan 94 p 5

[Unattributed report: "A Meeting With an Opposition Leader"]

[Text] Ukraine's Ambassador to Israel Yu. Shcherbak met with B. Netaniyahu, leader of the parliamentary opposition in the Knesset. During their conversation, the ambassador told him in detail about the political and economic situation in Ukraine. Yu. Shcherbak laid particular emphasis upon the issues of nuclear disarmament in the context of the ratification by the Supreme Council of START-1 and the Lisbon Protocol. B. Netaniyahu showed understanding of Ukraine's position and stressed the need for a concrete, well-weighed, and differentiated approach to the problem of nuclear disarmament.

Ukrainian People's Deputies Comment on Russian Elections

WA0501001994

[Editorial Report] Kiev TV-1 Television Network in Ukrainian at 1900 GMT on 14 December carries its regular "UTN" program which contains a report on the reaction of Ukrainian People's Deputies to the results of elections in Russia.

Head of the Democratic Party, People's Deputy V. Yavorivskiy says that now Ukraine has Zhirinovskiy's Russia, not Yeltsin's Russia, as a neighbor. He says that this should be a serious lesson to Ukraine. He then says that even though he believes that there are no forces similar to Zhirinovskiy's forces in Ukraine, all the Ukrainian forces should ask the people of Ukraine to elect sensible people to the Parliament.

People's Deputy B. Oleynik stresses the point that Yeltsin himself and his forces brought Zhirinovskiy to victory, just like Gorbachev brought Yeltsin to victory.

People's Deputy Yu. Gnatkevich says that lesson no. 1 is that the Ukraine should implement reforms rather than mark time, otherwise the people will vote for any dictator or a demagogue. Lesson no. 2 is that exhaustive information about elections should be provided, because people are confused and can elect someone who simply gives good promises. Lesson no. 3 is that democrats should unite on the basis of a common platform and should form a single bloc that would unite all those who support reforms, private property, and denationalization. Another lesson is that elections in Russia showed that people can access power in Russia on the basis of slogans proclaiming restoration of the foundations of a great imperial power.

This is followed by a commentary over visuals by Yu. Gorovoy on the same subject. Reporter comments on territorial claims made by Zhirinovskiy in the course of his election campaign, noting that he already refers to Ukraine as "small Russia" and does not hide his intention to restore Russia within the boundaries of the former empire. Reporter then says that Ukraine should remember the "mistakes of its great neighbor", which are as follows. The central bodies of power were completely detached from provinces. The economic program has proved itself only in theory. As for the population, it could not endure social problems associated with transition from a planned economy to a market economy. The main reason for the success of the Reds and the Brownshirts is lack of unity between democratic parties, which failed to recognize a common enemy due to internal discord. If Ukraine wants to preserve its independence, it should recognize this enemy, evaluate it, and develop a process to ensure formation of a strong and healthy Parliament and the government.

Liberal Democrats Denounce Russia's Zhirinovskiy

LD0501142494 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2020 GMT 4 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev—On 4 January in a conversation with a UNIAN correspondent, Volodymyr Klymchuk, the leader of the LDPU [Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine] noted that apart from the name, Ukrainian Liberal Democrats have nothing in common with Zhirinovskiy's party. "In the near future we want to appeal with an initiative to the Liberal International, which unites parties from the whole world that have a liberal democratic orientation, to deprive the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia of its name, because being chauvinistic in content, this party has discredited the ideas of liberalism and democracy, said Volodymyr Klymchuk.

Black Sea Naval Engineers Swear Allegiance

MK0501141094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jan 94 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "NEGA Reports" rubric: "Crimea"]

[Text] Officers of the Black Sea Fleet naval engineering service departments in Nikolayev and Odessa have voluntarily taken the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. In a briefing held at the Black Sea Fleet press center devoted to these events, it was however stated that the transfer of Black Sea Fleet naval engineering service departments to the subordination of Ukraine's Navy and Defense Ministry had been taking place with the aid of submachine gunners. The Black Sea Fleet command believes that such actions were sanctioned by Ukraine.

Polish Services Hold Lvov Oblast Officer on Spying Charges

AU0401152194 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 1 Jan 94 p 3

[Report by Bohdan Kushnir, MOLOD UKRAYINY special correspondent, from Mostyskyy Rayon in Lvov Oblast: "Major of Ukraine's Security Service Anatoliy Lysenko Celebrated the New Year in a Polish Prison"]

[Text] Relations between the special services of neighboring countries have always had their own traditions: They may be good-neighborly, even friendly, or, at least, colleagues may always find a common language. The problem lies in what they are after. Traditions are only just taking shape in the relations between Poland and Ukraine, because, until quite recently, the two countries were under control of the almighty KGB, and their special services danced to the same tune. The history of these relations has only started to take shape, although not in the best spirit. Its first page is the fate of Anatoliy Lysenko, major of the Mostyskyy Rayon (in Lvov Oblast) Department of Ukraine's Security Service.

On 23 August 1993, the major of Ukrainian special services was arrested on the territory of Poland and accused of espionage. It is already the fourth month that Anatoliy has been under investigation. The trial will be held soon. It is a strange case—the major was arrested not far from the border. On his trip to Poland, Anatoliy was accompanied by his whole family—wife, student daughter, and a little son. He did not receive permission to leave from his authorities—for lack of time. Doctors insisted on the fourth operation on his son, and the parents decided to seek the advice of an experienced Polish specialist. In addition, there was nobody he could ask permission from—the chief was away on leave, and his deputies were afraid to take the responsibility upon themselves. The Lysenko family decided to go to Rzeszow on their own, though they did have corresponding documents for crossing the border.

Nowhere in the history of special services worldwide will one find a precedent in which a whole family would be engaged in spying. The version maintaining that Major Lysenko collected intelligence information seems, to put it mildly, doubtful not only to professionals. It is a different matter that the Poles, taking advantage of the distress of the Lysenko family, did everything in order to lure the major to their territory. The first officer, who was in charge of the Mostyskyy Customs House and who, apparently, ensured free border crossings for more than one cargo, could not but interest his Polish colleagues. The Mostyskyy Customs House is the gate to Western Europe, and officers of the local department of Ukraine's Security Service are a Klondike of intelligence information. The "proofs" of espionage about which Lysenko's wife writes in her appeal to the Ukrainian president, are ridiculous. Lysenko allegedly asked one Pole to bring a few newspapers from Poland; another time, he asked about who was going to head the religious community in Przemysl and when the clergyman there would be replaced. Finally, the most serious accusation—he helped a Polish citizen to bypass Customs. Based upon a testimony of their citizen, Polish special services charged the major with espionage and applied to him an article of the Criminal Code envisaging between five and 15 years imprisonment or capital punishment.

Although, Major Lysenko has yet another choice—to betray his fatherland. The Poles are offering him a job in their special services, to bring his family, and adopt Polish citizenship.

Meanwhile, Ukraine's Security Service, having abandoned their colleague to the mercy of fate, maintains calm and pretends that nothing has happened. The Poles show greater interest in Lysenko's case, because they already repeatedly hinted that Ukrainian leaders should come to his rescue. Judging by numerous hints, it is not just a matter of Anatoliy Lysenko's fate. It appears that we are dealing here with the worst variant of relations between special services, where the rule "tit for tat" is in effect. Consequently, Ukrainian special services pushed their Polish colleagues to a decisive step, or else the Poles decided that attack was the best type of defense. As a result, Ukraine's Security Service Major Anatoliy Lysenko celebrates the coming of the New Year in a Polish prison, his wife Olena haunts the thresholds of high-ranking officials, who can only help by appointing a lawyer. Perhaps, they do not want to help? It only remains for us to wonder what kind of logic the Polish special services adhered to by picturing a modest rayon official as the greatest Ukrainian spy. It is possible that Anatoliy does not even have an idea about this. Now, his colleagues will welcome him as a hero....

Lvov Railroad To Receive Better Access to Europe Via Poland

WS0501195994 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] In December, a meeting was held in Khyriv in Lvov Oblast between representatives of the Lvov Railroad and the National Railroads of Poland. The meeting was devoted to Ukraine's repeated requests to initiate direct railroad links between the Ukrainian juncture of Khyriv and Kroscienko in Poland. This would grant Ukraine additional access to Germany, Austria, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Having spent 222 million karbovanetses on preparations for this undertaking, Ukraine planned to open the route on 31 December 1993.

However, the Polish side declared that the lack of appropriate infrastructure for customs and border troops would hinder the process. The Poles also did not agree to operate a joint customs and border checkpoint on Ukrainian territory. Following this declaration, Lvov Railroad Deputy Manager Tkachuk threatened to block the Polish Przemysl-Kroscienko route stretching in part via the Ukrainian station of Khyriv. According to MOLODA HALYCHYNA, the threat worked and the Polish side gave in.

Volodymyr Kulyk, head of the International Routes Department deemed as "absolute nonsense" the report on Tkachuk's ultimatum. According to him, the route will open no sooner than 31 May 1994.

National Affairs

Official Views Conditional Ratification of START I

WS0401150094 Kiev SAMOSTIYNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 20 Dec 93 p 6

[Interview with Bohdan Horyn, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council commission for foreign relations, by Myroslav Levytskyy; place and date not given: "Ukraine Takes Historic Steps, But Russia Plans Drastic Measures in Turn"]

[Text] **Among the deputies who worked on a committee for ratification of the START I agreement was Bohdan Horyn, deputy chairman of the commission for foreign relations, who agreed to comment on the Supreme Council's resolution of START I and other related questions.**

[Horyn] The Supreme Council resolution ratifying the START I treaty and Lisbon Protocol was an historic moment in helping address the issue of nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine. Ukraine has earnestly been preparing for the adoption of this important document. However, following the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine, this step has not been properly understood by other countries.

I want to stress that the Supreme Council resolution of 18 November has several important points. Ukraine, being one of the inheritors to the USSR, ratified the treaty with provisos made for the USSR, which obliged the latter to reduce 36 percent of warhead carriers and 42 percent of all warheads. Ukraine became a party to the treaty after the disintegration of the USSR; it signed the Lisbon Protocol with one particular item: Article 5 has put Ukraine within a framework that would have been very tight if the protocol had been ratified in its original version. Therefore, the resolution states that the Lisbon Protocol has been ratified with the exclusion of Article 5.

Article 5 provides for Ukraine joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty with the status of a nonnuclear state. Taking into account that Ukraine keeps nuclear weapons on its territory and that they are Ukrainian property, Ukraine's joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state, while at the same time retaining its nuclear weapons, would be an illogical step and cause a misunderstanding in the world community. Reassuring the world that Ukraine joined the treaty as a nonnuclear state, while keeping nuclear weapons on its territory, we would not quite be in line with logic. Therefore, according to the Constitution, the final say had to come from the Supreme Council. The Lisbon Protocol cannot be a binding document unless ratified.

I believe the assertions of individual officials that Ukraine will destroy all its nuclear weapons without condition are a little premature. Such assertions are unfounded. There were two opinions during the preparations for ratifying START I. The deputies who prepared the resolution pressed for determining the percentage ratio of nuclear reduction as a next step toward nonnuclear status. The executive structures expressed the opinion that the percentages should not be fixed because this may complicate the understanding of Ukraine's position by other states. The stance of individual representatives of executive power has been dictated by promises and assertions that they made during numerous interviews and meetings with high-ranking foreign officials. This obliged them to defend their position during the preparation of the Supreme Council draft resolution.

[Levytskyy] *The last word was left for the Supreme Council, so why were diplomats in such a hurry to make promises?*

[Horyn] Diplomacy is often put in a complicated position of choice. Since Ukraine has unceasingly been pressed by certain countries, particularly by Russia, executive branch representatives were forced to make promises under pressure.

[Levytskyy] *Still, at one news conference, Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk stated that, within the START I framework, all nuclear weapons are subject to destruction.*

[Horyn] I think that the deputy minister misspoke. The START I agreement was signed by the United States and USSR. Ukraine has joined it after the downfall of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the norms of reduction were in the competence of the Supreme Council. Taking into account that there were some mistakes made in the initial stage of Ukraine's path to nonnuclear status, this act has not been legalized by appropriate documents. In the second stage, as I believe, previous mistakes were noted and the possibility of implementation was examined. We have a grounded document with all the complexities taken into account. These documents give witness to the maturity of political thinking and the new level of caution exercised by the deputy body when adopting important political resolutions.

[Levytskyy] *What was the position of the manager body [dyrektorskyy korpus] with regard to this question?*

[Horyn] The so-called deputy majority has undergone many changes in its attitude toward nuclear weapons. While adopting the Declaration of State Sovereignty, the managers said that Ukraine should not give away its nuclear weapons to Russia because these weapons are of great material value and constitute a reliable guarantee of our security.

[Levytskyy] *However, along with this assessment of the problem, the Supreme Council has put forth declarations on our status as a nonnuclear state?*

[Horyn] The declarations on Ukraine's nonnuclear status have exerted great influence on quickening the international recognition of Ukraine. It seems to me that if we had chosen a different path, the making of our statehood would have met with many more difficulties.

However, the Declaration of State Sovereignty and the Supreme Soviet resolutions were the very documents which expressed Ukraine's willingness to become a nonnuclear state in the future. These documents cannot be interpreted as obligations. Ukraine's first international obligation to reduce nuclear weapons was a Supreme Council resolution of 18 November 1993.

[Levytskyy] *This question is assessed by the world in its own way. Nuclear states have a negative view of the Supreme Council resolution.*

[Horyn] The first reaction was voiced by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. He argued that Ukraine had declared itself a nuclear state. I will try to explain his position. Russia, during the first stage of Ukraine's path to nonnuclear status, behaved like a state that has full control over foreign territory. Tactical nuclear weapons were stolen from Ukraine by strategic units, which at that time were under the control of the CIS Supreme Headquarters. Ukraine had no chance to counteract Russia's unceremonious behavior on Ukrainian territory.

Taking this into account, Ukraine put strategic nuclear weapons under administrative control. Russia has lost an opportunity to withdraw strategic nuclear weapons from Ukraine without Ukraine's consent. Moreover, despite the fact that the possessions of the former USSR on Ukrainian territory were declared to be Ukrainian property, Russia did not recognize that the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukraine were Ukrainian property. It was done without regard to the fact that Russia has also adopted a zero option. Nonrecognition of property implies a denial of compensation for material goods, for enriched uranium and plutonium.

There is also a third reason for the harsh Russian reaction. Politicians in Moscow understand pretty well that strategic nuclear weapons are a stimulating factor. Even despite the fact that Ukraine does not exercise operational control over strategic nuclear weapons, their presence plays an important and stimulating role. Therefore, Ukraine cannot be approached unceremoniously, as was done with Moldova, Georgia, and Tajikistan.

[Levytskyy] *How will the ratification of START 1 and, subsequently, the destruction of nuclear missiles affect the economic situation in Ukraine?*

[Horyn] The reservations in the ratification document state that Ukraine will be able to implement the adopted obligations providing it receive appropriate financial and material assistance from Western countries, as well as security guarantees. I would like to stress that the international community should be interested in Ukraine's movement toward nonnuclear status. The reduction of nuclear weapons is a matter of great interest for Ukraine as well, which has suffered from Chernobyl. This is a matter of interest for the United States, at which those rockets are aimed. The United States should take the most active part in liquidating nuclear weapons, because this question directly affects U.S. national security.

[Levytskyy] *Thank you for the interview.*

Nuclear Industry 'Disintegration' Viewed

PM0501144594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Panchenko: "Chain Reaction of Disintegration. The Catastrophic State of Nuclear Power Engineering in Ukraine"]

[Text] Energodar-Zaporozhye—The Ukrainian Supreme Council has lifted the moratorium which it introduced in August 1990 on the construction of new units at the republic's nuclear stations. The ban is lifted, but the chain reaction provoked by it continues.

The Chernobyl disaster hit Ukraine twice. The first time was in April 1986; the second in the summer of 1990. Behind the "concern for the people's welfare" which moved some people's deputies to conduct an unprecedented antinuclear campaign could be seen a desire to reap political capital quickly for themselves.

Hotheads, only superficially familiar with the problem, assured the people that Ukraine could get by without nuclear electric power stations [AES], and if they were all closed no one would notice. Things never got as far as closures, but a moratorium, the idea of which was supported by the Ukrainian Communist Party and Communist deputies in parliament, was adopted.

...Ukraine's five AES's have fourteen power units with a total capacity of 12.8 million kw. In 1990 they provided a little less than one-third of all electricity generated in the republic. Today nuclear stations bear 40 percent of the load.

But at the same time the symptoms of the current power crisis were already more than obvious. Since 1988 the generation of electricity in the republic has constantly declined. There are two reasons for this: First, half of the equipment at thermal electric power stations [TES] is worn out and needs to be replaced. Second, the extraction of energy sources has declined in both Russia and Ukraine, and their price has risen. But whereas TES's have reduced production, AES's have increased theirs year after year.

...Parliament's former decision halted the construction of three megawatt units in the Zaporozhye, Rovno, and Khmelnitskaya AES's. Economists have estimated that, given international electricity prices of 6-7 cents per kilowatt, a year's moratorium on one unit costs the country $500 million. However, this is not all: In shutting the door to nuclear power engineering, the Supreme Council automatically halted the development of high technologies in Ukraine.

The first to disperse were the builders. Then came the turn of personnel operating the AES's themselves. Clever people, the majority of them young, at once understood that the moratorium sounded the death knell to their careers in Ukraine. No new units—no new positions. And pay? In Russia the controller of a unit [operator upravlenii blokom] earns $300 a month, whereas at the Zaporozhye AES it is 10 times less. Many, just to support their families, are forced to dash off to Moscow after their shift and sell goods...

When Russia began to launch its own nuclear power engineering program, recruiters went in droves to Energodar and other Ukrainian AES's. They offer the specialists they need not only a decent wage, but also apartments. Highly skilled workers, whose training takes from three to five years, began to pack their suitcases en masse. This year alone around 400 qualified nuclear engineers left for Russia. If things continue like this, Vladimir Bronnikov, director of the Zaporozhye AES stated, there will be simply no one to operate the sixth unit.

The moratorium forced plants producing equipment for AES's to seek orders more crudely. The quality control system became unnecessary and collapsed. As a result, many enterprises can no longer deliver equipment meeting the requirements of nuclear power engineering. The shortage of equipment and its low quality and high cost have slowed the rate of the refitting of operational units. It is clear that their safety has not increased as a result.

It is now clear that the aims declared by the moratorium's supporters were not achieved. The ecological situation in Ukraine has not improved; rather the reverse. The generation of electricity has fallen.

What should be done next? The moratorium has been lifted, but, alas, this will not affect the power crisis in the republic. The sixth unit at the Energodar AES will come on stream not earlier than next March-April. Zaporozhye AES workers, despite the ban, have nevertheless been able to assemble the equipment and keep it in pre-operational mode. At the Rovno and Khmelnitskaya stations construction of units is not complete, and the equipment is not yet all in place. Now it will have to be collected from all over the CIS or production will have to be set up in Ukraine. Specialists believe that, on condition that it is given strong state support, work could be completed there in 1995-1996.

But what question can there be of support, when the Ministry of Power and Electrification owes the Zaporozhye station alone more than 30 billion karbovantsy for energy already produced? Ukraine's debt to its neighbors is great. So that the future of these units is unclear, as is the future of power engineering in the republic as a whole.

Government Signs Agreement With Crimea on Tax System

LD0501190994 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1200 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Simferopol, 5 Jan—The press service of the Crimean Council of Ministers reports that Ukraine and the Crimea have signed an agreement on introducing a national taxation system into the tax relations between the Crimea and Ukraine. In accordance with this, taxes payable by the citizens of the Crimea will go to the budget of the Republic of the Crimea. A sum equal to one-twentieth of the state budget of Ukraine will in its turn be payable as contributions by the republic's centralized budget to Kiev. The relevant document was signed by Acting Ukrainian Prime Minister Yukhym Zvyahilskyy and the chairman of the Crimean Council of Ministers, Borys Samsonov.

Council Chairman, New Ukraine Leader Assess 1993

WS0501143494 Kiev KYYIVSKA PRAVDA in Ukrainian 1 Jan 94 p 1

[Statements by Supreme Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch and New Ukraine leader Volodym[illegible] Hrynyov; place and date not given: "Let Us Light New Year Candles for Fulfilling Our Wishes"]

[Text] [Plyushch] This past year has not been easy for our country and people. However, those who believe that the current hardships and economic crisis have been originated exclusively during the years of Ukraine's independence are wrong. I would like to recall that from 1985 [to 1990] the USSR foreign debt increased from $28 billion to $55 billion, and hard currency reserves decreased two-fold. This "spending" took place over some five years. In other words, we have come to the crisis not alone, but along with our brothers and sisters from the Union, during several years. By the way, they also, as well as an array of countries from the former socialist camp, are experiencing difficulties caused by the processes connected with economic reform.

However, we are not without sin. One could provide many examples of our own mistakes caused by the extreme complexity of the state-building process, our lack of experience, and our evident shortsightedness.

Nevertheless, we should not seek the guilty today, as we used to do, but we should jointly find a solution. One such solution, in my opinion, is to liberate producers of industrial and agricultural goods. In place of the Moscow government, today we have the one in Kiev. Certain voices can being heard saying that it is necessary to establish tough administrative structures in the oblasts, and that they should take everything in their hands and restore order. But a producer should only obey the law and by the law be connected with the state.

In politics, there is a priority task for us today—elections for the new legislature formed along professional lines.

Certain people predict that the people will not participate in the elections, because they do not trust anybody. But, this is an incorrect opinion. They want to trust somebody, but they do not know whom.

I believe that it is impossible—and sociological surveys confirm this—for our people to elect a dictatorship, and this will lead the country away from the edge of the precipice. The people must elect legislators who will

endorse centrist approaches to the most acute problems. Only such legislators will be able to form an efficient government.

I believe that not a single man, for sure not a dictator or yet another secretary general, but a centrist bloc that will develop a national platform, not a narrow party one, will become Ukraine's leader in 1994.

[Hrynyov] I believe that 1994 will see the introduction of intensive reforms in Ukraine. I do not expect any new political forces to appear and assume responsibility for carrying out such reforms. I think that the harsh reality will force Ukraine to reform its economy.

We have wasted the opportunity to do so over the last two years. We have not even tried to actually introduce reforms, but spent our time on uncomprehensible policy which follows the principle of "neither a plan nor a market." This has led to the sharp deterioration of basic preconditions that are necessary for the introduction of market reforms.

Two years ago, one could assess our situation as dramatic, today—as tragic: We are beginning reform while in a state of complete economic destruction, a lack of control over economic processes, and the collapse of the financial system. Despite these facts, I repeat that 1994 will be the year of beginning economic reforms.

Guarantees for success do not exist. Failure to proceed on the path of transformations means losing Ukraine.

I am very aware of public opinion polls, and they indicate that the psychological atmosphere in Ukraine is that reforms are considered as not one of the variants, but as the only one possibility, and that there is no other path but the path of market reforms.

'New Wave' Leaders Review Current Situation, Tasks

WS0401171194 Lvov MOLODA HALYCHYNA in Ukrainian 25 Dec 93 p 2

[Statements by People's Deputies Ihor Yukhnovskyy, Viktor Pynzenyk, and Mykhaylo Kosiv, cofounders of the Nonparty Professionals' Electoral Bloc "New Wave"]

[Excerpts] [Yukhnovskyy] [passage omitted] The Ukrainian nation is facing the most crucial task—building the state and working for its benefit. It is easy to criticize government activities, but it is difficult to assume leadership, rule the state, make decisions, and foresee their consequences. This is why small and big political parties should come together to resolve these principal problems.

Take inflation, for example, the devaluation of the Ukrainian karbovanets, the unjustifiably high exchange rate of the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble. One of the sources of inflation is the erroneous postulate that the former can be curbed by restraining wages. It is only true in some cases, when wages exceed a certain reasonable level. However, in Ukraine, the situation is quite different. People's wages are so low that their purchasing power in fact equals zero. People are losing interest in work and discipline.

Can anything be done to alleviate the situation? Undoubtedly, yes. This includes the functioning of customs offices on all the borders, an increase in wages on the basis of introducing a land tax, the introduction of a tax on the active part of enterprises' capital stock. These measures must be accompanied by the privatization of land and state property. Of course, monthly wages should be increased to a certain reasonable limit of say, $90. The next step toward curbing inflation is regulation of the nation's banking system. The ban on bank credits was a desperate measure and amounted to acknowledging complete disability to run the financial system. [passage omitted]

Overwhelmed by our domestic problems, we seldom speak of our foreign policy. Unfortunately, the latter is conducted so inadequately that Ukraine's rating in the world community is very low. We are irresolute in our relations with Russia and the newly independent states. This important aspect will also depend on those who assume power.

Political contests sometimes resemble military drills and children's games played by grown-ups. We should not look for harsh words leading to political divisions within society. We need an increase in mutual respect and trust on all levels.

We are standing on the threshold of elections. We should rally around a centrist electoral bloc.

[Pynzenyk] A lot of people are asking the same question: Can we overcome the crisis and halt the skyrocketing inflation? Do we have experts capable of leading our state to prosperity?

I can give positive answers to all those questions. We have every chance of exiting the current situation. Many people believe that the latter is a result of reform. However, it is the irresoluteness and inconsistency of reform, as well as attempts to revert its progress that have caused the dramatic deterioration of the situation, impoverishment, corruption, embezzlements, and the flourishing of the shadow economy.

Two major factors are determining the critical situation in Ukraine's economy: the leadership's lack of political will and professionalism. The problem of drafting a program for putting an end to the crisis does not exist. The problem lies in the high echelons' will to implement this program. [passage omitted]

Unfortunately, time and again, we witness the mass incompetence of officials entitled to make crucial decisions. These people often hide behind beautiful phrases while, in fact, only caring about their own personal well-being.

There are a lot of specialists in Ukraine ready to assume responsibility for changes in people's lives. However, no individual efforts can change the situation. There is the need for a **team of professionals** enjoying appropriate **political support.**

Only professional resolute measures can save the situation. The experience of Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia proves that there is no option to such measures.

Today, our people have a unique chance to create political prerequisites for reform (through the legislative elections) and to form (by means of the legislature) a professional government.

We are the masters of our fate and we have no right to pass our hardships of today onto our children and grandchildren.

[Kosiv] [passage omitted] We are being ruled by Russified turncoats who do not want to and never will consolidate Ukrainian independence. They are doing everything to prevent stabilization in production and banking, as well as to halt reform. State functionaries, red managers' corps, and the leadership of the agroindustrial complex use all available mechanisms to prolong their control over national property, because this property is easy to steal.

We do not have to invent anything special. The Baltics, for example, were in a similar situation but they endured Russian pressure, launched market processes, and set out upon the path of civilized development. Will we be able to elect a Supreme Council able to form a government of the independent Ukrainian state?

Ten Additional Parties Register for 27 Mar Elections

WS0501143294 Kiev KYYIVSKA PRAVDA in Ukrainian 1 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by V. Tymoshenko: "Parties Are Standing in Line"]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission has adopted resolutions on registering the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Ukraine, Rukh, the Labor Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Ukrainian Party of Solidarity and Social Justice, the Party of Free Peasants of Ukraine, the Peasant Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, in connection with their plans to field candidates in the 27 March Supreme Council elections. The parties have received the appropriate certificates.

Two More Parties Register

WS0501143194 Kiev KYYIVSKA PRAVDA in Ukrainian 4 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by A. Tsybulskyy under the "Ukraine and World" rubric: "There Are More Aspirants"]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission for Ukraine's legislative elections has examined another list of applications and related documents submitted by political parties hoping to field candidates in the 27 March elections. Central Electoral Committee Chairman I. H. Yemets issued registration certificates to the Civil Congress of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Party of Justice.

Democratic Bloc Condemns Rukh for Nomination of Candidates

LD0501143994 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 2300 GMT 4 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev, 4 Jan—The second working sitting has taken place of the the All-Ukrainian Electoral Committee of the Democratic Association bloc, which unites parties and organizations of national democratic orientation such as Rukh [People's Movement of Ukraine], URP [Ukrainian Republican Party], DemPU [Democratic Party of Ukraine], KUN [Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists], Prosvita [Enlightenment], SOU [Union of Officers of Ukraine], and others. Chaired by the URP honorary chairman, Levko Lukyanenko, the sitting considered and coordinated lists of the bloc's candidates in separate Ukrainian regions. Rukh was accused of destructive activity in that some local NRU organizations, in particular the one in Kharkov, in spite of prior arrangement had composed lists of candidates of their own. People's Council Chairman Ivan Zayets brushed aside these accusations saying that this situation was the result of the sluggishness of other organizations who had not made up their mind yet exactly in which districts to nominate their candidates. It was decided to organize regional tours by leaders of the bloc's parties to settle contentious issues locally. The second part of the sitting discussed the name of the bloc and its pre-election slogans.

Trade Union Election Platform Advocates 'Civilized' Reform

WS0501203694 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The Ukrainian Trade Union Presidium has approved the organization's platform for the upcoming legislative elections. The trade unions advocate civilized market reform carried out under the slogan: Humane life for the man of labor. The platform, in particular, stipulates the formation of a reliable legislative footing for an efficient social system for the people, a radical improvement of working conditions and living standards, the introduction of flexible work schedules, a shorter work week, and an increase in social payments.

Crimean-Tatar Movement Opposes Majlis Boycott of Elections

LD0501221294 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1430 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Simferopol, 5 Jan—The Crimean-Tatar People's Majlis has called on its countrymen to boycott the Crimean Republic presidential elections since none of the candidates promises to meet the Crimean-Tatar people's demands. According to a recent statement by a majlis leader, the majlis has indisputable influence over an absolute majority of voters among the Crimean-Tatars.

On the other hand, Vashtiy Abdurayimov, the leader of the National Movement of Crimean Tatars, who became head of the organization after the death of its founder and leader Yuriy Osmanov, stressed that the majlis was in fact

betraying the national interests of the Crimean Tatars. In Abdurayimov's opinion, the Crimean Tatars must by all means vote in the Crimean presidential elections in order to elect a president who would more or less suit the Crimean-Tatar people. According to some sources, Abdurayimov is inclined to support the candidacy of Ivan Yermakov, Ukraine's presidential representative in Sevastopol, deputy chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council [as received].

Majlis leader Mustafa Dzhamilev is known to have recently met President Kravchuk. Although the results of the talks are not known, local observers believe they reached a certain, if not full understanding.

Party Urges Setting Up Antigovernment Opposition Bloc

LD0501221994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1912 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] "The Union in Support of Crimea's Republic" (USCR), one of Crimea's most popular parties, has urged setting up an anti-government opposition bloc.

As senior party member Vladimir Zubarev, chairman of the Crimean Bar of Lawyers, told INTERFAX, "because of the tragic death of the Union's chairman, Jacob Apter, a member of Ukraine's Parliament, the party has been unable to nominate its candidate to the Crimean presidency and, for this reason, will support the nomination of Ivan Ermakov, the Ukrainian president's envoy to Sevastopol, advocating the integration of Sevastopol and Crimea in a single state structure.

Zubarev made it clear that "the USCR is ready to take part in forming a popular coalition government." In his words, "an economic council with Russian economists taking part in it has been set up for that."

He reported that the political council had decided to "constructively oppose the current Crimean Supreme Soviet Chairman Nikolay Batrov, nominated to the presidency despite his personal responsibility for the plight in the republic."

Poll Indicates Kuchma More Popular Than Kravchuk

LD0501190494 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1200 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev, 5 Jan—At the end of December 1993, experts from the joint venture Socio-Gallup conducted an opinion poll in every region of the republic, which resulted in the rating of the popularity of politicians on the five-point scale being as follows:

Leonid Kuchma	2.11
Leonid Kravchuk	2.07
Vyacheslav Chornovil	1.61
Ivan Plyushch	1.56
Ihor Yuhnovskyy	1.50
Volodymyr Yavorivskyy	1.42
Volodymyr Hrynyov	1.22
Kostyantyn Morozov	1.22

Oblast Procurator Denies Sale of Former Missile Base

LD0601120994 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2030 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Lvov—The [Lvov] region's procurator, Zenon Kotyk, informed a UNIAN correspondent today that his office has no official information about criminal proceedings instituted in the case of the sale by the region's state administration of the former missile base near Brody to Lvov's private firm Konza for $13,000. Vasyl Dzera, a member of the regional council's commission for the inspection of the foreign trade activity of the oblast state administration, asserted this to be the case at a 3 January meeting of the workers of Lvivprylad production association that nominated him as a candidate for election to the Ukrainian Supreme Council.

Zenon Kotyk officially told a UNIAN correspondent that the base remains in the regional communal property fund's ownership.

Estimates Say Living Standards Below Survival Level

LD0501144494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1125 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By BUSINESS-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, January 5 (TASS)—The latest prices hike has compelled many Ukrainian families to reduce their spendings substantially, BUSINESS-TASS has learned today from the Ukrainian NORMA-PRESS NEWS SERVICE. Today, according to expert estimates, the physiologial survival basket costs 383,996 karbovanets, which is double the november figure.

A more or less normal minimum consumer basket, comprising twenty products, now costs 900,738 karbovanets, while the average wages are much lower than that. NORMA-PRESS economists stress that all the measures taken by the government to raise minimal wages, pensions, scholarships, and allowances to poor families leave these sections of the population without any hope for even purely physiological survival.

Belarus

Shushkevich Signs CIS Security Agreement With 'Reservations'

LD0501174794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1714 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By BELINFORM correspondent Larisa Lazar for TASS]

[Text] Minsk January 5 TASS—Belarusian Parliament head Stanislav Shushkevich has sent a letter to the CIS executive secretariat to confirm that Belarus has signed the CIS collective security agreement, the parliamentary press service announced today.

The press-service said the problem had to be addressed anew because the procedure of the preliminary signing of the agreement was interpreted incorrectly by some officials.

The parliament empowered its head, Stanislav Shushkevich "to sign the agreement on collective security after making a statement on certain reservations," it said.

These reservations "rule out in particular the use of Belarusian Armed Forces on the territory of other countries, and the stationing and use of Armed Forces of other states on the Belarusian territory without the express permission of the Belarusian Parliament," the press-service said.

Kebich Signs Monetary Unification Agreement With Russia

WS0601090894 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Text] Russia and Belarus will merge their monetary systems in the second half of January. The Russian ruble will freely circulate on the territory of Belarus. This agreement has been reached at the Russian-Belarusian negotiations conducted by Boris Yeltsin and the government leaders of both countries, Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vyacheslav Kebich. After almost three hours of talks, the prime ministers signed an agreement on the unification of monetary systems of the Russian Federation and Belarus. The document says that monetary systems of both countries will be merged after Viktor Chernomyrdin and Vyacheslav Kebich sign in late January in Minsk more than 10 agreements regulating the mechanisms of this process. In an interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent, Vyacheslav Kebich said it was agreed that the one-to-one exchange rate for both currencies during the unification be established. Vyacheslav Kebich believes that Belarus' transition to the Russian ruble will be a continued process lasting for three to six months. This is caused by purely technical problems of Belarus [words indistinct].

Kebich Reviews Outcome of CIS Ashgabat Summit

WS0501183094 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 28 Dec 93 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich by unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "Vyacheslav Kebich: 'Belarusian-Russian Political Statement Likely To Appear After the New Year'"]

[Text] [Reporter] Not all the documents discussed at the CIS summit in Ashgabat bear your signature....

[Kebich] A total of 25 documents had been prepared for discussion at the level of heads of state, and 19—at the level of prime ministers. Some of those documents, indeed, we did not sign, including the agreement on assistance to Tajikistan in proportion to national budgets. We were among those who opposed adopting this resolution, saying that as long as we receive no assistance in eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, we cannot grant financial aid to Tajikistan. We have nothing against sending foodstuffs and other products there, but we do not agree to pay a VAT just for them. Russia backed us on this issue, and so did other states. It was decided to send the draft for completion.

Another document that we did not sign stipulated the unification of prices and taxes, and thus, the lifting of customs duties. The document was not approved at the initiative of Russia and Belarus. We cannot grant equal conditions to all the states, because Russia and Belarus spent a long time paving the path and we should receive the status of trailblazers.

We also refrained from signing a document on the mechanism of enacting the collective security treaty, because in fact, we had not joined the treaty. This happened because CIS members did not acknowledge the onetime declaration by Stanislav Shushkevich, and maintained that the document should be signed without provisos. On the other hand, the collective security treaty has not been ratified by the Belarusian Supreme Soviet as of yet. We also did not sign a number of less relevant agreements.

[Reporter] Which of the signed agreements do you consider most significant? In general, what can be regarded as the most momentous outcome of the Ashgabat summit?

[Kebich] First of all, I want to emphasize the agreement on investments. Similar agreements had been signed with foreign states, but somehow this had fallen through the cracks and they had not existed within the CIS framework. That was a paradox. The signing of this document facilitates investments in neighboring states, the forming of joint-stock companies, and leasing enterprises in CIS states. Our legislative opposition has always stressed the urgent need for such an agreement. The treaty was signed by all the participants, and so were the agreements on joint financing of the Interstate Economic Court and the Television and Radio Company. The most important thing was that agreements vital for the functioning of the economic union were signed. I also want to underline the fact that Turkmenistan has become a legal member of the union. Thus, only Ukraine has not joined the economic union yet, but we believe that the situation will change in the immediate future.... Among other important agreements there are also the ones on communications and medicine.... Medicine will be exempt from VAT, and thus will be cheaper.

The cooperation agreement alone was worth going to Ashgabat. It envisions that if we receive oil or gas as part of cooperation deals, that is if the end product is returned to the producer of raw materials, we will not pay any taxes or customs duties. This will significantly reduce prices.

At the same time, we also held bilateral talks in Ashgabat. I signed a bilateral agreement with Kazakhstan, while Uladzimir Zalamay signed such agreements with all the other republics except Russia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. I will be visiting Moldova soon, while we need time to reach an accord with Tajikistan. With regard to Russia, after we sign an agreement on merging our financial systems, we will not need any bilateral agreements at all. There were a lot of personal talks in Ashgabat, including my meeting with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

Bilateral talks with the Turkmen leadership also yielded dividends. Turkmenistan remains our primary debtor. We agreed with Chernomyrdin that Russia will not hinder shipments of Turkmen gas via its territory. In addition in 1994, Turkmenistan is going to supply us with 1,000,000 metric tons of industrial oil. Kazakhstan also agreed to ship industrial oil to Belarus, while our commercial organizations will be able to buy Kazakh oil. There is one more thing. In January, we will receive 90,000 metric tons of high quality wheat as compensation for the work of Belarusians in Kustanay Oblast. Truck and tractor drivers and combine operators who took part in harvesting in that oblast will receive another 11,000 metric tons.

[Reporter] Can we anticipate the merging of financial systems in the immediate future?

[Kebich] We are rapidly approaching this goal. I want to get this straight to everybody—forming a monetary union with Russia will not preclude pursuing independent policies. By the way, we adopted the national budget some time ago. In Ashgabat, Aleksandr Shokhin told me: "You were faster, and now Russia will have to adjust its budget to the Belarusian one." This means that politically, we have gained a lot.

[Reporter] What other Russian leaders did you confer with in Ashgabat?

[Kebich] I talked to almost all of them, including a short conversation with Boris Yeltsin. He confirmed our agreements with Chernomyrdin and Shokhin.

[Reporter] Who among the Russian leadership supports the merging of our financial systems, and who opposes it?

[Kebich] There is no opposition, although some people may have doubts. However, there is one problem. When we resolve issues at the highest level everything goes smoothly, but every bureaucrat at lower levels wants to demonstrate his omnipotence. Thus, we decided that there will be no more agreements at the level of clerks. Agreements should be signed by the highest officials and then be carried out by clerks.

[Reporter] Will a political declaration be announced soon?

[Kebich] Although we agreed on this, both the Russian and Belarusian schedules are so packed with events that the declaration may be postponed through a lack of time and not a lack of desire. As we know, the Russian leadership is concerned with the future of its two legislative chambers. Anyway, I believe, that a political declaration will be made shortly after the New Year. This is my forecast.

[Reporter] The CIS Charter has not been ratified by our legislature. Do you think there may be complications in the course of the ratification process?

[Kebich] I believe there will be no problems until the clause dealing with collective security is discussed. This will initiate another great debate. We have plenty of experts majoring in disputes.

Deputy Claims Kebich Steered by 'Russian Special Agencies'

WS0501160694 Minsk BELAPAN in Russian 1507 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] It is very likely that Russian special agencies stand behind the Kebich government; this was declared by Vladimir Novik, Belarusian Supreme Soviet deputy and secretary of the legislative standing commission on the economy, in an interview with SVABODA [Freedom] on 5 January. "You can be absolutely sure," he said, "that stabilizing the Russian ruble or the U.S. dollar means undermining our economy and robbing our people. This would strengthen the economies of the countries whose currencies would be allowed in Belarus. Who is devising these kinds of policies? The government of an independent state or a special agency? The latter, is the most likely answer."

Communists Unite With Other Leftist Movements

WS0501142994 Minsk VO SLAVU RODINY in Russian 30 Dec 93 p 1

[Report by G. Palchevskiy: "One More Step Toward Unification of Left Forces"]

[Text] One more step toward the unification of left forces has been made in Grodno, where a unification plenum of the oblast branches of the Communist Party, the People's Movement of Belarus, the Movement for Democracy, Social Progress, and Justice [DSPS], was held. Following speeches on the socioeconomic situation in the Republic delivered by N. Prisada, K. Lisitsin, and S. Posokhov, secretaries of the Communist Party Oblast Committee, the plenum adopted a resolution on the collective joining of the National Movement of Belarus by the oblast branches of the Communist Party and DSPS.

Popular Movement Leader Outlines 3 Main Political Groupings

WS3112084893 Minsk SEM DNEY in Russian 25 Dec 93 p 3

[Interview with Sergey Gaydukevich, chairman of the Popular Movement of Belarus, by Andrey Korabelnikov; place and date not given: "There Are Only Three Forces in Belarus"]

[Excerpt] **There are 13 political parties and over 100 different movements in Belarus today. A SEM DNEY correspondent has interviewed People's Deputy Sergey Gaydukevich, chairman of the Popular Movement of Belarus [PMB], on the real political power of these organizations.**

[Gaydukevich] There are many parties and movements. However, that does not imply that they are cardinally different. The world has long been acquainted with the pendulum principle. This principle accounts for only two determining forces. These forces can be assessed in many terms, but in their essence they are either "right" or "left." Political power is also controlled either by the former or the latter —it never rests in the middle. Therefore, any party or movement gravitates either to the "right" or to the "left." One force stands for the superiority of government property and the implementation of major social programs, the other stands for the superiority of the private sector and the reduction of state subsidies for social security programs. A state that tries to stop the movement of that pendulum is in dire straits. Unfortunately, this is the situation in which we find ourselves.

There are only three real political forces in the Republic: the PMB, the Belarusian Popular Front [BPF], and...the Council of Ministers. All the others are satellites. With regard to the Council of Ministers being a third political force, it is an obvious fact. It is not without reason that people speak about Kebich's policy; no other politicians or economists are mentioned. In our situation, this force speaks of reforms, but, thus far, its declarations have not been supported by practical actions.

The second influential force was—and remains—the BPF. This organization has a concrete political and economic program. BPF representatives work in different command structures, participate in Supreme Soviet activities, and exert significant influence on mass media. The determining factor in their activities is private property. However, their proposal for the resolution of the national question has pushed many people away from the BPF. The BPF is supported by fewer and fewer people.

The third force is the PMB, which is a peculiar union of unions. We bring together 22 parties and movements from throughout the Republic. What does that mean? It means that all these organizations are united in one front. Their independence is secured, but common goals will be achieved together. The basic principle of our movement is the return of a strong system of state power, as well as economic diversity with social security guarantees for workers. [passage omitted]

Economist Outlines Reform Requirements

WS0501173094 Minsk DOBRY VECHAR in Belarusian 29 Dec 93 p 2

[Interview with Professor Vladimir Ivanovich Tarasov, deputy director of the Institute of Economy at the Belarusian Academy of Sciences, by Tamara Markina; place and date not given: "We Should Introduce Our Own Currency To Be Able To Conquer the Market's Everest"]

[Text] Market relations in Belarus are the cause of our despair. Is this what we fought for? Why are our neighbors reaping the fruits of market reforms while we are making no headway? Moreover, we are sliding ever closer to economic carnage. Why is Belarus—whose standard of living was one of the highest in the USSR—lagging behind our Baltic neighbors and Russia? Production is falling, hopes are expiring....

Professor Vladimir Ivanovich Tarasov, deputy director of the Institute of Economy at the Belarusian Academy of Sciences, is one of those few people who can see a real way out of this predicament.

Today, Vladimir Ivanovich Tarasov visited our editorial office. I hope that our interview with him will help some people to differentiate between the "black" and "white" sides of our economy. Some years ago, many residents of Minsk started making "shopping-tours" of Poland and Turkey. Currently, most of them have accumulated the initial capital. The second wave of "shopping- tours" rolled into the Baltics, Moscow, Smolensk, St. Petersburg.... They have literally stripped the Belarusian foodstuffs market. Some of my acquaintances state that Belarus has raised market reforms in Baltic states and Russia with its dairy products... What is your opinion on the issue?

[Tarasov] I would support such commercial junkets if our economy was healthy and sound. Why not? Exports which stimulate production are growing.... Our Belarusian "merchants" make profits of around 500,000 rubles [R] on every commercial trip.

Nevertheless, given our deficit economy and falling production, these exports will not bring us any good. I would like our merchants to bring back to Belarus some Russian goods, however, they do not do this. They bring Russian rubles and one ruble is worth three or four Belarusian "hares." You see: Money makes money. However, it is not provided with goods produced in Belarus. Next, the twist in the price spiral follows....

The next problem is the trade deficit. It turns out that we import more goods than we export. Nobody has yet calculated this deficit amount. If we could receive precise statistics from our state customs checkpoints and the Belarusian National Bank, we would be able to coordinate the prices for Belarusian goods with the constantly changing prices for imported raw materials and energy.

If we had these data, we could realize that constantly increasing prices for energy resources leave our command economy far behind and raise the prices of goods produced in Belarus. The main reason for this is the expansionist economic policy of Russia. Therefore, we should draw some conclusions. First of all, our government should start watching the price policy changes of our neighbors. Do you remember the increase in prices for glassware in the Baltics when the price of one bottle stood at R3 there and 20 kopeks in Belarus? Our neighbors started with bottles and since then have achieved serious economic reforms.

[Markina] Maybe our wages and salaries should also be increased, along with prices?

[Tarasov] We need a Belarusian currency. Only then we will be able to pursue our own policy in the sphere of price changes. Currently, we do not have a rate for our Belarusian "hare" currency.

[Markina] Vladimir Ivanovich, can we expect that everything could be automatically resolved when we join the so-called ruble zone, which had been promised by our government and the Supreme Soviet?

[Tarasov] What will this ruble zone look like? That is the question. Russia will hardly agree to the establishment of a 1:1 exchange rate giving the possibility of introducing single prices. Everything could have been different if Belarus were a subject of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, Belarus is an independent state. Therefore, in my opinion, it is unlikely that Russia will introduce a 1:1 exchange rate. Hence, we should speak not about a single ruble zone but about a currency union. In addition, all the cataclysms of the Russian economy will effect the exchange rate of Belarusian payment notes.

By the way, this currency union will not be a novelty in the realm of international economic relations. For example, the Austrian schilling is linked to the German mark. Thus, all changes in the German mark affect the financial sector in Austria.

Our government should demonstrate its political will regarding the introduction of our national currency. We have been using Belarusian payment notes for some two years. However, have they become a solid monetary unit? Yes, they are used in payment operations but they do not fulfill another function—the accumulation of capital. Who saves "hares" in Belarus? People are saving dollars. Sometimes, they are saving Russian rubles. Moreover, Belarusian "hares" are not used in export-import financial operations. This means that "hares" do not fulfill the function of international money.

It is evident that we should introduce our own national money. We should not be scared that this will break our relations with Russia. On the contrary, they will become stronger. Pay attention to the fact that Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin has already visited Lithuania, which introduced its own currency, but he has never been to Belarus.

It is high time for Belarus to take analogous steps.

We should not rely on the "kind uncle." To my regret, many people think the opposite. For example, Prime Minister Kebich has visited Valday, where he spoke with Chernomyrdin on increased deliveries of oil to Belarus. However, where is this oil? Currently, the political situation in Russia is extremely unstable. Belarus should conduct talks on all levels, including contacts between government delegations, individual enterprises, and commercial structures.

Russia has started creating joint stock companies. We could do the same. Belarus can attract Russian partners. However, we have no favorable conditions for foreign investments. Belarus has hundreds of joint ventures with French, German, and English partners, however, not a single one with Russia. At the same time, our economic potential depends primarily—70-80 percent!—on Russia. We could have no problems with gas if we had joint ventures with Russian oil structures. The Baltic states do not experience any gas shortages due to the fact that Latvian and Lithuanian businessmen have found a common language with Russia. I want to emphasize: Progress is obtained by private initiative. So, we should stimulate our own Belarusian private initiative.

Moldova

Snegur Seeks Advice From Writer on Parliamentary Elections

LD0501231294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1743 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko]

[Text] President Mircea Snegur met in Chisinau on Tuesday [4 January] with Ion Drutse, a noted Moldova writer permanently living in Russia. Preparation for parliamentary elections was discussed. The elections are due on February 27.

Independent experts believe that Drutse's arrival in the republic at the peak of the election campaign may tangibly affect its outcome. The writer is immensely popular in Moldova, so many observers predict that he will be able to win thousands of extra votes for the centrist agrarian-democratic and social-democratic parties.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: Snegur declared in a recent exclusive interview with INTERFAX that he was not going to stay neutral, and resolutely supported these centrist parties in their advocacy of state sovereignty and aversion for reunion with Romania.

The opposition parties and movements which advocate reunion with Romania have been holding rallies in protest against the guilty verdict passed on a group of Christian Democratic Popular Front supporters by a court in Tiraspol. Snegur administration officials regard these actions as part of an anti-presidential campaign to charge their chief with betrayal and duplicity.

The president's spokesman, Vasile Grozavu, told INTERFAX that Snegur emphatically rejects allegations that "he has kept a conflict in Moldova's east from the world public. However, it was Snegur who invited a CSCE mission to monitor the situation in the region and help to remove the differences there. In a statement released in Rome, the foreign ministers of the CSCE participant-states pledged to spare no further effort to secure a settlement.

More than that, Snegur has repeatedly urged reactivating a four-sided mechanism to resolve the region's problems. The issue re-surfaced at a recent summit with Ukraine's President Kravchuk.

Grozavu dismissed as improper an assertion by some media that Snegur is responsible "for an economic disaster." It is common knowledge, he noted, under what conditions the ministers were nominated and appointed in parliament and how many pledges were made by certain parliamentary factions behind the scenes and otherwise to win some ministers' approval.

It was this and nothing else, Grozavu added, that prompted the president to back up the initiative to dissolve parliament and elect a new legislature with representatives of one party or a coalition apt to run the country.

Grozavu reported that the president was preparing a special statement "about the conflict on the Dniester and its true culprits." "The document," he stressed, "would be a convincing response to irresponsible charges by those who are making patriotism their trade."

Opposition Accuses Snegur of 'Treachery'

LD0501170194 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1131 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Moldova's opposition parties and movements advocating reunification with Romania have turned the campaign against the death sentence passed on leader of the Popular Front's Tiraspol branch Ilie Ilascu, into an anti-presidential one. They have accused the Moldovan president of treachery and duplicity, the president's Press Secretary Vasile Grosavu told INTERFAX.

He said that the opposition had also accused the president of making public the conflict in Moldova's eastern regions in the summer of 1992. Meanwhile, it was Snegur who invited CSCE experts to get acquainted with the situation and help settle the conflict between Transdniestria and the central authorities, he noted.

Moreover, Snegur favors further quadripartite talks between Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Tiraspol, said Grosavu.

The press secretary also denied media reports laying the blame for the current economic crisis in Moldova on Mircea Snegur.

Grosavu said that the president's support for the idea of dissolving the parliament and holding early parliamentary elections was motivated by his plans to lead the country out of the economic crisis as soon as possible.

Moldovan Prosecutor General Dumitru Postovan has denied reports that Snegur was involved in the "dirty deals" linked with the notorious Seabeco company.

Radicals Seen Strengthening Among Dniester's Leaders

LD0501211594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1603 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Demidetskiy]

[Text] Chisinau January 5 TASS—Leader of the Centrist Popular Union Andrey Safonov has filed his resignation from the post of the head of the "OLVIYA-PRES" news agency.

Local observers note his resignation is linked with strengthening of leftist-radical forces in the leadership of the Dniester Republic, Moldova's breakaway province. The radicals support Tiraspol's tough position at talks on settlement of the Dniester-Chisinau conflict. They also oppose economic and social reforms in the region.

Tajikistan

Prime Minister Outlines 'Three Important Tasks'

LD0501170294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1131 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] In an exclusive interview with INTERFAX, the republic's Premier Abdulmadjid Samadov said that Tajikistan's government had three important tasks to be solved in the short term.

The first was to conclude the republic's entering the ruble zone as soon as possible, which would facilitate surmounting of budget deficit which at present totals 95 Bn [billion] rubles.

The premier mentioned the necessity to widely use market structures in the economy, trading of enterprises which are on the brink of bankruptcy as the government's second task. According to his estimate, there are dozens of bankrupt enterprises in all branches of the national economy already and their existence is problematic without additional state allocations. These are primarily the Tajik aluminium factory, the Vakhsh nitric fertilizers factory and several other large sites.

The third task is to increase the republic's authority in the world community against the background of political and economic transformations. This will give a real opportunity to receive investments in the economy. According to Samadov, a $500 million credit would enable the republic's economy to develop without worsening the living standards of the local population.

"In 1994 we shall be experiencing rather painful political processes linked with the discussion and adoption of the new Constitution, a nation wide referendum on the state system and further elections of a new parliament," said Samadov. He mentioned social security of certain categories of the population, primarily pensioners, families with many children, invalids and students, as one of the priority tasks of the government.

Tajikistan's present government, a country within the CIS, takes the obligations of the previous cabinet, indicated Samadov.

As far as priorities in the cooperation with other countries are concerned, we cannot but mark the role of Russia and Central Asia countries, primarily Uzbekistan, said the prime minister. In his words, Tajikistan is inclined to cooperate with the West.

"We must not forget that the nation's mentality adheres to the Moslem religion," emphasized the premier and said that Dushanbe pays great attention to its relations with Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

Prime Minister Samadov Departs for Russia 5 Jan

LD0501162894 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 0400 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Yesterday, in Dushanbe there was a joint session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan. It discussed the financial position of the republic. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Tajikistan, Abdujalil Samadov, flies out to Moscow today. It is expected that he will meet with the prime minister of the Russian Federation, Viktor Charnomyrdin, on questions of interest to both sides.

Deputy Premier Views Recent Murders of Russians

LD0501234694 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1912 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The recent murders of Russians in Tajikistan are of a purely criminal character as they are neither religiously, nor politically nor ethnically colored, Tajik Vice Prime Minister Makhamadsayed Ubaidullayev told a briefing in Dushanbe today.

Ubaidullayev said four suspects of a murder of nine people in the village of Novobad near Dushanbe late at night on December 30 were arrested yesterday. He added that the suspects did not conceal that they had committed the crime with the aim of robbery.

Ubaidullayev also said that the motive for the murder of Father Sergy, a priest of the Russian Orthodox Church in Dushanbe on the same night, still remained unclear. The investigating bodies were working on a number of likely versions, the high official said.

The Tajik Interior Ministry announced a considerable financial reward for information helping to solve the case.

On behalf of the republican government, Ubaidullayev expressed condolences to the family and friends of the murdered.

Rebirth Party Leader Stresses Talks With Russia

LD0501210594 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0600 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] His eminence Haji Akbar Turajonzoda, first deputy leader of the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan, has once again stated that the Russian troops stationed in Tajikistan together with UN forces, under the supervision of Islamic countries and the European Community, can play the role of peacekeeping and take part in disarming the warring side.

Haji Akbar said: We too understand the geopolitical interests of Russia and do not want to deprive Russia of them [words indistinct].

Haji Akbar once again reiterated that the Islamic Rebirth Party of Tajikistan will first hold talks with Russia. Talks with Russia will determine the course of our future negotiations with the authorities in Tajikistan.

Armenia

Azerbaijani Attacks Reported Escalated

NC0501144194 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Military operations are escalating on the Karabakh front every day. Disregarding huge losses in men and material, the Azerbaijani Army Command is launching uninterrupted new offensives against the defensive positions of the Karabakh forces.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's Press and Information Department reported that the enemy troops launched a new offensive at around 0600 this morning all along the frontline from the Iranian border to the Murov mountain range in the north of Mardakertskiy Rayon. The Karabakh formations were still successfully halting the Azerbaijani attacks at 1100.

According to preliminary reports, an enemy tank was hit and some 150 soldiers and officers are surrounded in the southeast of the front.

Casualty figures for the previous day have been determined. Karabakh fighters killed 140 Azerbaijani soldiers, destroyed four tanks, and an infantry vehicle. Five fighters were killed and one tank was hit on our side.

We have no news from the Armenian Defense Ministry Press Service on the situation in Armenia's border regions.

Dram Drops Against Dollar

NC0501184194 Yerevan SNARK in English 1234 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Yerevan, January 5 (SNARK)—The rate of Armenian dram relating to USD was dropped down ⅓ times [as received]. So, today, "Armimpexbank" (the Foreign Economic Bank) purchased USD for 100 drams and sold for 105 drams.

In the specialists' opinion the Armenian president's [word indistinct] about indexation of salaries, pensions and the resolution of the government to increase the prices for bread, transport, communal services influenced upon the rate.

The official rate, set by Central Bank of Armenia, equals 75 drams for 1 USD.

Azerbaijan

Fighting Resumes in Nagorno-Karabakh

LD0501185794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1725 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Following a brief lull for the night, the Azeri units resumed their attack along the entire front line at 6:00 on January 5, officials in the Nagorno-Karabakh army press service told INTERFAX.

As of 12:00, Karabakh troops had beaten back all enemy attacks with Azeri troops suffering heavy losses. The worst fighting is continuing in the Martuni district of Karabakh.

In the southeastern area bordering Iran, the officials said, an unspecified number of Azeri troops had been surrounded Wednesday morning. An enemy tank was knocked out there.

Stepanakert reports that two more Azeri soldiers surrendered Tuesday evening, bringing the total number of Azeri servicemen who have surrendered within the past two weeks to 16.

Meanwhile, an official in the Azeri Defense Ministry said that following a heavy artillery barrage, Armenian troops resumed their offensive in the area of the Murovdag mountain ridge in the north of Karabakh. According to Baku, the Armenians lost six men and an armored personnel carrier.

The same source reported continued fighting in the north of the Mardakert district of Nagorno-Karabakh, in the east of the Agdam district, and in the vicinity of the Beilagan district of Azerbaijan.

Minister on Clashes, 'Mercenaries'

TA0501181294 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1600 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Announcer-read report over video]

[Text] Azerbaijani Defense Minister Mamedrafi Mamedov has stated that the Armenian Army started to attack on all fronts but that it was forced to withdraw as a result of the large number of soldiers wounded and killed following the Azerbaijan national army's resistance. Mamedov was interviewed by Ismail Karadavud, TRT correspondent in Baku.

[Begin Karadavud recording] In a statement he issued to TRT, Mamedov pointed out that the Armenians have not been able to advance during the last month, adding that approximately 200 to 300 Armenian soldiers were being killed in clashes every day. Mamedov reported that 19 Armenian tanks and a large number of military vehicles have been destroyed since the beginning of the new year. Mamedov further reported that approximately 100 Azeri soldiers were killed and 50 wounded in clashes between the Azerbaijani national army and Armenian units over the last month. Pointing out that both the Azeri people and their army will defend their territory until the last drop of their blood, Mamedov noted that the people of Kelbadzhar have started returning after the Armenians evacuated the area.

Mamedov stated that a large number of mercenaries from various nations are fighting in the Armenian Army, announcing that one of those mercenaries was being held by the Azerbaijani Army. [end recording]

'Great Losses' Reported

LD0501140294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1131 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Baku and Stepanakert are still reporting great losses during fierce fighting in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

A well informed source in Azerbaijan's Defense Minister asserted in his interview with Interfax that several dozen Armenian soldiers were killed on Tuesday [4 January] during the hostilities waged near the Murovdag mountain ridge on the border of the Kelbadzharskiy and Agderin (Mardakertskiy) regions. Two artillery guns of the Karabakh army have been destroyed.

According to Baku, the Armenians lost two tanks and an APC [armored personnel carrier] on other sections of the front.

Meanwhile, sources in Stepanakert assert that the Azerbaijani army lost more than 70 soldiers, 4 tanks and one APC during the hostilities Tuesday.

Stepanakert also asserts that the Karabakh party lost only three servicemen.

Aliyev Accepts Invitation To Visit UK

NC0501183994 Baku AZERTAC in English 1530 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Baku, January 5 (AZERTAC)—The Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev has accepted an invitation sent by Great Britain Prime-Minister, Mr. John Major for an official visit to this European country, according to the press-service of the Azerbaijani leader. The trip is likely to take place by the end of January. It is supposed that the Azerbaijani Embassy in London will be opened at the same time.

According to the Foreign Ministry of Azerbaijan, Mr. Geydar Aliyev in his turn has invited the head of the British Government to pay a visit to the Republic at any convenient time.

Officials in Baku stress the great importance of the development and intensification of relations with Great Britain, which was among the first states that established diplomatic relations with independent Azerbaijan. The two countries have already signed a protocol on economic cooperation and ratified documents on cooperation on Foreign Ministry level, as well as a memorandum on unlimited freedom of movement for British citizens in Azerbaijan.

At present, Great Britain has taken a leading position in the external economic relations of Azerbaijan coming third after Iran and Turkey. A number of leading British companies such as British Petroleum, JPT communication, Worldwide, Kaizer Engineering have already installed themselves. The first of these is going to take part in joint exploration and exploitation of off-shore oil fields and according to experts, has got excellent opportunities.

Gasanov Talks With PRC's Li Peng in Beijing

LD0501223294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1334 GMT 5 Jan 94

[by ITAr-TASS correspondent Vladimir Fedoruk]

[Text] Beijing, 5 Jan—Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, today expressed satisfaction at the development of Chinese-Azerbaijani relations. During the course of a meeting with Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov, who is here on an official visit, the head of the Chinese Government noted the "solid and healthy relations" between the two states since the establishment of diplomatic relations.

The premier stressed that the PRC attaches great significance to the development of bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. China and Azerbaijan are Asian countries, and friendly contacts between their peoples go back 2,000 years, to the time of the "Great Silk Road," he said.

Li Peng welcomed the planned visit to China of the Azerbaijani president, noting that an "exchange of visits at high level will undoubtedly foster the development of relations" between the two countries.

According to XINHUA, G. Gasanov, stressed Azerbaijan's desire to establish close cooperation with China in various spheres. He also highly appraised the results of the economic reforms now being carried out in China.

Azerbaijan Calls For Sanctions Against Armenia

LD0501232294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1943 GMT 5 Jan 94

[by ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations January 5 TASS—Azerbaijan calls on the international community to impose economic and political sanctions against Armenia because of escalation of its aggressive actions, a statement made by the Azeri Foreign Ministry said.

The statement was circulated as a document of the Security Council in the United Nations Headquarters today.

Former President Seen Used as Martyr Figure

PM0501153594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition p 6

[Report by Arif Useynov: "Azerbaijan: Martyrs Needed"]

[Text] Baku—Former Azerbaijan President Abulfaz Elchibey has once again loomed up on the political scene. Admittedly, now as a national martyr. To put it bluntly, this has been accomplished in a fairly original manner: Leading opposition publications have submitted for the public verdict a grand dedicatory anthem urging the nation not to stone yesterday's idol.

The idea of his being stoned is a patent exaggeration. The purpose of the article is simple: A People's Front leader with a tarnished reputation makes the opposition unappealing, and without that appeal there is every indication that it will be hard to revive its lost image. Especially since parties and their leaders do not currently enjoy popular support. That is why they are trying to draw public attention to their "own persona." This is the light in which one should view the rumors of the alleged attempt on Elchibey's life, as well as opposition newspapers' articles against President Geydar Aliyev.

Numerous articles are targeting the president's team. They interpret the failures on the Karabakh front as demonstrating the head of state's inability to ensure the people's safety and the hard lot suffered by the 1 million refugees is presented as the inevitable consequence of the "new Aliyev's" political course.

According to one observer, the "newspaper war" is equal to the Karabakh war. The president's meeting with the leaders of political parties revealed an extremely dangerous trend: Parties have become isolated from the masses and gotten carried away by what is just political intrigue in the newspapers. In an attempt to shout one another down 200 newspapers are vying in denouncing the authorities for the most grievous offenses and trying to outdo their opponents in terms of "perspicacity."

The hopes that Gaydar Aliyev would close down the political publications in anger have not been realized. In this respect the statement by a U.S. State Department spokesman, who rushed to shout menacingly across the ocean about alleged violation of press freedom in Azerbaijan, can only be compared to a "false alarm." No one in the republic intends to ban opposition newspapers.

Things banned by the law on the press have been banned. Newspaper publishers and editors have been given strict warnings: Wartime conditions have to be taken into consideration—they must not spread panic, engage in disinformation, or divulge military secrets. To that end the National Assembly has introduced military censorship. Georgia, incidentally, has done the same in the past.

The law says that any fabrication may cause a publication to be suspended for a month. If they do not like various actions taken by the authorities, they can go ahead and criticize individual points and individuals based on facts, but not on fabrication.

However, there is nothing mysterious about the articles carrying various rumors. There are definite forces behind each "custom-made" article: Some are dying for power, some are afraid of taking responsibility for crimes committed. After all, a number of the recent denunciations in the republic relate to thefts on a particularly grand scale: the illegal export of hard currency, machinations with grain and food purchases, arms dealing.

In a word, the "newspaper war" is least of all to do with an upsurge in political activity. Many political scientists think that the "unmasking" of every smart operator is accompanied by a "newspaper fusillade." But this time the opposition has miscalculated. The concentration of fire on "headquarters" has failed to hit its target: The authorities have not flinched, and the people have not rushed off to rallies.

As for the dedicatory anthem to the ex-president, "Don't Stone an Idol," this work has disappeared without trace. A popular singer has translated it into English and sings it country-and-western style with a saxophone and flute accompaniment. It has been a real hit. As they say, it is just one step from the sublime to the ridiculous.

Institute To Help Construct Baku Gold Plant

PM0501162394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[Report from roundup of RIA-NOVOSTI and INTERFAX reports]

[Text] The first plant in Azerbaijan for the production of gold ingots with a fineness of 999.9 will be constructed in Baku in cooperation with the Moscow "Geotep" institute.

The Muscovites have developed the technological part of the project for the future enterprise and handed over the blueprints to representatives of the client—the "Azerkyzyl" ("Azerzoloto") state company. This was announced by "Azerkyzyl" Vice President Valis Ismaylov. "Geotep," he noted, has assumed the purchase of specialized equipment and its delivery to the construction site.

Predicted gold reserves in Azerbaijan are assessed at 1,500 tonnes. At the same time other precious metals, silver in particular, will be mined with it.

The planned capacity of the first gold extracting plant is five tonnes of ingots a year. It will be possible to reach this level three to four years after the launch of the enterprise.

Georgia

Reportage on Zviad Gamsakhurdia's Death

Wife Says 'Suicide'

NC0501130994 Paris AFP in English 1247 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, Jan 5 (AFP) - Former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia has committed suicide, his wife Manana was quoted by Interfax as saying Wednesday [5 January].

Gamsakhurdia's wife, who was in the Russian Caucasus republic of Chechnya, said the ousted president killed himself in a west Georgian village on December 31.

Gamsakhurdia was ousted from power in January 1992 after a brief civil war.

DPA Cites INTERFAX

LD0501130994 Hamburg DPA in German 1248 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow (DPA)—The former, first freely elected President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia has committed suicide, according to his wife Manana. This was reported by the INTERFAX NEWS AGENCY on Wednesday. According to his wife, Gamsakhurdia killed himself on 31 December at the age of 54 in a place in western Georgia.

TASS Reports 'Suicide'

LD0501145694 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1428 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text]Moscow, January 5 TASS—Ex-President of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia committed suicide in one of the districts of western Georgia on December 31, 1993.

Gamsakhurdia's death was announced by his wife Manana. She said the place, where her husband happened to be at that time, was surrounded by unidentified men. According to her version, "the Georgian authorities are aware of Gamsakhurdia's death, but have carefully concealed the fact to this day."

Press Service Makes Statement

LD0501151694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1448 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Mikhail Shevtsov]

[Text] Moscow, 5 January—Zviad Gamsakhurdia, ex-president of Georgia, committed suicide at 0030 on 31 December 1993 [2130 GMT on 30 December] in a region of western Georgia.

An ITAR-TASS correspondent learned today from the Chechen president's press service that Zviad Gamsakhurdia's wife Manana had noted that the place where Zviad Gamsakhurdia spent that night had been surrounded by unknown persons. According to her version, "the Georgian authorities had information about Gamsakhurdia's death but carefully concealed it and are still concealing it to this moment."

A statement issued in Groznyy today by Zviad Gamsakhurdia's press service notes that a few minutes before his death he said that "he is committing this act in full awareness as a sign of protest against the existing regime in Georgia and of his inability, as president, to improve the situation and to restore legality and law and order."

Rumor Being Checked

LD0501161794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1525 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tengiz Jibuti]

[Text] Moscow, 5 Jan—"The Georgian Interior Ministry is in possession of information on the suicide of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and is engaged in rechecking it," an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told today on the telephone by Shota Kviraya, the republic's interior minister.

It was reported that Zviad Gamsakhurdia had committed suicide on the night of 30 to 31 December 1993 in one of the western areas of Georgia. The ex-president's last statement, issued today in Groznyy, makes the point that he performed this act consciously as a protest against the existing regime in Georgia.

Nothing is yet known about the reaction of official Tbilisi to Zviad Gamsakhurdia's suicide.

'Shot Himself' 31 Dec

LD0501190394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1725 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Former Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the country's first democratically-elected head of state, shot himself dead at a hillside village in western Georgia on December 31 while being surrounded by members of the paramilitary Mkhedrioni unit, his wife Manana told Interfax.

She said Gamsakhurdia and part of his supporters were ambushed in a village but she was not told about its location.

Mrs. Gamsakhurdia said her husband had told his supporters to blow themselves up with grenades in the face of an overpowering pro-government unit. But he later shot himself dead "not wanting to cause anguish and pain to his associates," she said.

Gamsakhurdia said she was told about her husband's death only on Wednesday.

Gamsakhurdia's death puts an end to the national liberation movement in Georgia, which will forever remain in slavery, Manana said in tears. She said her husband was Georgia's last hope.

She said she would like her husband to be buried next to his father's grave in the courtyard of their house in Tbilisi, something she said the government would never allow.

The 54-year-old Gamsakhurdia took over the country's national democratic movement in 1989 following the death of its leader and well-known human rights campaigner Merab Kostava. In the same year, pro-democracy groups forged a "Round Table-Free Georgia" alliance which won an overwhelming majority in Georgia's free elections a year later, its first for many years.

In 1991, Gamsakhurdia became the country's first democratically-elected head of state after gaining 97 percent of the vote. However, he was accused of dictatorship and overthrown in December 1991, after the anti-government forces mounted an attack on the presidential palace. Gamsakhurdia left it and went into hiding in the Chechen republic early in January 1992. However, the former president returned to western Georgia last fall to take charge of troops loyal to him.

TV Views 'Rumors' of Suicide

LD0501220194 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 2055 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Citing information received from Chechnya and a statement by the Georgian ex-president's wife, Manana Archvadze, international media reported that the former president of Georgia committed suicide in a village of Zugdidi Rayon on 5 January. However, the official authorities and appropriate bodies in Zugdidi, Tsalenjikha, and adjacent rayons do not possess such information.

A high-ranking officer in the Georgian Security Ministry believes that the information about Gamsakhurdia's suicide must be thoroughly checked. One of the high-ranking officers in the Georgian Security Ministry who did not want to reveal his identity stated that the information about the Georgian ex-president Zviad Gamsakhurdia's suicide in a populated location in western Georgia on 31 December was based only on rumors and must therefore be thoroughly checked.

In an interview with INTERFAX, the officer said that three days ago Security Ministry officials in Zugdidi got hold of leaflets carrying Zviad Gamsakhurdia's address to the Georgian people in which he urged them not to surrender and to continue the struggle against the Shevardnadze junta.

The officer also believes that Zviad Gamsakhurdia is not a man capable of committing suicide.

There are also other versions. According to reports from the IPRINDA agency, a split occurred over the new year among the former president's supporters in Chechnya. It developed into an armed clash, as a result of which Zviad Gamsakhurdia was wounded and died several days later.

The Georgian leadership does not possess information to confirm or deny these reports. However, since there are such reports, the republic's Prosecutor's Office and other competent bodies have been entrusted with the task of carrying out an investigation. The public will be informed about its results.

In connection with this incident, Chechen Vice President (Zelimkhan Yantardiyev), Foreign Minister (Shamsudin Yusip), and the president's adviser arrived in Tbilisi today, 5 January.

[Signed] The press secretariat of the head of state

Shevardnadze on Reported Death

LD0601014194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0040 GMT 6 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vitaliy Gordiyenko]

[Text] Moscow, 6 Jan—Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze told an ITAR-TASS correspondent on the telephone from his office shortly after 1:00 A.M. this morning: Whatever the truth about Zviad Gamsakhurdia's death, it is of no great importance to the situation in Georgia.

Asked about the possible consequences of Gamsakhurdia's death, Eduard Shevardnadze said that he "would rather Gamsakhurdia stayed alive." He explained: "It was clear to us that the former president had long been a political corpse. This is the reason the Georgian leadership decided not to physically destroy him or his supporters."

The Georgian leader continued: "Moreover, many of the ex- president's supporters who had been taken prisoners were set free after the western regions of the republic were recaptured." Eduard Shevardnadze emphasized that "the majority of his supporters had dissociated themselves from him."

Eduard Shevardnadze did not give a final version of the death or suicide of the 54-year-old Zviad Gamsakhurdia, though the ITAR-TASS correspondent asked for one.

He said: "The Georgian leaders learned about this from Chechen sources, and it was confirmed by a Chechen delegation which came to Tbilisi on 5 January." The Georgian head of state said: "We immediately got in touch with [people in] places where Gamsakhurdia was likely to be staying, and with his wife Manana who is in Groznyy, but it is hard to tell whether it really happened this or that way."

At the same time, Eduard Shevardnadze suggested that Gamsakhurdia might have died in a conflict between some people in his entourage because "he started getting in their way and they were capable of such a step."

Officials Depart To Investigate

LD0601105894 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1000 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Text] In accordance with an instruction from the Georgian head of state, law enforcement officers of the republic today left for Zugdidi rayon which, according to preliminary information, was the place of Zviad Gamsakhurdia's death.

The group of prosecutors and experts is led by Deputy Prosecutor General Anzor Baluashvili. The group will be joined on the spot by representatives of the interior and security ministries and by the state minister for western Georgia.

The population of Zugdidi rayon where, according to one report, the former president's death took place, has no accurate information in this respect.

Trial Begins for Murder of U.S. Official

LD0501135594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1131 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The trial of Anzor Sharmaidze, 21, charged with the murder of Fred Woodruff, an official of the American Embassy in Georgia, began in Tbilisi on Wednesday [5 January].

Before the trial the lawyer of the unemployed defendant made a statement claiming the murder was a tragic accident.

The trial taking place at the Supreme Court is attended by the vice-consul of the American embassy.

Woodruff was killed last summer on a highway near Tbilisi. Investigators arrived at the conclusion an attempt was made to stop the diplomat's car for the purpose of robbery. As the car driven by the chief of Shevardnadze's security did not stop, fire was opened at it.

According to many sources, Woodruff was a CIA officer. The chief of the organization James Woolsey came to Tbilisi to escort the dead body back home.

800 Gamsakhurdia Supporters Disarmed in West Region

LD0501132794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1131 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] According to the press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry, four armed groups of supporters of the former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia—a total of 800 persons—were disarmed in West Georgia in December 1993. The press center says the overwhelming majority of rebels have been disarmed in that part of the country.

Ministry Rejects Rumors of Armed Forces 'Split'

LD0501133394 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By M. Vardzelashvili; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The press center of the Georgian Ministry of Defense has issued a statement in which it rejects rumors circulating in Tbilisi, as well as throughout the republic, that allegedly a split has taken place among the Georgian Armed Forces that could lead to armed conflict. The statement of the press center says that such rumors are absolutely not in accordance with reality. Nevertheless, tension is being felt in Tbilisi, particularly since the explosion in the building of the Ministry of Security. As for the general situation in the republic, measures are continuing in West Georgia to confiscate weapons from the population.

Shevardnadze Preparing Ministry Reshuffle

LD0501170994 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1540 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Zurab Dvalia, IPRINDA news agency correspondent, reports from Georgia by telephone.

[Dvalia] A constituent meeting of the Abkhazian regional branch of the Union of Georgian Citizens took place in Tbilisi today. The union is headed by Eduard Shevardnadze. The speakers noted the need to unite all forces in order to attain stability and order in the republic. Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze himself spoke at the meeting. He gave a brief analysis of the sociopolitical situation that had taken shape. Naturally, he paid special attention to the Abkhazian problem. For the first time over the few months since Georgian troops had left Abkhazia, Shevardnadze openly said that, apart from everything else, a large-scale betrayal near the Katorskiy bridge in Abkhazia was one of the main reasons for the defeat in Abkhazia. Also, this betrayal took place in Ochamchira Rayon, as well as in Sukhumi, where whole battalions were often withdrawn from advanced positions without command agreement.

Shevardnadze openly accused Tengiz Kitovani, former republican defense minister, and General Paata Datunashvili, current first deputy defense minister, of handing over great amounts of weapons, ammunition, and hardware to the armed formations of the ex- president's supporters.

The head of state noted that today's Georgia did not have, in fact, a unified disciplined army since the available armed forces cannot be regarded as such. Also, he said that in the next few days he intended to issue several decrees aimed at forming new unified armed forces but he did not elaborate on the subject.

At the same time, it has become known from unofficial sources that serious changes are being prepared in the top echelons of the Georgian Defense Ministry.

Shevardnadze Stresses Ties With CIS

LD0501182294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1643 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By GIA correspondent]

[Text] Tbilisi January 5 TASS—In today's interview with national television, Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze cited the republic's entering the Commonwealth of Independent States as one of the last year's most important events.

Analysing the current political and economic situation in Georgia, Shevardnadze listed three principal factors which he believes should determine joint activities within the CIS framework. These are strengthening the economy, fighting separatist sentiments and averting a threat of dictatorship.

The Georgian leader said the Commonwealth of Independent States is presently charged with a historical mission, and "if all the countries work in agreement in these three directions, if we efficiently fight these evils, all citizens of newly-independent states will feel the goodness resulting from our unity."

Shevardnadze on 'Political Way' for Abkhazia

NC0501183894 Yerevan SNARK in English 1405 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Tbilisi, January 5 (SNARK)—Abkhazia surely will return to the body of Georgia said Eduard Shevardnadze during a constituent meeting of the regional organization the Union of Georgia's citizens. On his words it is must take place by political way. However, if it doesn't happen he, the head of the state, personally, will head the "march of peace" and cross Abkhazia from Inguri river to Psoe river.

As SNARK reporter informs seemingly under "march of peace" Shevarnadze means force methods. It is not accidental he also appeal for pressing formation of Georgian Army.

Ministry Attacks Ardzinba Skepticism on Talks

LD0601105694 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The mass media has spread reports about Vladislav Ardzinba's radio address. According to these reports, Ardzinba said he is rather skeptical about Georgian-Abkhaz consultations set for 11 January. In this connection, the Georgian Foreign Ministry has issued a statement which says, in particular:

Ardzinba's radio address shows not only his skepticism, but is also an attempt to poison the atmosphere in advance of the forthcoming [Geneva] talks and, if possible, to wreck them. His judgements are a testimony of this. He says Abkhazia is no longer part of Georgia, that Abkhazia has won the war, that conditions are set by the winners, and that it is only possible to talk about a treaty between Abkhazia and Georgia as two equal entities.

The history of the conflict in Abkhazia has many examples proving that Ardzinba and his supporters are used to trampling on and scrapping agreements they have signed themselves. It is enough to mention the fate of the Moscow and Sochi agreements. Such perfidy has become for them an effective and common means of carrying out their intentions.

In his New Year address to Abkhazians, Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze said:

The democratic Georgian state is giving you not only a guarantee of preserving your national identity but also a guarantee of development and improvement, as well as appropriate political, economic, and other guarantees. We promise this to these people, as we do to anybody else who lives in Georgia. We promise them freedom, civil rights guarantees, and anything else which is accepted in the modern civilized world.

This was part of the statement by the Georgian Foreign Ministry, the full text of which will be published in the press.

Russian Delegation Arrives in Abkhazia

LD0501221594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1831 GMT 5 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Zurab Argun]

[Text] Sukhumi January 5 TASS—A delegation of the Russian Federation led by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Pastukhov arrived in Sukhumi on Wednesday.

In an interview with ITAR-TASS Pastukhov said that the delegation arrived in Abkhazia to familiarise itself with the situation in Abkhazia on the eve of Georgian-Abkhazian talks due to begin in Geneva on January 11.

A meeting between Pastukhov and Vladislav Ardzinba was held in the residence of the Abkhazian parliament chairman. After the talks with Abkhazian leaders the Russian delegation met with the people of the Abkhazian capital Sukhumi and visited districts damaged during military operations.

Pastukhov positively assessed efforts made by the Abkhazian government to eliminate the after-effects of the war and improve the social position of the Abkhazian population.

Pastukhov expressed the hope for the speediest solution of problems connected with the return of refugees who fled the republic during the war.

On Thursday, the Russian delegation is leaving for Moscow.

Nation Invited To Attend Talks With Abkhazians 11 Jan

LD0501150294 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1115 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Tbilisi, 5 Jan—IBERIA has learned that the Georgian leadership has already received an official invitation from the UN to take part in the next round of Georgian-Abkhaz talks to be held on 11 January. It was finally decided that the talks would take place in Geneva, which, observers believe, is likely to annoy Russia, to a certain extent.

Article Analyzes Defeat in Abkhaz War

AU0501133194 Tbilisi THE GEORGIAN TIMES in Georgian 27 Nov 93 p 3

[Article by Mamuka Dzebisashvili: "Why Were We Defeated in Abkhazia?"]

[Text] The first stage of the Abkhazian conflict has ended with the defeat of the Georgians. However, as has been said more than once, the war has not ended and it is only a matter of time before it begins again. Consequently, the renewal of combat actions in Abkhazia is unavoidable. Therefore, it would be better for us to take into account those military mistakes or technical failures that took place during the course of the conflict. In spite of the self-sacrifice of Georgian fighters, these errors were, to a significant degree, responsible for the defeat of the Georgian Army and the loss first of Sukhumi and then the whole of Abkhazia.

Without a State Army:

The process of forming a single Georgian army has been going on for several years now. However, almost nothing has been done in this respect. A hastily formed, untrained, undisciplined army will not be able to win a war. Any person with a military education knows that an army is formed through incessant training at barracks. In this respect, the situation is bad. The barracks, firing ranges, and military bases that Russia transferred to the Georgian Ministry of Defense are in a demolished state. Many are, in general, abandoned military installations that do not have the appropriate military contingent and that have been plundered by the local population. However, once repaired and provided with elementary defense, they will play a decisive role in the formation of the Georgian Army. There are significant problems within the military commissariats that are unable to call up the necessary number of young persons for service in the armed forces. The reason is simple: The commissariat is a bureaucratic body. Due to thousands of "arrangements" and machinations, conscripts have easily been able to avoid compulsory military service. If this body is not reformed or replaced by another structure, we will not be able to achieve the desired results. We have to create an institution that will punish with the full severity of the law those persons who avoid service in the armed forces.

The lack of officer cadres remains an unresolved problem. On the initiative of the Ministry of Defense, Georgian and

non-Georgian officers serving in the Russian Army have started to be brought into the national army. However, unless there is an improvement in the social situation of officers, this priceless treasure will slip out of our hands.

The existence of armed formations remains an insurmountable barrier to the creation of an army. These subunits are not accountable to anyone and, in a number of cases, appear almost as bandit detachments. It has been repeatedly stated that they are to join the official armed forces but, in reality, nothing has changed. Quite recently, the republic's defense minister again issued an order on the necessity of all military formations becoming part of a single army and on providing the sides that participated in the Abkhazian conflict with weapons and technical equipment. Naturally, the nonexistence of a trained army played a big role in the defeat in Abkhazia. However, the antiquity of Georgian military equipment and weapons had decisive importance. At the initial stage of the conflict, the Abkhazians had a qualitative rather than quantitative advantage in equipment over their opponents. However, following violation of the Sochi agreement [signed on 27 July 1993], they also had quantitative superiority.

Armored equipment: The existing conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union have clearly shown the importance of armored equipment in conditions of war. In today's conditions, having modern armored forces that have been tactically trained means being halfway toward winning a war. Unfortunately, Georgia has nothing to boast about regarding its armored equipment. Of all the former Soviet republics, Georgia was the one that received the most antiquated and worthless equipment. Whereas Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan received modern armored vehicles (T-72, T-80, BTR-80, and so forth) from the Russian Army, Georgia, on the other hand, was given tanks and APC's (T-54, T-55, T-62, BTR-60BP, and BRDM) dating from World War II and its aftermath.

During the initial stage of the Abkhazian war, the Georgian side had a big advantage (in the main, quantitative) as far as armored equipment was concerned. However, the situation gradually changed. The Abkhazians had in their weaponry: T-72, T-55, BTR-80, MT-LB, and so forth. The defenders of Gagra and Sukhumi were astonished by the qualities of the so-called "uncapturable" T-72 tank. It was impossible to destroy it with small-caliber guns and the RPG-7 and "Mukha" [antitank] rocket launchers. The IFV-2 also worked well for the Abkhazian side, a vehicle which, for the most part, is an improved version of the IFV-1 in possession of the Georgians, the only difference being that it has a semi-automatic gun (while the IFV-1 is still loading a shell, its new modification manages to fire 10).

Of the new Russian weapons that were used by the Abkhazians, it is worth singling out the antitank guided missile. This missile was responsible for destroying a large number of tanks on the Georgian side. These were fired, in the main, from the [seismic] laboratory in Zemo Eshera.

The importance of armored equipment is also borne out by the opinion of the majority of the defenders of Sukhumi, according to which the city would not have fallen if they had possessed tanks.

Artillery: At the start of the conflict, the Abkhazians found themselves in a difficult situation as they practically had no artillery. They had innumerable automatic weapons, machine guns, rocket launchers, but no cannons and howitzers; by rarely using 85 mm D-44-type cannons, it was impossible to destroy the many Georgian tanks and, in general, inflict serious damage upon the enemy. However, as time passed, the Abkhazians acquired all the modern artillery currently to be found on the territory of the former USSR. Their weaponry included 122 mm D-30 howitzers and 152 mm self-propelled artillery systems (2S-3 "Akatsiya" and 2S-1 "Mimoza"), and they also later acquired the so- called "Grad" launcher vehicle, which is capable of salvo fire and has a huge destructive force.

The Georgian Armed Forces did not lag behind the enemy as far as artillery was concerned; as a result of the selfless struggle of artillerymen, Sukhumi escaped being taken on several occasions.

The plethora of artillery and the lack of qualifications of those operating it (thanks to Russian military instructors, the combat capabilities of Abkhazian artillery significantly increased during the final period of the conflict) conditioned the destructive and devastating character of combat actions. This was shown by the burned-down city of Sukhumi and the destroyed villages in Ochamchire rayon.

Aviation: Georgian aviation was produced, in the main, at the former Dimitrov 31st Aviation Factory (Su-25 fighters) although the Georgian Ministry of Defense did receive a squadron of strike [damrtqmeli] helicopters (Mi-24 and Mi-8 MT). Our aviation took an active part in the Abkhazian war but it also incurred big losses. By using antiaircraft missile systems, the Abkhazians succeeded in shooting down several planes and helicopters (Su-25, Mi-24, and Mi-8 MT). Such losses incurred by Georgian aviation are wholly understandable since we had neither fighter-interceptors (Su-27, MiG-29) nor combat radar systems, as a result of which our aviation became an easy prey for Abkhazian antiaircraft defense and fighters.

It is a joke to speak about Abkhazian aviation. It would be more correct for us to speak about Russian aviation that was hired by the Abkhazians and that actively participated in the conflict: Su-25's bombed and reconnoitered Georgian positions and Mi-24's also frequently took part in battles; however, it was the Su-25's that carefully protected the aforementioned fighting vehicles. In spite of the high caliber of Russian pilots and the poor capabilities of Georgian antiaircraft defense, the Georgians did succeed in shooting down Mi-24's, Mi-8 MT's, and, most importantly, Su-25's.

Antiaircraft Defense: It would not be an exaggeration to say that antiaircraft defense brought the greatest advantage to the sides fighting in the Abkhazian war. This was particularly true in the case of the Abkhazians. By means of the "Igla," "Strela," and "Osa," portable antiaircraft missile

systems and the "Su-25" [as published] "Shilka" self-propelled antiaircraft gun, they were able to neutralize Georgian aviation. The "Osa" was particularly effective in this respect. It should be said here that, according to certain sources of information, the latest antiaircraft systems located in Gudauta were also used in battles.

It is true that the antiaircraft defense of the Georgian Armed Forces was not equipped technically to the same level as that of the Abkhazians. Nevertheless, it also achieved certain results. The date 19 March 1993 represents a landmark in the history of our antiaircraft defense. On this day, a Su-27 fighter-interceptor (tail number 11) belonging to the Russian Army and piloted by Major Vatslav Shipko was shot down. In addition, several assault aircraft and strike helicopters belonging to the Russian Army and based at the Babushera military airfield were destroyed.

If we do not take into account barges and "Kometa" [launches] on which heavy-caliber machine guns, guns, and "Grad" launchers were installed, the sides involved in the fighting did not have navies. By using these means, it was impossible to carry out precise bombing of the opposing side's positions and it resulted only in destruction and the killing of the peaceful population.

Such an Abkhazian navy presented a danger for Georgian aviation as they had portable antiaircraft systems on the launches, which enabled them to destroy several Su-25's belonging to the Georgian Armed Forces and several passenger aircraft belonging to the "Orbi" Aviation Company.

At the same time, it was established that vessels belonging to the Russian Black Sea Fleet were participating directly in battles on the Abkhazian side. For example, the combatant ship "Bezukoriznennyy" fought against the Georgians.

The one thing for which the Abkhazians made superb use of their so-called navy was landing an amphibious assault force, which caused considerable damage to Georgian military formations.

Fire arms and rocket launchers: In this war, different types of Kalashnikov assault rifles [AK] were widely used. The Kalashnikov improved assault rifle (7.62 mm) [AKM] proved to be particularly effective. A 5.45 mm bullet from the AK-74 and AKS [folding-stock assault rifle] changed its trajectory when fired in cornfields or mandarin groves in contrast to a bullet fired from the AKS [as published] that did not change its trajectory. In this respect, the Abkhazians were at an advantage. They were armed, in the main, with AKM's and a rocket launcher of the same make that was unrivalled in street battles.

Of the Kalashnikov assault rifles, one can single out the 7.62 mm Kalashnikov medium machine gun and the 12.7 mm Degtyarev-Shpagin heavy machine gun. These weapons represented a big force in battles in forests and ravines.

Snipers also played their part in the fighting. They used the Dragunov and Tokarev semiautomatic sniping rifles. It is significant that there were many female snipers on the Abkhazian side.

One of the "heroes" of the Georgian-Abkhazian armed conflict was the rocket launcher. On account of geographical conditions, it proved to be the most effective weapon in this war. It was used both to destroy armored equipment and to bomb positions. The Abkhazians undoubtedly held the advantage regarding this type of weapon. The sides involved in the fighting had the RPG-7, RPG-18, "Mukha," RPG-22, "Osa," and the 30 mm AGS [expansion unknown] rocket launcher.

Proceeding from all the aforementioned, one can draw the following conclusion: The Georgian defeat in Abkhazia resulted from having an army that was untrained and lacking in discipline at an elementary level and having antiquated military-technical capabilities compared with the Abkhazian side. Therefore, if we want to achieve any kind of military success in the future, we should start eradicating these shortcomings now.

Visa, Business Documents Signed With China

LD0501163794 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1115 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Tbilisi, 5 [January]—A meeting was held today at the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs between Wang Fengxiang, the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to Georgia, and Aleksandr Chikvaidze, the minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Georgia. Two intergovernmental agreements relating to the development of business relations and tourism were signed during the meeting.

The first agreement deals with the introduction of visa-exempt procedures for business visits between China and Georgia. This agreement is a practical step towards the development of trade and economic relations.

The second agreement introduces visa-exempt procedures for tourist groups. This is the first such agreement for Georgia. It will promote organized tourism under the guarantees envisaged by the norms of international law.

The Georgian and Chinese foreign ministries have prepared a consular document between the two countries which will be signed during the next meeting of the Georgian and Chinese foreign ministers.

Estonia

Government Not To Apply to NATO Individually

LD0501161994 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1300 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Estonia will not express in the near future an official wish to become a NATO member, the head of the first bureau of the Foreign Ministry, (Raimo Reinart), asserted to the BNS [BALTIC NEWS SERVICE]. In the words of the foreign ministry representative, all three Baltic States have already expressed their wish to become integrated in the security structures of Europe, among them NATO. In what forms one or another state expresses its plans is no longer that important, considered (Reinart) in the interview given to the BNS. He said that the question of Lithuania will not be discussed in Brussels separately, but in the joint context of central and eastern European states. (Reinart) emphasized that joining NATO was a lengthy process, in the course of which armaments, control of troops and many other questions would have to be generalized. This was enabled by the Partnership for Peace program offered by the United States of America, which, in the words of (Reinart), was supported by all three Baltic states.

Nuclear Fuel Removal From Paldiski by April

WS0501143394 Tallinn BNS in English 1013 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 05, BNS - Russia will probably start the removal of nuclear fuel from Paldiski in March or April, Environment Minister Andres Tarand told BNS. The process will take about four months, he said.

Tarand's statement was based on Foreign Ministry Adviser Mark Sinisoo's claim that Russia proposed June 30 as the deadline for taking out the fuel.

The minister told BNS this is "a case typical of the situation in Estonia where a department does not coordinate its activity with others."

In Tarand's opinion, the Transportation and Communications Ministry and the Rescue Service should certainly take part in the dismantling of the reactors.

Kalev Timberg, the deputy director of the Rescue Service, told BNS the service is to secure fire safety during the process and deactivation of radioactive substances if an accident occurs. Russia hasn't yet submitted to the Rescue Service the dismantling blueprints, which complicates the situation, he said.

Timberg refused to comment reports that Russian military authorities want the Rescue Service to bring to the scene equipment able to shoot jets of water to a height of at least 12 meters.

Henno Putnik, the chief specialist of the Estonian Meteorology and Hydrology Institute's radiation laboratory, told BNS removal of nuclear fuel rods from reactors "is an operation Russian submariners often carry out."

The dismantling of the entire nuclear reactor complex in Paldiski is to take place in the second stage of the operation.

Tarand told BNS Finnish and Swedish specialists have offered to help Estonia in this.

Plans for Government Reshuffle Reported

MK0501143094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Jan 94 p 3

[Unattributed NEGA report in the "Estonia" column]

[Text] According to a report in the local press, four ministers are going to be replaced in the Estonian Government. Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste is to be replaced by the current defense minister, Juri Luik. Trivimi Velliste himself will be sent to the United Nations as Estonia's permanent representative. The post of defense minister is to be ceded to parliament member Indrek Kannik. Finance Minister Madis Uurike is to be replaced by Kheyki Kranikh, a member of the liberal faction in the State Assembly, while Economics Minister Toomas Sildmae will give way to Toyvo Yurgenson, a deputy of the State Assembly. T. Sildmae's dismissal, however, has been opposed by representatives of Estonian entrepreneurial circles. Coming together for a hasty meeting on 3 January, they sent a joint letter of protest to the republic's president and prime minister. All the supposed candidates for ministerial posts are members of the ruling coalition in the State Assembly. A final decision is expected to be made before the first parliament session this year, scheduled for 10 January.

Latvia

Danish Minister Ends Visit, Pledges Assistance

LD0501131194 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1000 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Your problems are also our problems: With these words, Danish Defense Minister Hans Haekkerup today ended his lecture at the Latvian National Defense Academy. He also ends his visit to Latvia today.

In the lecture at the National Defense Academy, the Danish defense minister was explaining resolutions that will probably be passed at the summit meeting of the NATO member states in Brussels on 10 January. At the end of his lecture, Haekkerup promised that Denmark would also be granting to Latvia all kinds of assistance in the future.

Haekkerup also held a news conference this morning about his visit to Kurzeme province yesterday. He visited the Russian military facility—the Skrunda radar station and the 45th Kuldiga battalion of the Latvian Home Guard. Haekkerup stressed that the radar station should not be left in Latvia and that the dismantling of the radar should be agreed on at Latvian-Russian talks. Haekkerup also positively assessed the Latvian Home Guard.

Doubts Lithuania's NATO Admission

LD0501150894 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Danish Defense Minister Hans Haekkerup, who is visiting Latvia, said at a meeting with reporters today that NATO would most probably turn down Lithuania's request for admittnce to that organization. Haekkerup explained that he has that impression knowing the attitude of NATO member states towards the involvement of new states in the organization.

A special program proposed by the United States for states which wish to cooperate with NATO will be discussed at a conference of the heads of NATO member states scheduled to take place in Brussels on 10 January. Participation in this program would be a mandatory condition to become a NATO member state.

The program provides that countries will be able to conclude bilateral cooperation agreements with NATO. NATO will provide necessary consultations for such countries in cases when their territorial integrity, security or political sovereignty might be threatened.

NATO is also ready to cooperate with the Baltic states and Russia within the framework of such a program. Haekkerup drew journalists' attention to the fact that the conclusion of bilateral agreements would allow NATO to cooperate individually with each state taking into account its peculiarities and wishes.

Latvia Supports Lithuania's NATO Application

LD0501174894 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1700 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Latvia has expressed positive support for Lithuania's intention to join NATO; at the same time making it known that it will not hurry to follow Lithuania's example. We are satisfied that Lithuania has done this; if the right moment comes, we will do the same, Gunars Meierovics, Latvian minister of state for relations with the Baltic and Nordic countries, has said. In his view, at the moment there is no sense in Latvia turning to NATO with a request to join, because, in contrast to Lithuania, Latvia still has about 20,000 Russian soldiers on its territory.

Meeting in Stockholm today with Swedish Prime Ministert Carl Bildt were Martins Virsis, parliamentary secretary at the Latvian Foreign Ministry; Aleksandrs Kirsteins, chairman of the Saeima Foreign Affairs Commission, and Juris Sinka, a member of the Saeima Foreign Affairs Commission. They discussed Latvian-Russian relations, devoting most attention to the issue of the withdrawal of the Russian Army and the problem of the Skrunda radar station. The Swedish prime minister stressed the need for our country to agree with Russia on the withdrawal of the army by concluding an agreement in the nearest future. To quote Bildt, that would an important investment in promoting stability in the Baltic region.

German Official's Support of Baltics Noted

WS0501163794 Riga LETA in English 0545 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] Riga, January 5 (LETA)—The press service of the Foreign Ministry here has received a statement released to the press by professor Wolfgang Von Stetten, chairman of the Baltic parliamentary group within the German Bundestag. The German parliamentarian calls on the German Bundestag and Western countries to throw their weight in support of the Baltic states, amid the threats voiced by the Russian ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and worries sparked in the Baltic states by the hints which have cropped up in the New Year's address of Russian President Boris Yeltsin to his fellow citizens. "It has to be made clear to the Kremlin leadership that, whatever the government of the Russian Federation is, independence of the three Baltic states has to be inviolable," says the statement. "Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia should not be betrayed and sold out once again, as it has already happened in 1940, 1941 and 1945. Russia ought to be told that the remaining troops be withdrawn from Latvia and Estonia in 1994."

Dr. Von Stetten maintained that he had not witnessed any evidence of Russians being discriminated repressed in any of the three Baltic countries, they had been only deprived of their self-assumed rights to act as occupants and masters of the three people, which they had enjoyed until recently. He pointed out that legislation on minorities rights in Estonia and Lithuania met the most strict European standards, the only controversy being the laws on citizenship. Von Stetten said, however, that the citizenship laws in Lithuania and Latvia are much more liberal than respective legislations in the countries of Western Europe, including Germany. The German parliamentarian underlined that both the allegations by Zhirinovskiy and implications by President Yeltsin were groundless.

Von Stetten also stated that the former occupants could not be granted any privileges they are claiming so vehemently. The chairman of the German parliamentary group suggested it was necessary to consider seriously and to discuss an option to grant the Baltic states the NATO membership, or to offer Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia guarantees of their security, in order to ease their worries of a new eventual annexation on the part of Russia.

Lithuania

Paper Examines Ministry's Former Arms Deals

WS0501083094 Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 17 Dec 93 No. 244 p 3

[First article in a series by Virginijus Gaivenis: "Who Armed National Defense? (1)"]

[Excerpts] RESPUBLIKA mentioned the name of Kaunas inhabitant Vladas Laurinavicius for the first time in the article "In the Tangle of the Kaunas Mafia" published in the fall of 1991. We described the cruise of the Kaunas Mafia "celebrities" around the Mediterranean. It seems that gathered on the ship "Gruzia," the leaders of the

Lithuanian-Hong Kong enterprise "Grand Queen," who had caused suspicion among law enforcement officials for a long time, and their assistants were not just resting. The list of holiday-makers surprised the officials most of all because it included not only V. Laurinavicius, but also Andrius Jankevicius, nicknamed Psidze, who is one of the best known persons in the Kaunas criminal world, S. Ciapas, president of the closed stock company "Deka," and other well-known "businessmen." [passage omitted]

The Lithuanian state and its government leaders authorized [former] Defense Minister A. Butkevicius to conclude an agreement on the purchase of 5,000 machine guns from the Kaunas association "Selma" headed by no one else but V. Laurinavicius, a person who has been sentenced thrice, like Psidze himself. [passage omitted] Today, our law enforcement officials have become interested in the activities of this association and its ties with the former leaders of the National Defense Ministry [KAM]. Maybe, because aircraft and machine guns, as they suspect, were bought from Russia for a "nickel," while they were "pushed into" the KAM for hundreds of millions [currency unspecified]. Prosecutors are trying to assess material losses. They are also trying to find out who proposed the Kaunas company "Selma" with its president V. Laurinavicius as arms suppliers to the government.

We will try to base the study of KAM former agreements on definite and documented facts in the current publication.

Ship Traders Under Pirates' Siege

KAM leaders established the first contacts with "Selma" last spring. On 11 May, they concluded an agreement on the acquisition of six armed war ships with equipment and ammunition. "Selma" President V. Laurinavicius pledged to observe it. The KAM leaders made a deal with "Selma" without delay. The then Deputy Defense Minister A. Pauzuolis was authorized by Minister A. Butkevicius himself to sign the agreement. However, when employees of the State Inspection Department began to analyze the conditions for concluding and implementing this agreement, the KAM leaders refused strictly to provide copies of the documents. By the way, as it turned out later, the agreement with "Selma" had been concluded without permission from the Lithuanian Government. A relevant government resolution appeared only on 1 July of last year.

However, under the 11 May agreement, the KAM did not receive a single ship, as it is. Therefore, a new government resolution (24 September) was adopted which served as the basis for signing another agreement between the KAM and "Selma." True, the latter bears no concrete date, only the year 1992. It provides for the acquisition of one war ship at a price of 120 million rubles [R]. Although the 24 September resolution did not permit paying cash, R60 million were taken from the Vilnius branch of the Lithuanian Bank and handed to V. Laurinavicius the next day. The money was paid to the "Selma" president without the minister's signature, because the KAM allegedly owed him this money according to the former unfulfilled 11 May agreement. A week later on 6 October, following the government resolution, the KAM leaders took 117 million talonai [provisional currency before the litas] from the Lithuanian Bank and gave it to V. Laurinavicius. The money for one war ship. The KAM had no agreement with the association "Selma" for this purpose. It had only Minister A. Butkevicius' resolution (without a date and a number) on additional payment for one war ship.

At the same time, the National Defense Ministry [KAM] launched another agreement with "Selma" (indicating only the year 1992) on the acquisition of a second frigate for 240 million talonai designed to combat submarines. Despite all Lithuanian laws, this agreement allowed that the "Selma" president be paid in cash. Another 240 million talonai were taken from the bank and handed over to V. Laurinavicius on 17 November.

Thus, V. Laurinavicius received 417 million rubles [R] for two ships in cash. The statement of transfer of two small ships, built in 1980 and 1981, was signed by R. Baltuska, commander of the coast guard unit, and Baltic Fleet Deputy Commander N. Kachanovich. On 21 October 1992, this statement was confirmed by Baltic Fleet Commander Y. Yegorov and Minister A. Butkevicius. However, none of the documents indicated the actual price of the ships. Maybe, this is why officers often hold their heads when hearing the sum that the government paid for the two ships. One could buy newer and much better ships for the millions that went to "Selma." When the State Inspection Department tried to retrieve the documents from the KAM confirming the prices of the acquired ships, the ministry refused to provide them. As it turned out, the KAM was overzealous—it paid to "Selma" 78.8 million litai more than it had in Finance Ministry allotments.

"Selma" Takes Care of Arms

A government resolution of 19 August 1992 authorized Defense Minister A. Butkevicius to conclude an agreement with the "Selma" association, so that the latter assisted in supplying the KAM with light firearms. According to the plan, "Selma" had to provide 5,000 AKM-74 machine guns for R198,770,000. This government document served as a basis for the agreement between the KAM and "Selma." The agreement (bearing only the year 1992) was signed by "Selma" Managing Director V. Laurinavicius and Minister A. Butkevicius. Although without a date, the document has a stamp. Under this agreement, "Selma" had to supply 5,000 AKM-74 machine guns. The KAM had to pay $220 for each of them at an exchange rate of $1 to R180.70. For some reason the minister again promised to pay this sum in cash, although Lithuanian law forbids this.

Judging from the documents that RESPUBLIKA possesses today, between 20 August and 7 September 1992, KAM officials took out R198,770,000 from the ministry's account in the Vilnius branch of the Lithuanian Bank. All the money was handed over to "Selma" President V. Laurinavicius.

V. Drupas, chief of the KAM Armament Department, received the machine guns from "Selma" on 15 August 1992. True, "Selma" supplied AK-74 machine guns

instead of the AKM-74 indicated in the government resolution and the agreement. The arms were transferred without a ministry's commission. The bills of lading were issued the same day. However, there is not a single word about the price of these arms and the total sum paid for them. How much did the ministry actually pay for these machine-guns? (To be continued).

Further on Former Arms Deals

WS0501094494 Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 18 Dec 93 No. 245 p 3

[Second article in a series by Virginijus Gaivenis: "Who Armed National Defense? (2)"]

[Excerpts]

Prosecutors Are Estimating State Losses

Last spring, not only the employees of the State Inspection Department, but also the police and the Prosecutor's Office became interested in the Kaunas association "Selma" and its formerly convicted president Vladas Laurinavicius. The latter took care not only of the arming of Lithuanian soldiers but also of the welfare of Russian servicemen in Kaliningrad Oblast [reference to the construction of military housing]. [passage omitted]

Having received 615.77 million rubles [R] in cash from the National Defense Ministry, the "Selma" association deposited only R41.054 million into its current bank account. The remaining cash, as the inspectors from the State Inspection Department have established, were used for other purposes. [passage omitted]

Minister Will Not Tolerate Illegal Actions

Current Lithuanian Defense Minister L. Linkevicius maintains that he has known "Selma" president V. Laurinavicius since the time he belonged to the Seimas [parliament] Foreign Affairs Committee. The active and business-like person from Kaunas made a good impression not only on L. Linkevicius. It was clear from conversations with V. Laurinavicius that he had good contacts not only with Kaliningrad, but also with Russia's ruling circles. Minister L. Linkevicius cannot account for the activities of the former Defense Ministry leadership, its decisions, and the mysterious links with the criminal world. The minister did not know, however, that V. Laurinavicius had been convicted. "We must make clear today which actions were legal and which were illegal. However, we must assess this from the viewpoint of benefit to the state. No illegal actions will be tolerated in the future," promised Minister L. Linkevicius.

Further Details

WS0501133194 Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 23 Dec 93 No. 248 p 3

[Third article in a series by Virginijus Gaivenis: "Who Armed National Defense? (3)"]

[Excerpts]

What Links "Celebrities" of Kaunas Mafia With Former and Current National Defense Ministry Leadership

Last Tuesday [21 December], the Russian daily KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA reported that in early summer, the KGB division in Smolensk prevented an operation whereby 10 military helicopters MI-8MTB-1 had to be transferred to Lithuania through the Russian air company "Vityaz" and the Kaunas association "Selma." The newspaper claimed that the first two helicopters had to fly from Yaroslavl to Kaunas, where their "duplicates" with the same numbers were waiting. The latter would have flown to Kaliningrad in order to return later to Lithuania legally. The helicopters from Yaroslavl would have remained in Lithuania. According to the newspaper, the operation failed in the first stage, when its executors landed at the Vitebsk military airport for refueling. This big shady deal, as the Moscow newspaper reported, is linked with the Baltic Fleet leadership and other officials.

V. Kravchenko, acting Russian Baltic Fleet commander, told a BNS correspondent that the results of the investigation proved that no one from the Baltic Fleet leadership or the fleet's air force command had any link with this deal. The fleet does not have any agreements with the Russian air company "Vityaz." In addition, Vice Admiral V. Kravchenko confirmed to BNS that the Baltic Fleet collaborates closely with the Kaunas association "Selma" which is building military housing in Kaliningrad Oblast. As V. Kravchenko stressed, however, "cooperation is conducted according to the program drafted by the Russian government." [passage omitted]

The National Defense Ministry [KAM] bought two frigates from the Baltic Fleet through "Selma." V. Laurinavicius [the firm's president] received 417 million rubles [R] in cash for them. While law enforcement officials are investigating the circumstances of the origin of these and other contracts between KAM and "Selma," RESPUBLIKA is conducting its own investigation into this scandal.

The ships which the KAM leadership chose (or which the Baltic Fleet leadership offered for sale) were assessed for the first time in July of last year in Liepaja. A preliminary agreement was reached with the Baltic Fleet command on the purchase of two torpedo boats, one hydrographic ship, and one vessel of another sort. Last summer, the meeting in Liepaja was attended by KAM commanders Lieutenants E. Miliauskas, V. Mockus, and R. Baltuska. An agreement was reached with the Baltic Fleet leadership and stated in a special document that one frigate will cost Lithuania R94 million. This price seemed acceptable to the Lithuanian Fleet commanders, because prices for used ships on the world market are higher. They felt happy that they had found a common language with the Baltic Fleet command. Shortly after this, about two weeks later, Lieutenant E. Miliauskas was called to the office of Commander E. Nazelskis, first deputy national defense minister. Arriving there, E. Miliauskas also found "Selma" President V. Laurinavicius. E. Nazelskis, who had previously received the document concluded in Liepaja with the prices of the ships, ordered E. Miliauskas to rewrite the first page

bearing the prices. "I did this because I could not ignore my chief's order," said E. Miliauskas to RESPUBLIKA recalling those days. The KAM leaders began to persuade their subordinates immediately that inflation forced them to review the prices of ships. The subordinates found out later that the ministry was already paying R240 million instead of R94 million to "Selma." How? What does "Selma" have to do with this? There were no mediators in the Liepaja talks. An agreement on the sale of ships was reached. Was a mediator necessary to "launder" millions from the state's pocket?

On 21 October 1992, while Baltic Fleet Commander Y. Yegorov and Minister A. Butkevicius were confirming the statement of transfer of the ships to Lithuania, a meeting was held in Kaliningrad, which was attended by R. Baltuska, commander of the coast guard unit, and the aforementioned V. Mockus and E. Miliauskas. They discussed with the Baltic Fleet leadership that the ships be sailed to the wharf in Klaipeda in 10 days. Apart from the three KAM officials, the talks were also attended by "Selma" President V. Laurinavicius and his companions. [passage omitted]

Yesterday, we tried to talk to Mr. E. Nazelskis whom Prime Minister A. Slezevicius is sending for training to the Czech Republic. Sensing the topic of our conversation, E. Nazelskis categorically refused to speak with us.

Who armed Lithuania's national defense and how? Why Minister A. Butkevicius, who comes from Kaunas, chose "Selma" and its convicted president as a partner in buying arms, ships, and helicopters? What links Commander E. Nazelskis with the leaders of the Kaunas Mafia?...

Official on 'Useful' Foreign Property Talks

LD0501215494 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1616 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy and others]

[Text] Aleksandr Udaltsov, a senior Russian diplomat in charge of relations with the Baltics, told Interfax that the talks Russian Deputy Foreign Ministers Boris Pastukhov and Sergey Krylov held Tuesday with their Lithuanian counterpart Albinas Januska were regarded as useful in the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Udaltsov said that the talks covered the foreign property of Lithuania and Russia following the disintegration of the USSR and issues in the functioning of the Russian embassy in Vilnius and the Lithuanian embassy in Moscow.

He emphasized that it was the first time the two sides had discused "this delicate matter. ...One could not expect to have all the property issues settled in one day. What is important is that we have come to an understanding of the way these issues should be discussed."

The diplomat expressed the hope that in further talks, to be held in Vilnius shortly, the two sides will agree on the Lithuanian embassy buildings in Rome and Paris that had been taken over by the USSR in 1940. The Lithuanians want them back.

Another senior Russian Foreign Ministry official, who also handles Baltic issues, thinks that the outlook for solution of the "property issue" is "dim."

He told Interfax that there was no solution in sight for the problem of the Russian embassy in Vilnius. "We would like to purchase good premises using the cash Lithuania owes for supplies of natural gas but the Lithuanian authorities remain ambiguous on that," he said.

The diplomat also said that the Lithuanian ownership rights of numerous buildings in Moscow "are in serious doubt." In his words, Lithuanian diplomats have no documents confirming their rights to use premises they now hold.

He said that Russia owned the former Lithuanian embassy building in Rome "quite legally" while the situation in Paris was "more complicated and should become the subject of bilateral talks, especially because French authorities refused to act as arbiters."

Landsbergis Comments on NATO Membership Request

WS0601111594 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1844 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 408]

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 5—The right-wing opposition leader Vytautas Landsbergis made a statement concerning the official request for the membership in NATO:

"I hope that the West will notice the letter and request by Lithuanian president and Lithuania will stand next to Poland not only in the map, but in the list of candidates for NATO as well. Nobody can protest against that. We are striving for stability and security and this causes neither danger nor humiliation for anybody.

I also see that Lithuania's wish to become a member of NATO and its request do not contradict the agreement on Partnership For Peace. But the agreement on partnership will not serve as a substitute for conditions which should be fulfilled by Lithuania in order to become a member of NATO. This complies with the agreement on European security initiated by France and maintained by European Union.

It is very important that the process of peace and European consolidation in the Baltic region should not be disturbed by any non-democratic imperialistic forces".

Power Minister Claims Oil Problem Solved

LD0501204694 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] The oil problem has been solved, the minister of power engineering maintains. The Baltic News Service reported that Minister of Power Engineering Algimantas

Stasiukynas denied reports published by the press that the price for oil in the republic is artificially inflated.

The figures which he presented to the journalists today show that the petrol price is approximately the same as in Estonia, however, it is significantly cheaper than in Latvia or Belarus. Heating, fuel oil, and electric power are cheaper than in neighboring countries.

According to Algimantas Stasiukynas, there are no problems at the moment in getting fuel supplies. The problems appeared in November when Russia and other CIS countries were feverishly accumulating supplies for the winter, however, even then Lithuania did not buy fuel [as heard]. At the moment the reserve of fuel oil is 260,000 tons. If the present weather remains unchanged then this amount of fuel oil would be enough for approximately 50 days.

The minister said that since the Russian oil companies became commercial, purchasing oil products has been no problem. Last year, because of the difficult financial situation, only 50,000 tons of its own oil were refined by the Mazeikiai oil refinery Nafta; meanwhile 500,000 tons per month are needed by the enterprise to work at full capacity. Although it would cost $40 million, according to the minister we should look for possibilities for the enterprise to process its own oil. The products from its own oil would cost approximately 10 to 15 percent more, therefore, it is necessary to discuss how these products could become competitive with imported products.

The minister maintained that Lithuania has already received a proposal from the Russian oil companies to refine 20 million tons of oil, however, the oil from the Lukoil company has been delayed because export papers were not prepared in time.

Getting supplies of gas is a serious problem indeed. The minister said if an extreme situation emerges Lithuania could be left without gas supplies, because so far there is no alternative means of supplying gas.

The minister of power engineering stressed that in order to ease the problem of fuel supply Lithuania needs an oil terminal. This would allow the country to import cheaper oil, cause Russian oil companies to reduce the oil price, facilitate the export of fuel oil produced in Mazeikiai, and import cheaper oil products into Lithuania. He denied allegations that preparations for the construction of the oil terminal are being dragged out. On 15 January the results of the competition will be known and the foreign firms which took part in the competition will present their conclusions concerning the construction of the oil terminal in Liepaja.

According to the minister of power engineering there are many technical problems in Liepaja; however, international organizations would support Lithuania's decision to build the terminal there because the tendencies of Baltic integration are especially welcomed. In any case the construction of the oil terminal will start this spring, the minister of power engineering maintained.

Minister on Results of Crime Fighting in 1993

WS0401133194 Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 22 Dec 93 No. 247 p 6

[Report by Remigijus Barauskas: "A Temporary Illusion of Success in Combating the Mafia"]

[Text] After the adoption of the law on preventive detention, 58 groups of organized crime were identified and detained in Lithuania over a short time. "However, their removal has resulted in the annexation of their spheres of influence to other groups or to the establishment of new organizations. The fight against crime by police and legal measures alone produces a temporary illusion of success. If we do not eliminate the economic factors promoting crime, this fight may lose any sense," said Lithuanian Interior Minister Romasis Vaitekunas at a collegium meeting yesterday.

According to the minister, some leaders of criminal gangs in Vilnius, Kaunas, and Siauliai have emigrated and established contacts with international criminal organizations. According to Interpol reports, Lithuanian criminal groups have relations with those in the United States, Israel, Germany, Russia, and other countries. The list of criminals includes large-scale leaders of groups known both to Interpol and the police in different states. The key areas of Mafia activities are drug trafficking, trade in oil products and arms, money forgery, racketeering, prostitution, and gambling.

Resolute actions of the police in applying the law on preventive detention helped stabilize the criminal situation in the country. The rate of crime has dropped from 40 in early 1993 to 10 percent by the end of the year. Criminal police have uncovered one-third of the crimes. However, the fact that the number of violent crimes has increased considerably is worrisome. In comparison with last year, the number of recorded murders with premeditation and attempts to murder have increased by 53 and 76 percent, respectively. The criminals' aggressiveness and violence is growing. Firearms were used 127 times (or twice) more often than last year, and 124 explosions were registered this year. There are increasingly more attacks on policemen. In the opinion of the interior minister, trust in law enforcement institutions has risen, because the number of people informing the police about racketeers has increased five-fold.

R. Vaitekunas predicted that the level of crime should stabilize next year. Combating organized crime remains the key task of the police. This task should be facilitated by a law on control over criminal communities (or an anti-Mafia law) which is currently being drafted.

Farmers' Union Resolves To Strike 10 Feb

WS0601111794 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1844 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 408]

[Text] Kaunas, Jan 5—The Lithuanian Farmers' Union adopted a resolution to start a strike on February 10. The

union threatened to go on strike several times last year, but every time a compromise was reached after the negotiations with the government. The main demand presented by the organizers of the strike is to increase produce purchase prices, to solve the problems of settlements with processing enterprises and their monopoly.

Professor Jonas Ciulevicius, chairman of the union, said that a quarter of 4,000 agricultural companies should go bankrupt this year because of the high purchase prices.

"The preparation for the strike have brought some positive results. Some milk processing enterprises pay the prices we required, however, this is not the achievment of the government. We will try to influence the government through the milk processing industry in order the demands of farmers to be fulfilled", Ciulevicius said.

The questions of supplying hospitals and kindergartens with milk and its products during the days of the strike were discussed at the meeting of the union.

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